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I. INTRODUCTION

Victims of medical accidents traditionally have resorted to a
cause of action in negligence to obtain damages for their injuries.
There is an ongoing expansion of liability caused by a subtle erosion of negligence as the basis for recovery, first through the broad
application of res ipsa loquitur and later through the growth of
the doctrine of informed consent, causing movement toward a system of strict liability for medical accidents. Recently there even
have been some head-on assaults on the citidel of negligence to replace it with strict liability as the basis for recovery in medical
accident cases. The informed-consent doctrine has been responsible
for the greatest portion of the erosion of negligence, because informed consent is closely akin to strict liability in tort. While this
development presages greater equity for medical-accident victims,
it threatens to undermine some of the important functions of the
informed-consent doctrine.
Medical patients whose treatment' has not brought them their
hoped-for succor, and who have in fact been harmed rather than
healed by the medical 2 intervention, have had a legal remedy available to them in negligence. 3 However, not all individuals who have
experienced "bad results"' 4 from the medical intervention have been
1. The term "treatment" will be used broadly to include not only those
medical procedures that are intended to ameliorate illness and injury,
but also diagnostic procedures designed to determine the nature of the
disorder and the appropriate course of treatment.
2. The terms "medical" and "medicine" are used herein to include treatment that might more properly be characterized as surgical, dental, or
podiatrical. The same general principles of liability apply, however,
regardless of the characterization of the treatment. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; see, e.g., Simpson v. Davis, - Kan. -, 549 P.2d 950
(1976).
3. Other civil causes of action, in addition to negligence, may be brought
against physicians for misfeasance or nonfeasance. Abandonment,
assault and battery, breach of contract, deceit, and miscellaneous other
charges form the basis for action against physicians. See generally 1
D. LouIsELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE I 8.08-.13 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & WILLIAMS]; Smith, Antecedent
Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 ROCKY MT.L. REv.
233 (1942). The great bulk of cases against physicians, however, involve allegations of negligent medical treatment, or what is usually
referred to as "malpractice."
4. The problem of defining "bad results" is exceedingly complex. The
term may be defined from the patient's perspective, from the physician's, or from the perspective of the larger medical profession (i.e.,
the so-called "experts" in a particular area of medicine). It may be
viewed in terms of a deviation from an expected outcome if the best
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able to avail themselves of this remedy. When an individual cannot demonstrate medical negligence,5 no remedy has been available.
Thus, a situation existed in which two individuals with identical,
bad results from their medical treatment might be treated differently in terms of a legal remedy. The one who could demonstrate
available treatment had been accorded, if the generally accepted treatment had been accorded, or by comparison with the outcome in similar
cases. Further complicating the problem is the consideration that the
patient is ordinarily ill or injured before he seeks medical treatment;
thus the bad results that would have resulted had no medical intervention occurred must be distinguished from those arising from the medical intervention (what is referred to as "iatrogenic" disease). See
generally 1 LouisELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, 118.07. Some medical
procedures are, however, performed on healthy persons, notably in the
case of "normal" volunteers for medical experimentation. See Silverstein, Compensating Those Injured Through Experimentation, 33 FED.
B.J. 322 (1974). In addition, some medical procedures are performed
preventively on persons who are not ill or injured.
The present discussion is concerned only with the bad results that
are the consequence of medical acts or omissions (whether negligent
or not), and not with the bad results from illnesses or injuries for
which the patient originally sought medical attention. Although this
is a viable conceptual distinction, it is often quite difficult in practice
to separate the bad results of medical care from those that would have
materialized had no medical care been obtained at all See authorities
cited note 244 infra. Bad results not caused by medical negligence are
not presently compensable, although they might be under a program
of national health insurance or social insurance generally. See Bernstein, "No-Fault" Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand,
in U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THm SEcRETARY's CoMMInSSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 836 (App. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. Such injuries may be

compensable, however, even in theory, where there is proof that medical negligence on the part of the physician is the "intervening" cause
of the bad results. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF
TORTS § 20.5(5) (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMtES]; 1
LOuISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, 8.07; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 44.

r

5. Throughout this paper, the shorthand phrase "medical negligence" is
used to apply to those acts or omissions of physicians that traditionally
are grounds for liability in negligence. Such negligence may take several specific forms. The classic malpractice case of Pike v. Honsinger,
155 N.Y. 201, 209-10, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898), lists several specific species of negligent medical practice: (1) failure to possess a reasonable
degree of learning and skill; (2) failure to exercise reasonable care
and diligence in the exercise of skill; (3) failure to use best judgment
in the exercise of skill and application of knowledge; (4) failure to
keep abreast of development in medicine; and (5) departure from gensupra
erally used approved methods. See also 1 LouIsELL & W L-vs,
note 3, f 8.04.
This definition of medical negligence excludes the more recently
recognized duty of a doctor to make disclosure of '"material" information to the patient before treating, known as "informed consent." The
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negligence might obtain substantial monetary compensation not
only for his out-of-pocket expenses, but also for his pain and suffering, while the other would walk away empty-handed. In fact, a
more seriously injured patient might obtain no compensation while
a less seriously injured one who could convince a jury that the medical procedure had been performed negligently, would be entitled
to compensation.
There are two ways in which a medical accident may be caused.
Some accidents result from the physician's negligence-that is, from
his failure to adhere to accepted standards of practice, or his failure
to possess or exercise the requisite degree of skill or care in carrying
out the medical procedure. Other medical accidents may result
from what may be referred to as "statistical risks."6 That is, there
reason for this exclusion is that courts are increasingly coming to the

realization that the determination of whether or not information is material does not require the special expertise of a physician. See pp.
97-98 infra. Thus, breach of this duty is not "medical" negligence.
There is also some question as to whether the cause of action for in-

formed consent is properly brought in negligence or in trespass. See
note 111 infra.

6. What is referred to herein as a "statistical risk" is the same as the "unavoidable accident" of classic tort law-that is, even in the exercise of
due care, the accident could not have been avoided. See PaossER, supra note 2, § 29. This is similar to what Louisell and Williams refer
to as one of the meanings in medicine of "calculated risk":
In the first sense, "calculated risk" usually defines a procedure which is considered to carry an inherent probability
that a bad result will occur in a more or less fixed percentage
of cases

. . .

whether or not there is negligence; hence when-

ever a bad result occurs it is likely to be designated as one of
an "irreducible minimum" number. Calculated risks sometimes are actually figured out on a statistical basis, with substantial numbers of cases reviewed as the basis of the calculation. On the other hand, the expression simply may cloak
merely subjective impressions that some poor results inevitably occur in certain procedures, and thus be without statistical
foundation for which analysis of cases, negligent or otherwise,
is essential.
19.02, at 568 (footnotes
2 LouISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3,
omitted).
A physician is not required to exercise the highest degree of care,
but merely the reasonable care and skill usually possessed by physicians of the same school and locality. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis.
2d 569, 584, 207 N.W.2d 297, 305 (1973). See generally 1 LOUISELL &
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, I 8.04-.06. Thus, the term "statistical risk"
as used herein includes both those bad results that would have occurred not merely if the defendant-physician had failed to possess and
exercise the highest degree of skill, but also those resulting from a
failure to possess and exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care.
An example of a "truly unpreventable complication" is the risk of
hepatitis from a blood transfusion. See Comment, Blood Transfusions
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is some risk that any procedure, even when performed in compliance with the generally accepted manner of performing the activity,
may fail to yield the intended result or also may yield a bad result.7
As long as the physician's conduct conforms to what is generally
accepted among individuals of like training and experience, the
courts have been unwilling to say that he should have behaved differently.8 The fact remains that in medicine, as in all human
pursuits, things often do not turn out the way they are supposed
to even when all procedures are performed in a commonly accepted
way.9
and the Transmission of Serum Hepatitis: The Need for Statutory
Reform, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 367, 368 (1975).
7.
People are normally hurt by a simple, traumatic blow of one
kind or another, but when a doctor begins prescribing drugs or
rummaging around a patient's insides, infinitely greater possibilities of adverse effects arise. The origins of much ill health
are so obscure that strictly non-negligent medical treatment
may provoke untoward physiological responses.
T. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 72 (1975). See also HEW,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supranote 4, at 22, 24.
8. See Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 462-63, 138 A.2d 902, 905 (1958);
Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505, 510-11 (Mo. 1958); Gore v.
Brockman, 119 S.W. 1082 (Mo. 1909); Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash.
2d 369, 375, 387 P.2d 527, 531 (1963).
Permitting the medical profession in effect to establish the legal
standard by which the adequacy of its performance is measured may
have the effect of encouraging (or at least failing to discourage) the
"inadvertence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring and corner-cutting that normally is associated with negligence." PROSSE, supra note
2, § 33, at 167. See also pp. 135 et seq. infra.
Of course, the victims of "statistical risk" medical accidents may
bring suit under a negligence theory alleging that their injury resulted
from medical negligence. The determination that the injury actually
resulted from a "statistical risk" is never explicitly made. The conclusion is an inferential determination based upon the plaintiff-patient's
inability to convince the trier of fact that the physician has performed
in a negligent manner. See HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTxCF, supra note 4,
at 22-24.
9. See, e.g., Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961) (in approximately 2% of thyroidectomies, there is damage to the recurrent
laryngeal nerves resulting in loss of voice, even in the absence of negligence).
The fact that there is a statistical risk of something going wrong
even in the absence of negligence may merely be another way of stating that we are unable to explain why the bad results occurred. As
the understanding of a particular procedure and of human physiology
increases, a new, accepted way of performing the procedure may
evolve, and either eliminate or reduce the statistical risk of bad results. In any event, there are times when things "go wrong" and we
are unwilling to ascribe the cause to the failing of a particular individual.
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The true medical accident-bad results caused by the medical
intervention-must be distinguished from the pain, suffering, and
poor results that are traceable directly to the patient's underlying
illness or injury. Because medical procedures generally are not
performed on individuals who are not already ill or injured, the
problem of separating the bad results caused by the medical
treatment from the bad results that would have occurred without
medical intervention can be quite difficult in practice.' 0
The compensation of only those medical-accident victims whose
injuries are attributable to negligent medical care may be seriously
at odds with common contemporary notions of fairness." The inMedical accidents resulting from negligence or from statistical risks
might both be said to occur because the procedure was performed in
the "wrong" way. The difference between the two cases is that in
negligence, it is generally known what the "right" way is; with statistical risks, a means of preventing the accident has not yet been developed. An alternative view would hold that in some activities, there
is an irreducible minimum number of accidents, which may vary with
the state of the art, but will never disappear entirely.
The explanation for a medical accident arising from a statistical
risk may be a peculiarity of a particular patient's physiology or
anatomy, about which the physician could not have known. Alternatively, the explanation may be that medical knowledge has not yet Advanced to the point of understanding why the outcome in this particular case differs from the result that is to be expected. There is an unwillingness to denominate an action as negligent when a respectable
body of medical opinion does not prescribe a different course of action.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. In an age when fairness was seen exclusively as a matter of the relative degrees of wrongdoing of the victim and the injurer, 2 HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 4, § 13.2, at 761-62, like cases were treated similarly
by shifting the loss from the victim to the injurer only when the injurer was guilty of wrongdoing. In other words, fairness would be
achieved by treating differently cases involving similar injuries, so
long as cases involving a "wrongful" cause of the harm were treated
similarly.
To the extent that fairness has increasingly been viewed as including not just the parties to the lawsuit, but the larger society as well,
the precept of treating like cases similarly acquires a new meaning.
Id. at 761-63. The question of whether or not there has been "personal
moral shortcoming," id. at 762, on the part of the injurer is increasingly being viewed as irrelevant in determining whether cases are
"like." We are more inclined to look at the outcome of the interaction
between the victim and the injurer before determining whether the
cases are alike. See J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, at 65. Equally important, the societal interests in the cases must be taken into account

before determining whether they are "like."

[W]hile no social good may come from the mere shifting of
a loss, society does benefit from the wide and regular distribution of losses, taken alone. The administration of losses in
this way may entirely change evaluations of what is fair. If
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equity arising from one individual being denied compensation while
another with identical injuries obtains recompense has created an
impetus for the courts to find ways of compensating victims of medical accidents without regard to whether negligent conduct or a
"statistical risk" was responsible for the accident. While complete
12
compensation has not and may never be achieved, the courts gradually have modified the rules under which compensation is awarded
to medical-accident Victims so as to reduce the likelihood of individuals with substantial injuries going uncompensated while others
with less serious injuries receive compensation.
The result of the courts' efforts has been to increase the availability of compensation to victims of medical accidents.' 3 Less noticeable, but of far greater fundamental significance, is that the
trend of the decisions slowly has and almost imperceptibly been
toward the creation of a judicially fashioned system of strict liabilty for medical accidents. This trend is composed of three distinct
movements. First, there has been a movement toward strict liability engendered by the application of res ipsa loquitur in medicalaccident cases. This has produced a subtle erosion of the negligence
a certain type of loss is the more or less inevitable by-product
of a desirable but dangerous form of activity it may be just
to distribute such losses among all the beneficiaries of the activity though it would be unjust to visit them severally upon
those individuals who had happened to be the faultless instruments causing them.
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 13.2, at 763 (footnotes omitted).
The societal interest in accident cases includes, however, more than
merely an equitable distribution of the losses occasioned by accidents.
There is also legitimate concern with the efficient use of resources, or
more specifically with the minimization of the costs of accidents-that
is, the costs of avoiding accidents in the first instance, the costs of paying compensation to the victims of accidents that cannot or have not
been prevented, and the costs of administering a system that attempts
both to avoid accidents and to compensate accident victims. See G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AcciDENTS 26-31 (1970); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972). But see Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537 (1972); authorities cited note 255 infra. In this context, it
no longer always suffices to say that the accident victim should bear
the loss unless it can be demonstrated that the injurer's wrongful conduct caused the loss.
12. Theoretically, complete compensation of accident victims could be obtained. See note 26 infra. But total loss-spreading faces several practical obstacles. The cost of operating a compensation system that
spreads all losses would probably be prohibitive, and the problem of
defining what an "accident" is will pose other practical barriers. Cf.
note 244 infra.
13. Oelsner, Jury Awards Going Up in PersonalInjury Suits, N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1975, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.).
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requirement. Starting later, there has been a more direct circumvention of the requirement of medical negligence to impose liability
through the use of the informed-consent doctrine. Finally, there
have been a few direct assaults in recent years on the negligence
requirement in medical-accident litigation.
The battle over strict liability for medical accidents, as well as
for other types of accidents, 14 is but one of the fronts'1 in the war
being waged against a system of compensating accident victims
which is rooted in a philosophy of classical liberalism, nurtured by
a laissez-faire economic system,' 6 and legitimized by the moral posture that the losses from injuries must be borne by the individual
upon whom they have fallen unless they have been occasioned by
another's blameworthiness.' 7 While the black-letter rules remain
basically the same-that is, the plaintiff patient must demonstrate
that medical negligence caused the injury-the interpretation and
application of the rules is such that today the medical-accident victim stands a far greater chance of fitting his case within them, and
thus obtaining compensation, than in the past.
This article will examine the various ways in which the courts
have been fashioning rules of liability for medical accidents that
add up to an incipient system of strict liability. This examination
will concentrate on the broader strategic advances. The road'toward strict liability has not been without its detours.' 8 It is the
obvious judicial circumlocutions, which appear necessitated by the
inability of the courts under existing rules of law to award com14. See Section II infra.
15. See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, § 81. (discussion of other judicial and legislative applications of the principles of strict liability).
16. See generally 1 HARPER & JAA s, supra note 4, at xxvii et seq.; 2 id.
§ 12.3, at 752.
The general principle of our law is that loss from accident
17.
must lie where it falls .. .. "All the cases concede that an
injury arising from . . . an act that ordinary human care and
foresight are unable to guard against, is but the misfortune
of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for legal responsibility." If this were not so, any act would be sufficient, however
remote, which set in motion or opened the door for a series
The reof physical consequences ending in damage ....
quirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant
should have made a choice. But the only possible purpose of
introducing this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability.
O.W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (M. Howe ed. 1963) (footnotes
18.

omitted).

The law did not begin with a theory. It has never worked one
out. The point from which it started and that at which I shall
try to show that it has arrived, are on different planes. In the
progress from one to the other, it is to be expected that its

course should not be straight and its direction not always visi-
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pensation to severely injured medical-accident victims, that are our
main area of concern, and not the routine application of well-established general principles to novel situations of fact.
II. THE WAR ON NEGLIGENCE
The judicial movement toward strict liability for medical accidents is not an isolated occurrence. Aided by both legislative and
judicial armaments, similar activity has been taking place in other
areas of accident law since at least the beginning of the present
century. 19 Although liability without fault, or strict liability, 20 has
been known to the common law for certain civil wrongs for many
centuries,21 a landmark development was the enactment of no-fault
22
insurance for employment-related injuries in the early 1900'S.

More recently, strict liability has come of age in the law of products liability, culminating in the adoption in the American Law Institute's Restatement Second of Torts of a strict products liability
24
provision,23 and its rapid adoption in numerous jurisdictions.

19.

20.

21.
22.

ble. All that can be done is to point out a tendency, and to
justify it.
Id. at 63.
See J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw or TORTS 13-20 (1967);
1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at xxix-xLiv; 2 id. at 785-870 (1956
& Supp. 1968); PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 76, 96-99. See also O'Connell,
It's Time for No Fault for All Kinds of Injuries, 60 A.B.A.J. 1070
(1974).
Prosser distinguishes two different senses of the word fault-moral
wrongdoing, and departure from what is required by law. He therefore prefers to speak of "strict liability," rather than "liability without
fault," the former involving the imposition of liability as a means of
"allocating a more or less inevitable loss... upon the party best able
to shoulder it." PRossR, supranote 2, § 75, at 495.
Id. § 75, at 492-93.
See generally S. HOROWTZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WOR-MEN'S
COMPENSATION LAws (1944); A. LARsON, THE LAW OF WoRxnIEN's
COMPENSATION

(1966); W.

SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S

COM-

PENSATION (3d or perm. ed. 1941).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

24. Section 402A seems merely to have stated baldly what had been more
or less the case for quite a while.
[A]ll of the trouble lay with the one word "warranty," which
had been from the outset only a rather transparent device to
accomplish the desired result of strict liability .... Why not,
then, talk of the strict liability in tort, a thing familiar enough
in the law . .. and discard the word "warranty" with all its
contract implications?
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REv. 791, 802 (1966). See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCT'S LIABILITY § 16A[3], at 3-248 n.2 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN]; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 98, at 657 n.54 (collecting cases in other jurisdictions following § 402A).
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There also has been substantial interest in strict liability for automobile accidents, though the activity here as in workmen's compensation at the beginning of this century has been legislative rather
than judicial. Some optimistic proponents of strict liability view
it as a possible panacea for a variety of social ills,25 and one com-

mon-law jurisdiction has taken a substantial step toward the26adoption of a comprehensive social insurance system for accidents.
Prosser appropriately characterized the judicial efforts to adopt
strict liability in a military metaphor. In 1960, reporting on the
progress then occurring on the products-liability front, he sent a
dispatch proclaiming that:
One major bastion, that of negligence liability, has been carried
long since, and its guns turned inward upon the defenders. Another, that of the strict liability of the seller of food and drink,
is hard pressed and sore beset, and may even now be tottering to
its fall. Elsewhere along the battlements there have been minor
breaches made, but the defense is yet stout. War correspondents
with the beleaguering army are issuing daily bulletins, proclaiming
that the seige is all but over. From within the walls comes the
cry, not so; we have but begun to fight. Watchman, what of the
night? 27

Six years later, Prosser reported on the fall of the citadel:
The fall of a citadel is a dramatic moment....
In the field of products liability, the date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed with some certainty. It was May 9,
25. See J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7; O'Connell, supra note 19.
26. See Accident Compensation Act, 1972, no. 43, 1 N.Z. STAT. 521. For
a discussion of this act see Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New
Zealand and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 653 (1975); Palmer, Abolishing the Personal Injury Tort System: The New Zealand Experience, 9 ALTA. L. REv. 169 (1971); Palmer,
Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common Law
in New Zealand, 21 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1973); Palmer & Lemons,
Toward the Disappearanceof Tort Law: New Zealand's Compensation Plan, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 693; BRIT. MED. J., Nov. 29, 1975, at 529.
A less ambitious form of social insurance seeks to provide compen-

sation for the victims of crimes. Here, of course, the effort has been
not to substitute strict liability for negligence as a basis for obtaining
compensation, but to provide compensation where often, as a practical
matter, none was obtainable. In 1963, New Zealand passed the first
contemporary system for compensating victims of crime, and Great
Britain followed in 1964. H. EDELHERTz & G. GEIs, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VIcTIMs OF CRIM 11 (1974). In the United States, 7 states
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey,
and New York) had, by 1974, enacted programs of social insurance for
victims of crimes. The experience under these state programs is discussed in detail in H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEis, supra at 21-187.
27. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
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1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. The leaguer had
been an epic one of more than fifty years. The sister fortress of
negligence liability had fallen, after an equally prolonged defense,
in 1916. Much sapping and mining had finally carried a whole
south wing of the strict liability citadel, involving food and drink;
and further inroads had been made into an adjoining area of products for what might be called intimate bodily use, such as hair dye
and cosmetics. Heavy artillery had made no less than eight major
breaches in the main wall, all of them still stoutly defended.
case...
Then came the 2Herningsen
8
The citadel fell.
O'Connell, in writing about strict liability for automobile accidents,
adopted Prosser's military metaphor:
No-fault auto insurance seems to have come of age. If so, no
army of trial attorneys or timid insurance executives will be able
to halt its progress. Recognition grows daily that the theory of
as applied to all automobile accidents is intellectually
negligence
29
inert.
The battles over products liability and automobile accidents have
progressed to a substantial degree, and though they are not clearly
won, victories seem assured primarily by judicial incursions in the
case of products liability, while the inroads on the fault requirement
in automobile accidents have been secured through legislative ad-

vances.3 0 While both of these assaults have been progressing, an28. Prosser, supra note 24, at 791-93.
29. O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. Rsv. 749 (1973). Although adopting Prosser's military metaphor, O'Connell has characterized Prosser's style as "pretentious." See id. at 760.
30. By May 1975, 23 states (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia)
had enacted no-fault automobile insurance in some form. NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER Co., FIRE CASUALTY & SURETY BuLLETnis-AuTo (CAsUIn addition, several no-fault bills were inALTY), at Nc-1 to Ny-6.

troduced in the 93d and 94th Congresses. See S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 1606, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 354, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); LR. 10, 358, 1400, 1680, 4023, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); H.R. Con. Res. 116, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 285, 1272,
1900, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Commentators have disagreed on the consequences of no-fault automobile insurance. Compare Lubasch, The Early Returns on NoFault Insurance Show It's Working, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 4, at 6,
col. 4 (city ed.), with Lindsey, No-Fault Insurance Failing to Cut
Rates, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). See also
Widiss, Accident Victims Under No-Fault Insurance: A Massachusetts
Survey, 61 IowA L. REv. 1 (1975).
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other has also progressed almost unnoticed. Though much has been
written about this battle, few if any have viewed it as a part of
the same war. 1
31. The last few years, especially 1975, have seen much comment in the
lay, professional, and scholarly presses, about a malpractice "crisis."
A crisis, however, has been warned of for more than a quarter of a
century. See L.

REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW

7 (2d ed.

1949). The response of the medical profession, judging at least by the
titles of some recent articles in medical journals, has often been histrionic. See, e.g., Downey, Medical Malpractice Bares Its Fangs at Hospitals, and Its Venom May Prove Deadly, 3 MoD. HEALTH CARE 21
(June, 1975); Perry, Are We at Armageddon?, 62 J. FLA. Mxn. ASS'N

34 (1975); Hunter & Conroy, Malpractice Fever-A Social Disease, 61 J. FLA. MED. Ass'N 866 (1974). Professor Curran claims that
"there may have been some basis for a charge of 'crying wolf' too often in the past about malpractice litigation, but it is now clear that the
most chronic problem of all, rising insurance premiums and inadequate insurance coverage, has become, in 1975, a genuine national
economic crisis." Curran, Malpractice Insurance: A Genuine National
Crisis,292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1223 (1975).

Although the cost and availability of malpractice insurance have
become serious problems in many parts of the country-so serious in
fact that physicians have engaged in strikes over the issue, see Am.
Med. News, June 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1-medical practice seems to be continuing in much the same way as it did before the "crisis," though
some physicians have chosen to practice without insurance, Altman,
Alaska Doctors Work Uninsured, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1975, at 49, col.
1, a practice referred to by doctors as "going bare." See Am. Med.
News, Sept. 27, 1976, Impact Section, at 5, col. 1.
In response to this "crisis," many states have attempted piecemeal
procedural or substantive reforms of medical malpractice laws. This
legislation is summarized in

NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH, HEALTH POLICY CENTER, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, LEGISLATIVE BRIEFS-HIGHLIGHTS OF ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION (1975)
(up-

dates available from National Center for Health Services Research,
5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, Md. 20852), and in LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, PuBLIC AFFAIRS DIVISION, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOcIATION, 3
STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT, October, 1975. See also Comment,
An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1417. There have been numerous proposals
for reform, many of which include some form of "no-fault" liability.
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
590, 598 n.25 (1973), and Defense Research Institute, Medical Malpractice Position Paper, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 59 (1975), contain bibliographies of such proposals.
A few commentators, however, have realized that a system of strict
liability has been developing for some time. See, e.g., 2 HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 4, § 17.1, at 58-59 n.15 (Supp. 1968):
The pressure of hardship from [the conspiracy of silence] and
other sources has induced counsel, courts, and occasionally
legislatures to use their ingenuity in alleviating it by inventing or expanding rules which will either circumvent, or help
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The battle over liability for medical accidents has been waged
almost exclusively on the judicial battleground. 82 Despite this similarity with the battle on the products-liability front, the tactics
employed have been quite different. The products-liability battle
has been fought in the traditional style with opposing armies using
conventional warfare: sharply drawn lines of attack, battles fought
in the open, and war correspondents reporting regularly. The battle over medical accidents has not even been discussed as such.
Rather, it has been a battle waged with guerilla tactics. Camouflage
has been employed heavily by all the contending forces so that the
battle has been waged at first in terms of "malpractice" and "res
ipsa loquitur" but more recently with the weapon of "informed consent," which probably explains why the war correspondents have
failed to notice that this battle is part of a larger war.
It is time to look closely and forthrightly at what has been happening, and by pulling back the shroud of secrecy imposed by the
censors in the war department, to show the battle for what it is:
another front in the assault on the fault requirement."3
III. THE FAULT SYSTEM AND MEDICAL ACCIDENTS:
THE GATHERING STORM
The earliest efforts to facilitate the compensation of medical accident victims without regard to medical negligence took place
within the negligence framework. The efforts were aimed,, at least
the plaintiff to meet, the requirement. These are of various
kinds and include...
(4) [i]nvoking a substantive law theory which may not be
dependent on medical testimony, notably the doctrine of informed consent.
See also Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Move Toward Strict Liability, 21 Loy. L. REv. 194 (1975).
32. Recently, several state legislatures have enacted statutes codifyingand attempting to restrict-the judicially created doctrine of informed
consent. See note 97 infra.
33. It is not only in the context of medical accidents that there has been
a notable lack of forthrightness:
Frequently, when the courts have been unwilling to say
outright that the defendant is liable without negligence, something approaching this result has been accomplished by the
creation of presumptions. .

.

. In some cases, at whose num-

ber one may only guess, where there has in fact been no negligence but the defendant is unable to prove it, this will arrive
at the same result as strict liability.
PaossEn, supra note 2, § 81, at 539-40 (footnotes omitted). See also J.
FRANK, LAw AND THEn MODERN MIND 338-50 & passim (Anchor Books
ed. 1963) (discussing legal fictions).
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ostensibly, at lowering a practical barrier to proving that medical
negligence had caused the plaintiff's injuries.
In order to secure a favorable verdict, the medical-accident victim must, of course, demonstrate that the defendant strayed from
the recognized standard of care in the profession. 34 This imposes
upon the plaintiff the burden of establishing first what the professional standard of care is in any given case, and then the fact of
the defendant's departure therefrom. Because, generally, the only
acceptable manner of proof of the standard of care is the testimony
of another physician, 35 it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to secure
this testimony in order to survive a dismissal of the action.
This requirement has often posed an insurmountable obstacle
to the medical-accident victim, who routinely has been met with
the unwillingness of one physician to provide evidence which might
impose liability upon a colleague. What aptly has been dubbed "the
conspiracy of silence"3 6 has effectively prevented numerous medicalaccident victims from prevailing at trial, and probably has deterred
numerous others from instituting litigation. 3 This unwillingness
8.04; PROSSER, supra note 2,
34. 1 LoUIsaLL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3,
§ 32, at 161-63.
35. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 32, at 164. Only "[w]here the matter is
regarded as within the common knowledge of laymen ... [may] the
jury ...
infer negligence without the aid of any expert." Id. at
164-65. See also pp. 98-99, 135-38 infra.
36. See generally Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent
Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv. 250, 254-57 (1956); Kayajanian,
Confronting the Conspiracy of Silence: We Have a Tiger by the Tail,
6 U.W.L.A.L. REv. 40 (1974); Kelner, The Silent Doctors-The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 119 (1970); Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U. OF AM. L.
REV. 158 (1966); Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence":
Statutory and Common-Law Innovations, 45 MINN. L. REv. 1019
(1961); Comment, Medical Malpractice-The "Locality Rule" and the
"Conspiracy of Silence," 22 S.C.L. REv. 810 (1970). For a Canadian
view of the problem see Grange, The Silent Doctor v. The Duty to
Speak, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 81 (1973).
37. Because medical-accident litigation is often lengthy, expensive, and
uncertain, Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975); J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, at
29-47, the fault system probably deters many persons or their attorneys from bringing lawsuits. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC
A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE
INSTITUTIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
In addition,
COMPENSATION AND QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4 (1971).
countless other medical-accident victims, who are not even aware that
their condition has been occasioned or worsened by the medical intervention, never seek compensation. Id.; Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69, 73.
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stems in part from the desire of organized medicine to protect its
good name, not by aiding in weeding out incompetent practitioners
as might be hoped, 38 but by pressuring physicians to "protect" other
physicians by their silence. Still other pressure is applied by insurance companies whose motivation in silencing physicians is their
own financial well-being, and whose power stems from their ability
to cancel or refuse to renew the professional liability insurance of
a physician who breaks the rule and offers testimony. 9
However, plaintiffs' ingenuity and judicial receptivity have combined to circumvent this barrier to compensation, especially where
the manifest unfairness to the plaintiff of denying compensation
for egregious injuries could not be overlooked, primarily 40 through
38. See, e.g., Brody, Incompetent Surgery is Found Not Isolated, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.); Rensberger, Few Doctors
Ever Report Colleagues' Incompetence, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1976, at 1,
col. 1 (city ed.); Wilford, A.M.A. Disputes, but Others Praise,Series
About Incompetent Physicians, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1
(city ed.). See also Rensberger, Death of 2 Doctors Poses a Fitness
Issue, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.); Rensberger,
Unfit Doctors Create Worry in Profession, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976,
at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). Nor is it clear that the governmental agencies
charged with policing the medical profession are able to perform the
task properly. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1976, at 23, col. 1 (city ed.);
HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 52.

39. L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968), noted
in 11 B.C. IxD. & CoM. L. REV. 545 (1970), 54 IowA L. Rnv. 649
(1969), 63 Nw. U.L. Rv. 873 (1969), 47 TEXAS L. Ray. 152 (1968), 17

U. KAN. L. REV. 540 (1969), and 37 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 154 (1969). See
also Carlson, Suing the Doctor,Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
40. Two other barriers to obtaining compensation within the negligence
framework-the statute of limitations and the "locality rule," see note

41 infra-have also been the subjects of substantial attack in the last

few decades.
In medical-accident litigation, where the harm that the plaintiff experiences from a medical accident often does not manifest itself for a
considerable time after the medical procedure has been performed, the
statute of limitations is likely to present a significant barrier to bringing any action at all. If the statute begins to run at the time the medical procedure is performed, the statute may have expired before the
patient is aware that he had bedn harmed by the procedure, or before
he begins to suspect that the cause of his difficulties may lie in the

physician's negligence. See generally 1 LouIsELL & WnLIAms, supra
note 3, § 13; PRossER, supra note 2, § 30, at 144 n.54; Harper, Texas
Adopts the Discovery Rule for Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY's L.J. 77 (1969); Sacks, Statutes of Limitations and
Undiscovered Malpractice,16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 65 (1967). Plaintiffs'
attempts to escape its application have had mixed results. There has
been a modicum of success in invoking the argument that when a physician commits a negligent act and continues to treat the patient, the
physician is also negligent in failing to take efforts to remedy the
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the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The almost uniform unwillingness
of the local medical colleagues of the defendant to offer evidence
on behalf of medical-accident victims could not be entirely vitiated
by modification or outright abolition of the locality rule.4 1 Where
original negligence, and the "continuing negligence" tolls the statute.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963);
Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Frazor v. Osborne,
57 Tenn. App. 10, 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966) (collecting cases). Some
courts have softened the impact of the statute considerably by interpreting it to commence running when the patient "discovers" that he
has suffered an injury. Under this so-called "discovery rule," the
plaintiff does, however, have the duty to use reasonable care to discover the existence of an injury. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d
563 (1973); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Hays
v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Olsen v. St. Croix Valley Memorial Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972). See generally A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTiCE LAw 322-23 (1975); 1 LouisELL &
WILLAMS, supra note 3, 13.11, at 382.
41. Originally, the standard of care required of a physician did not allow
for the geographical locale in which he practiced medicine. See McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853). But an early modification of
the rule established as the standard of care "that skill only which physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability and skill practicing in similar
localities with opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily possess." Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880), overruled, Brune
v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
Adopted largely out of concern for rural physicians, whose access
to and knowledge of new developments in medical care was thought
to be iihnited, Small v. Howard, supra at 136, the locality rule had the
consequence of requiring medical-accident victims seeking judicial redress to establish the standard of care using, as an expert witness, an
individual living in the same locality as the defendant. In rural communities, where there may have been no physician other than the defendant, this was often an impossible task. Even if there were other
physicians, their friendship with the defendant, or fear of retaliation
in kind from him if they testified, often made them virtually unavailable.
The harsh effect of the locality rule encouraged the courts to devise
means of circumventing it without formally eliminating it. Waltz, The
Rise and GradualFall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 408, 411-15 (1969); Comment, Locality and

Standard of Care of Medical Practitioners,25 ARK. L. Rnv. 169, 17275 (1971). Some courts extended the geographic borders of the "same
locality." See, e.g., Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3-4, 85 P.2d
505, 506 (2d Dist. 1938); Pelky v. Palmer, 109 Mich. 561, 563, 67 N.W.
561 (1896); McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 602, 606, 29 S.E. 354, 35556 (1898). Others have redefined the "same locality" to mean the
"same medical locality." See, e.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 37273 (Ky. 1970); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 72, 121 A.2d 669, 672-73
(1956); Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 375-77, 387 P.2d 527,
531-32 (1963). Courts have also permitted the plaintiff to establish
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the rule could be breached, there still remained the problems of
locating a medical expert witness from some other area who would
be willing to testify, as well as the expense of litigation when dealing with a nonlocal expert witness. Even when an expert witness
could be obtained to testify, there still was no guarantee that
the witness would be able to provide convincing evidence that
the defendant's negligence had been the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.
Under specified circumstances, the plaintiff, through reliance
upon res ipsa loquitur, may have an opportunity to get his case
to the jury without introducing expert evidence of the defendant's
negligence. The strict statement of the appropriate circumstances
for the operation of the doctrine is stated by one court as follows:
The test almost uniformly applied to determine whether the
doctrine applies in malpractice suits is whether all the ultimate
facts alleging negligence, or some of them, are required to be established by expert testimony; or whether "* * * a layman is able

to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation that the
consequences of professional treatment were not such as ordinarily
would have followed if due care had been exercised." 42
the standard of care through interrogation of the defendant-doctor, see
Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz. App. 413, 533 P.2d 721 (1975); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520
S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), or through the use of medical treatises. Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968); Lewandoski v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 76, 146 N.W.2d 505, 509
(1966). But cf. Hickok v. G.D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444 (10th Cir.
1974).
Today when the defendant is a medical specialist, a national standard is generally applied. A. HOLDER, supra note 40, at 56-57. In 1916,
the Minnesota supreme court recognized that the original rationale for
the locality rule, if ever valid, had ceased to be compelling, see Viita
v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 137, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081 (1916). The locality rule, though not dead, is certainly on the wane. See Nortell, Medicolegal Rounds-Leading Cases, 235 J.A.M.A. 1614 (1976); Waltz, supra. But see LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794 (A) (1) (Supp. 1976) (legislative enactment of common-law locality rule).
42. Sung Wha Kim Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Hawaii 198, 201 (1953) (quoting Cavero v. Franklin Etc. Benev. Soc'y, 36 Cal. 2d 301, 309, 223 P.2d 471,
476 (1950)). See generally Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262, 1274 (1962).
Later cases have imposed three general conditions on the application of the doctrine: (1) the injury must be of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the injury
must be caused by an instrumentality or agency within the exclusive
control of the defendant-physician; and (3) the injury must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff-patient. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMdEs, supra note 4, §§
19.5-.8; 1 LouIsELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, 1 14.04, at 425; PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 39. It is sometimes said that there is a fourth condition
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In some jurisdictions, and at some times, the rule has been narrowly
applied merely to permit an inference of negligence to be drawn,
while at other times and places the rule has been given more powerful effect by not only permitting the plaintiff to meet his producthe burden of persuasion from
tion burden, but also by shifting
43
the plaintiff to the defendant.
-that

the evidence of negligence must be more accessible to the de-

fendant than to the plaintiff-but it seems rarely to be enforced. 2
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 19.9; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 39, at
225-28. See also note 53 infra.
The Restatement defines res ipsa loquituras follows:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is
caused by negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by
the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 328D (1965).
Several states have recently enacted legislation restricting the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases. See NEv.
REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3414(3) (C) (Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975) (by implica-

tion).
The case in which a foreign object is left in the patient's body during surgery is the prototype for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
See, e.g., Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960) (surgical
sponge); Swanson v. Hill, 166 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.D. 1958) (6W-inch

forceps); Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951) (10-inch
by 18-inch cloth sack); Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d
997 (2d Dist. 1953) (surgical needle).

The doctrine is also applied in

situations in which an injury has occurred to a healthy part of the pa-

tient's body remote from the place of the performance of the medical
procedure. See, e.g., Dodson v. Pohle, 73 Ariz. 186, 239 P.2d 591 (1952)
(cheek burned by steam from vaporizer used to treat inflammation of

larynx, trachea, and bronchial tubes); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d

486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (paralysis of right shoulder following appendectomy); Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 P. 134 (1st Dist.
1929) (tooth knocked out during adenoidectomy and tonsillectomy).

43. The procedural effects of res ipsa loquitur vary among the jurisdictions. At the very least, however, the plaintiff who satisfies the conditions for the application of the doctrine will avoid a nonsuit or a directed verdict for the defendant. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, §
19.11, at 1099. Thus, though the plaintiff may overcome an important
obstacle to compensation, the battle is not yet necessarily won.
The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the position that res ipsa loquitur creates only an inference of negligence, in turn permitting the
plaintiff to satisfy his production burden and escape a nonsuit. Id. at
1100. The production of evidence of breach of duty does not of itself,
however, entitle the plaintiff to a judgment in his favor. He must still
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The rationale for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the medical-accident cases has been well stated by Mr.
Justice Rutledge:
Malpractice is hard to prove. The physician has all of the advantage of position. He is, presumably, an expert. The patient
is a layman. The physician knows what is done and what is its
significance. The patient may or may not know what is done. He
seldom knows its significance. He judges chiefly by results. The
physician has the patient in his confidence, disarmed against suspicion. Physicians, like lawyers, are loath to testify a fellow craftsman has been negligent, especially when he is highly reputable in
professional character ....
In short, the physician has the advantage of knowledge and of proof ....
What therefore might be

slight evidence when there is no such advantage, as in ordinary
negligence cases, takes on greater weight in malpractice suits.44

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is intended merely to be an evidentiary device, a method of proof which relieves the plaintiff of
establishing by direct evidence specific acts of the defendant's negli45
gence.
prove the other elements of a cause of action in negligence-namely,
proximate cause and damages. Even if the plaintiff is able to establish
the remaining elements of the cause of action, and the defendant fails
to produce any controverting evidence, the inference of negligence
rarely entitles plaintiff to a directed verdict. Rather, the case will
usually go to the jury, which will consider the credibility of the witnesses before returning a verdict for either party. F. JAMES, CIvIL PRO-

cFouRP § 7.7 (1965).
The remaining jurisdictions are divided as to the procedural effect
of res ipsa loquitur. In some, the doctrine creates a presumption of

negligence requiring a directed verdict for the plaintiff unless the defendant offers sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. 2 HARPER
& JAMES, supra note 4, at 1101-03; PRossER, supra note 2, § 40, at 230.
In a few other jurisdictions, the courts go even further in permitting
res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of proof (i.e., the risk of nonpersuasion, F. JAMES, supra § 7.6) from the plaintiff to the defendant,
who must then introduce evidence of a greater weight if he is to avoid
a directed verdict. See, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338
A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975), in which the court held that
since all the defendants (the physician, the hospital, and the manufacturer and supplier of an instrument) had engaged in conduct creating a legal duty to the plaintiff, the failure of any of the defendants
to prove lack of culpability must result in the imposition of liability
upon all. See also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944); 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 1103; PRossER, supra note
2, § 40, at 230. The trend, however, is toward the majority position
of giving res ipsa loquitur no greater effect than that of raising a permissible inference of negligence, based on a policy of giving circumstantial evidence no greater effect than direct evidence would have.
PROssER, supra note 2, § 40, at 231.
44. Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
45. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 19.11.
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While no doubt the ostensible reason for the application of res
ipsa loquitur has weighed heavily upon the judiciary, a more compelling practical reason, while always lurking in the shadows, has
only occasionally surfaced and been acknowledged forthrightly by
the courts. The Supreme Court of California, long an innovator
not only in medical-accident cases but in accident cases of other
kinds as well, has admitted that another consideration is at work
in the judicial willingness to permit the use of the doctrine:
[G]radually the courts awoke to the so-called "conspiracy of silence." No matter how lacking in skill or how negligent the medical man might be, it was almost impossible to get other medical
men to testify adversely to him in litigation based on his alleged
negligence. Not only would the guilty person thereby escape from
civil liability for the wrong he had done, but his professional colleagues would take no steps48to insure that the same results would
not again occur at his hands.

The application of res ipsa loquitur represents a judicial effort to

circumvent the unwillingness of the vast proportion of the medical
profession to testify on behalf of patients injured at the hands of
negligent colleagues, and to compensate medical-accident victims on
the basis of the equities of the case rather47than in accordance with
strict legal rules of procedure or substance.
Because expert medical testimony is generally a prerequisite to
the establishment of the defendant's negligence, 48 a number of jurisdictions have refused to apply res ipsa loquitur. 49 However, the
overall trend has been toward liberalization of the conditions under
which it may be invoked by a medical-accident victim. 0 The
reason suggested by Mr. Justice Rutledge-the plaintiff's lack
46. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d

560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1st Dist. 1957).
47. See W. PnossEa, SEIEcTm Topics ox = LAw

OF TORTS

346 (1953).

48. See note 35 supra.
49. See, e.g., McDermott v. St. Mary's Hosp. Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 423, 133
A.2d 608, 611 (1957) ("Members of a jury are laymen as to medical
and surgical methods,.. . and they cannot be expected to know what
constitutes proper treatment"); Adams v. Heffington, 216 Ark. 534, 226
S.W.2d 352 (1950); Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537, 124 A.2d 265
(1956); Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. 1958);
Shockley v. Payne, 348 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
According to Prosser, res ipsa loquitur "is accepted and applied by

all of our courts, including those of South Carolina, which purport to

reject it by name, Michigan, which formerly did so, and Pennsylvania,
which purports to limit its application to cases in which the defendant
has voluntarily undertaken some responsibility." PROSSER, supra note
2, § 39, at 213 (footnotes omitted).
50. This liberalization has come despite substantial criticism of the doctrine. 2 HuPEa & JAIEs, supra note 4, § 19.5, at 1079-81.
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of understanding of medical matters and the consequent difficulty
of proof of the physician's departure from the accepted standard
of care 51-has played a role in causing many courts to overcome
some of the opposition they may have had to softening the requirement of expert medical testimony to establish negligence. However, another factor responsible for the increased acceptance of res
ipsa loquitur in medical-accident litigation has been the supposition
that lay comprehension of illness and medical practice has in52
creased.
It is ironic that two contradictory reasons are given for the increased judicial receptivity toward res ipsa loquitur. On the one
hand it is said that because laymen are not knowledgeable about
medical problems, it is unfair to impose upon the plaintiff the responsibility of explaining whether and how something went wrong
in the performance of the medical procedure. Thus the burden may
be shifted fairly to the defendant through the use of res ipsa loquitur. But on the other hand, it is said that because of the increased
lay comprehension of medical matters, the jury will be able to determine whether the defendant has been negligent without the aid
of expert testimony. It is clear that the only possible reconciliation
of these two contradictory beliefs is that some courts are bending
over backwards to permit medical-accident victims to obtain compensation for their injuries, regardless of the logic employed.
The courts have also been impressed by the contention that
knowledge of what actually happened to the patient is often far
more accessible to and easily explained by the physician who performed or was present at the procedure than by the patient or a
third-party physician.5 3 If the patient is unconscious when the
51. See p. 69 supra.
52. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. 2d 616, 619, 186 P.2d 450,
451 (2d Dist. 1947); Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 725, 18 P.2d
690, 694 (1st Dist. 1933); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 291, 289 P.2d 173,
179 (1955), af'd, 74 Nev. 729, 331 P.2d 850 (1958); Kennedy v. Parrott,
243 N.C. 355, 358, 90 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1956).
53. See Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 295, 188 P.2d 12, 14
(1947); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 825, 291 P.2d 915, 923 (1955);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944); Maki
v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 262-63, 7 P.2d 228, 231 (1932); Anderson
v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975);
St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. Chapman, 434 P.2d 160
(Okla. 1967); Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132,
145 N.W.2d 166 (1966). See also 1 LoUIsELL & Wn-LIAws, supra note 3,
14.04, at 425.
It is sometimes said that a condition for the appropriate operation
of res ipsa loquitur is that evidence explaining the mishap be more accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Appalachian
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medical procedure is performed, whether as a result of pre-existing
accident or injury, or anesthesia, the defendant doctor who was in
control of the potential cause of the medical accident possesses either a superior knowledge of what happened, or the best opportunity to obtain evidence concerning the injury.5 4 Courts also have
placed reliance upon the fiduciary character of the doctor-patient
relationship in permitting the invocation of res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that the confidence and trust placed in the physician by the
patient demands that the doctor come forward with an explanation
of what went wrong. 55 These justifications of the application of
res ipsa loquitur add up to nothing more than a feeling on the part
of their judicial progenitors that it would be grossly unjust to require the plaintiff affirmatively to prove negligence, in light of the
difficulties of obtaining expert testimony and the serious injuries
that have been sustained.
Although the primary effect of res ipsa loquitur has been procedural-that is, to permit the plaintiff to escape a nonsuit because
of an inability to obtain the cooperation of a physician to provide
expert testimony needed to establish medical negligence-the doctrine easily lends itself to abuse. The very issue to be established
is whether or not the event the plaintiff complains of arose from
"negligence" or from a "statistical risk." 56 Therefore, to the extent
that the mere happening of the event is permitted to give rise to
an inference of negligence, we come very close to permitting the
characterization of the event as negligence from its mere happening
alone. A liberal application of the doctrine is therefore but a short
step from the complete abolition of a negligence requirement.5" As

54.

55.
56.
57.

Ins. Co. v. Knutson, 358 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. East St.
Louis & Interurban Water Co., 295 Ill. App. 603, 15 N.E.2d 599 (1938);
Levendusky v. Empire Rubber Mfg. Co., 84 N.J.L. 698, 87 A. 338 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1913); Hughes v. Jolliffe, 50 Wash. 2d 554, 313 P.2d 678
(1957); Ellis v. Henderson, 95 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1956), opinion withdrawn on rehearing, 142 W. Va. 824, 98 S.E.2d 719 (1957). An extensive discussion of this point may be found in 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 4, § 19.9, at 1094 n.1.
Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 825, 291 P.2d 915, 923 (1955); Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944); Frost v. Des
Moines Still College of Osteopathy, 248 Iowa 294, 302, 79 N.W.2d 306,
311 (1956); Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 660, 364 P.2d 955, 971
(1961). See also Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
20 MnuN. L. Rav. 241, 260 (1936).
See Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 349, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171
(lst Dist. 1960).
See p. 54 & note 6 supra.
Some commentators have sensed the fine line between res ipsa loquitur and strict liability. See Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California
Medical Malpractice Law-Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting
Point, 14 STAN. L. REv. 251, 256 (1962). "[T]he expansion of the 'doc-
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such, res ipsa loquitur constitutes a bridge between the procedural
efforts to skirt the negligence requirement and the strategies based
upon entirely different substantive grounds employed to establish
liability without regard to medical negligence.
Faced with both practical and doctrinal barriers to the awarding
of compensation to persons seriously injured in connection with the
performance of a medical procedure, the courts have struggled to
fashion new rules to overcome these hurdles to compensation. The
Supreme Court of California has expressed its guiding assumption
this way: "[T]he maxim that for every wrong there is a remedy
would be rendered nugatory, 'by denying one, patently entitled to
damages, satisfaction merely because he is ignorant of facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the party who should, in all justice,
pay them.' ,58
In summary, under a negligence theory, plaintiffs have had to
establish that the physician who allegedly caused the injuries had
departed from accepted standards of medical practice. Because another physician was needed to establish what the accepted standard
of medical practice was, the medical profession as a whole, by refusing to testify, was able to thwart the awarding of compensation
to individuals injured at the hands of one of its members. In response to this conspiracy of silence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was invoked with increasing frequency by plaintiffs, and received
with increased acceptance by the judiciary. The result was that
more plaintiffs could obtain compensation. But compensation was
still limited to those plaintiffs who, even with the assistance of judicial ingenuity and receptivity, were able to demonstrate that the
physician had failed to conform to the accepted standard of medical
practice, and that this deviation had been the proximate cause of
their bad results. This left numerous plaintiffs without compensation, and possibly deterred many more injured patients from seeking recourse to the courts at all. 59 Clearly, so long as compensation
was sought within the bounds of the negligence system, there would
always be a large number of injured patients who could not obtain
compensation for their injuries, no matter how egregious.
trine'-in spite of trenchant and penetrating logical criticism-may
well be attributable to the strong general trend towards strict liability
and social insurance-a trend which is corroding a system of liability
nominally based on fault." 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 19.5,

at 1080-81. See also Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"--Liability Without
Fault,25 INs. COUNSEL J. 97 (1958).
58. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944) (quoting Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 262, 7 P.2d 228, 231 (1932)).

59. See note 37 supra.
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Warfare employing procedural tactics had achieved about all
that could be expected in the battle over medical accidents. What
was needed was an entirely new substantive strategy that would
not run headlong into the ubiquitous bastion of negligence. Loosed
from the requirement of having to establish that the bad medical
results were caused by the physician's failure to conform to accepted standards of medical practice, the medical-accident victim
might at last find a pot of gold at the end of the litigation rainbow.
IV. INFORMED CONSENT
Medical-accident victims who found themselves stymied by their
inability to demonstrate medical negligence6" sought and found
refuge in a completely different basis for liability. Since at least
the beginning of the present century-and probably much longer 61it has been recognized that the physician is, as a general rule,
not entitled to treat a patient unless the patient has consented to
treatment.6 2 Any patient who has been treated without consenting
60. See note 3 supra.
61. See Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
62. Among the earliest American cases so holding are Pratt v. Davis, 224
Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A.382
(1889); Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898); Mohr
v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), overruled on other
grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957);

Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92

(1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P.
96 (1913). By the second decade of the present century, the cases involving unauthorized treatment had become fairly numerous. See
generally Note, Consent As a Prerequisiteto a Surgical Operation, 14
CIN. L. REV. 161 (1940).
Many of the early cases, though acknowledging the general rule requiring consent, found "implied" or "tacit" consent in the plaintiff's
submission to treatment. See, e.g., McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225
N.W. 120 (1929); Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 A. 948 (Sup.
Ct. 1912); Boydston v. Giltner, 3 Ore. 118 (1869); Beatty v. Cullingworth, Q.B. unreported, 44 CENT. L.J. 153 (1897). Consent need not
be obtained in cases of emergency, 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMs, supra note

3, f 9.05, at 255, but assessments of what constitutes an emergency vary
widely. Compare Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444
(1931) (amputation of mangled arm; emergency, consent not needed),
with Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1949) (treatment of
fractured wrist held to constitute emergency).
Extensive discussions of the basic rules governing consent to medical treatment, prior to the development of the informed-consent doctrine, may be found in 1 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 4, § 3.10; PnossER,
supra note 2, § 18; McCoid, A Reappraisalof Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957); Smith, supra
note 3, at 233-58.
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may maintain an action against the physician for damages. 63
Through the numerous cases in which the charge of unauthorized treatment has been litigated, the courts have developed an extensive body of law specifying what sorts of behavior on the part
of the patient amount to a consent. More recently-most notably
in the last two decades-the courts also have begun to focus on
the conduct of the physician in obtaining the patient's consent, and
not merely on the conduct of the patient in giving or withholding
consent. In order for the patient's consent to treatment to be valid,
not only must the patient consent, but the consent must be preceded
by a certain degree of explanation by the physician about the anticipated treatment. This development is referred to as the doctrine
of "informed consent."6 4 Thus the patient who is injured but is
unable to prove medical negligence might also attempt to prove that
the physician did not obtain the patient's valid consent to treatment.
63. An action for unauthorized treatment may be maintained against a
doctor even if the treatment does not yield "bad results." See, e.g.,
Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1964) ($500 awarded for unauthorized removal of mole); Bailey v. Belinfante, 135 Ga. App. 574, 57475, 218 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1975) ("Plaintiff testified that Dr. Belinfante
had done a good job in removing his teeth, and that there was no quarrel with the work itself; the only question was whether the doctor
should have taken out all of the teeth or only some of them."); Rolater
v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) ($1000 awarded for unauthorized removal of a bone from foot). See also 232 J.A.M.A. 1059
(1975).
In the absence of bad results, a plaintiff may only be awarded nominal damages for injury to his dignity. See, e.g., McCandless v. State,
3 App. Div. 2d 600, 606-07 162 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575-76 aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 785,
149 N.E.2d 530, 173 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1957) (damages for unauthorized
abortion performed upon a patient in a state mental hospital held
excessive, and reduced in light of testimony that patient's condition
was improved by the termination of the pregnancy). See generally
C. Mom,s, TORTS 26 (1953); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 9, at 35. Punitive damages may also be available where the defendant acted in bad
faith. PROSSER, supra § 2, at 9-14; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908
(1939).
64. There is an extensive body of commentary on the law of informed consent. The references prior to 1970 are collected in Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 628 n.1
(1970). See also Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, 40
INS. COUNSEL J. 580 (1973); Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340 (1974); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment,Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain,84 YA.E L.J. 693
(1975); Gough, Recent Uses and Misuses of the Informed Consent
Doctrine, 10 FoRuM 383 (1974); Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking
for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580; Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some
Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527 (1972); Comment, Informed
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The rendition of medical care without the patient's valid consent
is at the heart of the new strategy that has been embraced by a
growing number of medical-accident victims. The litigation has focused upon what constitutes a valid consent, rather than upon
whether or not the physician negligently performed the medical
procedure. The plaintiff may seek compensation for the injuries
he received because the physician performed the procedure responsible for the injuries without adequate disclosure, which, if made,
would have caused the patient to refuse treatment. 65 Both the requirement of consent to medical treatment and the contemporary
doctrine of informed consent that has evolved from it are intended
to protect the individual's interest in freedom from unwanted bodily intrusions,6 6 whether beneficial or not. 67 Additionally, the informed-consent requirement is intended to encourage the individual
to make rational decisions about medical treatment. 68
Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503 (1974);
Note, Advise and Consent in Medicine: A Look at the Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 16 N.Y.L.F. 863 (1970); Note, Informed ConsentA Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 548
(1973); Comment, Informed Consent As a Theory of Medical Liability,

1970 Wis. L. REv. 879; Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient,

83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent:
Legal Therapy for the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533

(1970)

[hereinafter cited as Note, Restructuring Informed Consent].

65. There is some question as to whether the test of causation is an objective or a subjective one. See pp. 107-13 infra.
66. The law of battery is intended to protect the individual from harmful or offensive contact with his person, 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 4, § 3.2; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 9, and the requirement of consent assures that the individual will be subjected only to those bodily

touchings which he finds neither harmful nor offensive. See Pratt v.
Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905).

67. The right to be free from unwanted "beneficial" treatment is based on
both a rejection of paternalism in medical care, and on the practical
ground that what is beneficial in one person's view may not be in another's. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient,supra note
64, at 1646. This view rejects the necessary primacy of "health" values, and suggests that the individual patient should alone determine
whether or not he is to be treated. See generally Smith, supra note 3,
at 237; Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF.
L. REV. 1396, 1409 (1967) Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213-18 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
68. The most extensive treatment of the interests served by the doctrine
of informed consent may be found in J. KATz & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 82-90 (1975), in which the authors state that the functions of informed consent are to (1) promote
individual autonomy, (2) protect the patient's status as a human being, (3) avoid fraud and duress, (4) encourage self-scrutiny by the
physician, (5) encourage rational decisionmaking, and (6) educate the
public. See also J. KATz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 521608 (1972); P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 1-58 & passim (1970);
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While the values which the informed-consent doctrine ostensibly
seeks to implement may, in their origins, have been the primary
interest and purpose of the doctrine's judicial progenitors, the contemporary application of the doctrine serves a quite different purpose. The requirement of informed consent to medical treatment
has, for at least the past two decades, been used as the cloth from
which courts slowly have begun to fashion a no-fault system for
compensating persons who have suffered bad results from medical
treatment. Consequently, the development of the law of informed
consent has been influenced at least as much by the desire to compensate accident victims for their injuries as to promote the lofty
interests which the requirement of consent was originally intended
to protect.
A.

The Law of Consent to Medical Treatment

In the early part of this century, only in the clearest cases were
the courts willing to find that the patient had not provided a valid
Capron, supra note 64; Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient,
supra note 64, at 1643-47.
The objectives of the informed-consent doctrine are more extensive
than the interests served by the earlier requirement of consent, which
developed out of the law of battery. The requirement of informed
consent-that is, that before a consent may be considered valid, it must
be preceded by the disclosure to the patient of certain information, see
pp. 80-90 infra-isintended not merely to protect the patient's bodily
integrity, autonomy, and privacy, see note 66 supra, but also to encourage the patient to make a rational decision about treatment. It
should be noted that at least conceptually there is no requirementthat
the patient's decision in fact be "rational." The courts, however, when
confronted with the issue, have often seemed reluctant to honor what
they consider to be "irrational" decisions. The cases involving patients who refuse life-saving blood transfusions are paradigmatic. See
note 189 infra.
In addition to promoting self-determination, the duty to disclose
may also play a role in keeping the costs of medical care from skyrocketing. Hicks, Doctors Strong, Patients Weak, Costs Up, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.):
What is peculiar to the health sector and is in part related
to the ongoing cost of care the [report of the President' Council on Wage and Price Stability] went on, is the "passive" role
of the consumer in health services. When the patient goes to
see a doctor, it is the physician who determines how and when
he comes back, what other medical services or specialists he
requires, what drugs he needs, and whether he needs to go to
the hospital and for how long.
Id. at 11, col. 1 (citing ExEcuwn~r OmcE oF T= PRESIDENT, CoUNcH. ON
WAGE & PRICE STABILITY, THE PROBLEm OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS
19 (1976)). This also indicates that actual patient-participation in decisionmaking is far less prevalent than a routine application of the
doctrine of informed consent would suggest.
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consent to treatment. From this initial unwillingness to hold a
physician liable for unauthorized treatment, a gradual shift has occurred, most notably in the last two decades, toward far more stringent standards. What would often pass for a valid consent in older
cases would barely permit a physician to escape a directed verdict
in contemporary cases.6 9 The consequence of the more stringent
standards has been greater opportunities for compensation of patients. Because of the rather complex and vague set of rules that
has developed, by which the validity of the consent is measured,
the mere occurrence of bad results is more likely than ever before
to be compensable without regard to medical negligence.
The basic rule from which plaintiffs' counsel and compensationminded courts have fashioned subrules, counterrules, and exceptions is that a physician must obtain the patient's consent before
he is legally entitled to commence treatment. This rule traces its
origins in law at least to the late 18th-century case of Slater v.
Baker & Stapleton,70 which held liable two medical practitioners
for disuniting, without the patient's consent, a partially healed fracture. It is clear, however, from various portions of the case that
even before the decision therein it was customary among surgeons
not to treat patients without first having obtained their consent
to treatment:
[I]t appears from the evidence of the surgeons that it was improper to disunite the callous without consent; this is the usage
and law of surgeons: then it was ignorance and unskilfulness in
that very particular, to do contrary to the rule of the profession,
what no surgeon ought to have done .... 71
69. In McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929), the plaintiff authorized the defendant-doctor to reduce a foot fracture by manipulation. While the patient was anesthetized, and despite the absence of
an emergency, the doctor performed a surgical operation. The court
refused to hold the defendant liable for unauthorized treatment, finding that "[c] onsent may be implied from the circumstances ....

."

Id.

at 440, 225 N.W. at 123. The court added that "[t]he use of anesthesia
in modern surgery has modified to some extent the ancient rule of the
common law requiring consent." Id. But see Demers v. Gerety, 85
N.M. 641, 515 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869 (1974), in which defendant was held
liable for treating a patient without consent, in part because the patient had signed a consent form while anesthetized.
70. 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
71. Id. at 862. Counsel for the defendants raised the objection that the
case should have been dismissed because the proof-that the treatment
was rendered without the plaintiff's consent-did not conform to the
pleading that the procedure was performed unskillfully. The court rejected this defense on the ground that it was more important that justice be done than that the proof conform to the pleading. Evidently,
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What long passed for a valid consent to treatment was a simple
interchange between patient and physician. In substance the physician said to the patient, "You need thus-and-so to get better," and
the .patient responded with some phrase or action indicating
whether or not he intended to go along with the doctor's recommendations. The response may have been very broad: "O.K.
Doc, whatever you say"; slightly less inclusive: "Go ahead and do
thus-and-so"; somewhat more limiting: "Go ahead and do 'thus,'
but I don't want you to do any 'so' 1;72 or even totally restrictive:
"If that's what I need, then I'd rather be sick, and don't do anything
74
at all."73 Each of these responses (even the express prohibition)
has been relied upon by physicians as authorization to treat, and
the courts have generally agreed that the patient has, by speaking
some such phrase, authorized the physician to proceed and thereby
provided the physician with a defense to an action for battery.
Slowly, the realization grew that authorization for the physician
to proceed need not be the cut-and-dried matter that it had first
appeared to be. 75 For example, the doctor might not have said
merely that "you need thus-and-so to get better" but, trying to put
the anxious patient at ease, might have said to the patient about

72.

73.

74.
75.

the problem of compensating medical-accident victims without strict
adherence to procedural niceties is not of recent origin.
See, e.g., Perry v. Hodgson, 37 Ga. App. 314, 316, 140 S.E. 396, 397
(1927) (plaintiff's father agreed to operation only after repeated assurances from defendant that he would not invade the tract that drained
the infection); Demers v. Gerety, 85 N.M. 641, 647, 515 P.2d 645, 648
(Ct. App. 1973) ("[Pilaintiff emphatically told the defendant not to
touch the ileostomy. If anything had to be done to the ileostomy, he
would return to Boston for medical services."); Rolater v. Strain, 39
Okla. 572, 574, 137 P. 96, 97 (1913) (plaintiff expressly prohibited defendant from removing a bone in her foot); Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa.
305, 309, 16 A.2d 15, 17 (1940) (plaintiff instructed defendant not to
"go too much up in the neck").
See, e.g., Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 P. 683 (3d Dist.
1924); Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 P. 30 (1929); Corn
v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 282, 289 P.2d 173, 175 (1955) (plaintiff expressly
prohibited defendant from removing her breast); Throne v. Wandell,
176 Wis. 97, 186 N.W. 146 (1922); Beatty v. Cullingworth, Q.B. unreported, 44 CENT. L. J. 153 (1897) (plaintiff forbade performance of a
double ovariotomy).
See cases cited note 73 supra.
It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that litigation
over the requirement of consent to medical treatment began in earnest.
See note 62 supra. "The question of the necessity of consent on the
part of one submitting to an operation has not received much consideration at the hands of the courts of this country or in England."
1 E. KINKEAD, TORTS § 375, at 735 (1903). There was a "scarcity of
legal discussion upon this point. . .

."

Id. at 738 n.39.
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the procedure, "Oh, that's nothing; it is not a serious operation at
all."76 The patient would then agree to undergo it, much assured
that it was a simple operation, but would later be distraught when,
at the conclusion of the operation, he discovered undesirable results.
In response to this realization, there began to develop subrules,
counterrules, and exceptions, beyond the original simple proposition
that a physician might not treat a patient without the patient's authorization. To meet the changing circumstances, a court might say
that the physician's failure to obtain the patient's informed consent
raised an issue for the jury as to whether this failure constituted
an unreasonable departure from the degree of skill and care required of a doctor. Not only was the physician required to obtain
the patient's consent to treatment, but if he affirmatively misrepresented the nature of the procedure and of the probable consequences, the misrepresentation might be held to invalidate the patient's consent, leaving the physician open to a claim for unauthorized treatment.77 As litigation over the contours of a legally valid
consent proceeded, the concept of consent, like that of negligence,
began to be viewed as being quite malleable, if not quite infinitely
expandable.
B.

The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure

1. The Origins of the Physician'sObligation to Disclose Information
The most substantial and significant development in the law of
consent to medical treatment concerns the physician's disclosure of
information to the patient prior to obtaining his authorization for
treatment. While there are several suggestions to the contrry in
the case law prior to the last two decades, 78 there never existed
76. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 479 n.7 (5th Cir. 1943); accord, Hunt
v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955); Waynick v. Reardon,
236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578,

260 N.W. 448 (1935).
77. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943): State v. Housekeever.
70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173
(1955); Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Nolan
v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949); Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218

Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935). But this does not mean that a doctor
is under an obligation to describe in great detail all of the possible
consequences of treatment. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 590 (1959).

78. See, e.g., Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918), in which
the patient suffered burns from radiation therapy. One count of the
complaint alleged that the physician knew, or in the exercise of due
care should have known, of the possibility of burns to the patient's
skin, and that as a result he was under an obligation to make known

INFORMED CONSENT
any general rule that the physician's failure to provide a patient
with information about the contemplated medical procedure prior
to embarking upon its ministration would invalidate the consent
that the patient gave.7 9 Rather, the early cases, when concerned
at all with the information given the patient, directed their attention to the problem of the veracity of information that the physician
may have undertaken to disclose either on his own initiative or in
response to a patient's queries, though there was no legal compulsion to make any disclosure. Where the physician provided the patient with information about his medical condition or the proposed
procedure, the courts have uniformly held that fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading disclosure vitiates the consent that the patient
subsequently gave.8 0
these dangers to the patient. The court, in affirming the overruling of
the demurrer to this count, stated that "it is the duty of a physician
in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient of the danger of possible bad consequences of using a remedy .

. . ."

Id. at 133, 96 S.E.

at 366. Though the failure to warn is not "per se an act of negligence"because the duty does not exist in all cases-when the doctor knows
or should have known of the dangers of the treatment, failure so to
inform the patient constitutes negligence. See also Wall v. Brim, 138
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906),
aff'g 118 111. App. 161 (1905); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W.
12 (1905); Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (Ont. App. 1931);
Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
79. But see Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis
from Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349,
350 (1946). The existence of a therapeutic privilege to withhold information from a patient, see pp. 99-107 supra, recognized by Smith and
other writers, certainly presumes an affirmative obligation of disclosure.
80. See cases cited note 76 supra. The rule pertaining to the accurate disclosure of information has analogues elsewhere in the law. For example, in the law of torts, when a person who has no duty to act undertakes to act, he will be held liable for the failure to exercise reasonable care in his conduct. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note
4, § 18.6; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 56, at 343-48. For a recent application of this rule to another area of medical practice see Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976) (psychotherapist who acts to treat a dangerous patient must
exercise reasonable care, which may include warning third parties
threatened by patient's conduct).
Similarly, the seller of real property traditionally had no affirmative obligation to disclose conditions that, were the buyer aware of
them, would make the property less attractive. If, however, the seller
volunteered information or responded to inquiries from the buyer, he
was obligated to provide truthful information. See, e.g., Kraft v. Lowe,
77 A.2d 554, 557 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950). See also RESTATEMENT OF
ToRTs § 529 (1939); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 106, at 696. Like the disclosure of information concerning medical treatment, this requirement
has undergone substantial change in recent years. See, e.g., Schipper
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This early rule-that ordinarily no information need be provided, but if the physician does provide information, it must be
truthful-contained the seeds of the requirement which began to
develop in the 1950's that the physician has an affirmative duty
to disclose certain information to the patient. From here it was
only a short judicial step to imposing an affirmative requirement
of disclosure upon the physician.8 '
Because of the organic growth of the law of consent to medical
treatment, it is not possible to point to any particular case as marking the transition from a simple consent requirement to an "informed" consent requirement-that is, a rule requiring affirmative
disclosure by the physician to the patient before the latter's consent
to treatment is valid.8 2 While several cases intimated that an affirmative duty of disclosure existed, they were greatly scattered and
did not constitute any coherent pattern. However, a number of
cases in the 1950's together mark a clear transition from the older
"simple" consent rule to the first contemporary "informed" consent

cases.
In a 1955 case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, while refusing to require that a physician disclose the risk involved in surv. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (seller of residence
required to disclose-known danger to buyer who could not reasonably
be expected to know of it before harm was done). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
81. After reviewing the cases of Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn.
427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958), Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d
676 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957), and Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (Ont. App. 1931), the Supreme Court of
Kansas concluded:
[W]here the physician or surgeon has affirmatively misrepresented the nature of the operation or has failed to point out
the probable consequences of the course of treatment, he may
be subject to a claim of unauthorized treatment. But this does
not mean that a doctor is under an obligation to describe in
detail all of the possible consequences of treatment.
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1960).
82. One student commentator has made the rather bold claim that the doctrine of informed consent originated in dictum in Hunter v. Burroughs,
123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918). See Comment, Informed Consent as
a Theory of Medical Liability, supra note 64, at 880. There are, however, suggestions in several other cases decided before Hunter v. Burroughs, see note 78 supra, that the physician has an affirmative obligation to disclose information to the patient if the subsequent consent
is to be valid, and it seems that the development of the informed-consent doctrine is better characterized as an organic process than as a
single event. Several cases decided after Hunter v. Burroughs represent various points of development in this process. See, e.g., Wall v.
Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1
D.L.R. 507 (Ont. App. 1931).
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gery, stated that the failure to explain the risks involved "may be

considered a mistake on the part of the surgeon.

.

..

"83

Two years

later, a California appellate court, relying in part upon the North
Carolina precedent, specifically held that there was an affirmative
duty of disclosure upon the physician so that the patient could make
an "informed" consent, though this duty could be tailored by the
physician to the particular patient's emotional condition. 4 The
court, however, failed to provide a detailed and explicit statement
of what kinds of information the affirmative duty of disclosure envisioned. It merely stated that on remand the jury should be instructed that "the physician has ... discretion [to withhold alarming information from the patient] consistent, of course, with the full
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent."8 5 The court
actually reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the
trial court's instruction on the duty to inform went further than
required. The trial court had instructed that it was "the duty of
a physician to disclose to the patient 'all the facts which mutually
affect his rights and interests and of the surgical risk, hazard and
danger, if any * * *.'
"86 On appeal, it was held that the physician
had discretion to take into account the condition of the particular
patient when determining the amount of information to be disclosed.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reinforced the
affirmative duty of disclosure when it held liable a physician for
failing to inform the patient, in advance of the operation, of the
alternative forms of treatment which would not have entailed the
undesirable consequence of the procedure that was actually performed.87 Additional support for the duty was lent by an opinion
83. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 523, 88 S.E.2d 762, 766 (1955) (citing
no authority for this dictum). But see Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C.
355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956) (holding that patient impliedly consented to
a procedure the performance of which she had not been forewarned,
and characterizing the requirement of consent to medical procedures
as a "fetish").
84. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.
2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1st Dist. 1957). In addition to relying upon Hunt
v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955), the court placed some
reliance upon Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951), in
which the defendant-dentist did not warn the plaintiff of a risk that
later materialized. There was expert testimony that it was customary
practice for a general practitioner of dentistry in the defendant's locale
to inform a patient of this particular risk prior to the procedure. Id.
at 255-56, 231 P.2d at 21. The holding of the case, however, did not
turn on this point.
85. 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
86. Id.
87. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 434, 88 N.W.2d 186,
190 (1958). The plaintiff alleged that although he had consented to

84

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 1 (1977)

of the Fifth Circuit stating that the physician is obligated to acwith the medical diagnosis and the treatment
quaint the patient
88
that is proposed.

However, at the same time that some courts were imposing an
affirmative duty of disclosure upon the physician, still others reiterated the older view that the physician had no affirmative duty of
disclosure.8 9 One court even imposed liability upon a physician for
mental anguish to the patient caused by the information that he
disclosed to her about her condition and its proper treatment.9 0
Two cases, decided in different jurisdictions within two days of
each other in 1960, clearly indicated that there was to be no turning
back on the road to the imposition on the medical practitioner of
an affirmative duty of disclosure. While judicial abandonment of
the simple consent requirement had been in the air during the prior
decade, it was never as clear as after the decisions in Natanson v.
the performance of a prostate operation, he did not know that it would
necessarily involve the severance of his spermatic cords. He therefore
sought damages on the ground that his consent to the operation was
ineffective. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action,
holding that it was a question for the jury as to whether plaintiff's
consent was effective, and stating that when no emergency exists, "a
patient should be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a

chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation." Id.

88. See Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1957)
(dictum). Similarly, the Missouri supreme court, in 1959, suggested
that the physician has an affirmative duty to disclose relevant information about treatment, at least to the extent of advising the patient
what treatment is necessary. See Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187, 198
(Mo. 1959).
89. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. La. 1955),
aff'd, 234 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1956); Woods v. Pommerening, 44 Wash.
2d 867, 271 P.2d 705 (1954). See generally Symposium, Morals, Medicine and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1157 (1956) (authorities in medicine, law, and ethics agreeing that the physician has a moral, but not
a legal, obligation to tell the truth to patients).
90. In Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1958), the court upheld that portion of an award for mental anguish
flowing from the "cancerophobia" plaintiff had developed upon learning from a nondefendant physician that the radiation therapy a defendant-physician had administered to her might cause cancer. Although the disclosure was not made by a defendant, the plaintiff's employment of the dermatologist who made the harmful disclosure was
the result of the defendants' negligence. Id. at 20, 152 N.E.2d at 252,
176 N.Y.S.2d at 999; cf. Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 8, 379 P.2d
292, 294 (1963) (complete disclosure of all risks might so alarm patient
as to constitute bad medical practice); Furniss v. Fitchett, [1958]
N.Z.L. Rep. 396, noted in 4 N.Z.L.J. 65 (1958), and 34 id. 235

(1958); Karchmer, Informed Consent: A Plaintiff's Medical Malprac-

tice "Wonder Drug", 31 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1966).
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Kline9' and Mitchell v. Robinson 9 2 that the simple ways of the past
would no longer suffice.
In Natanson, a woman received radiation therapy after a mastectomy, and suffered injuries from the radiation. In Mitchell the
plaintiff received insulin shock and electroshock therapy for the
treatment of schizophrenia, causing the fracture of several vertebrae. In 3both cases, the patients' consent to treatment had been
9
obtained.
The gravamina of the complaints were that the physicians had
an affirmative duty to the patients to disclose information about
the risks of the treatment, and that this duty had been breached.
Both courts agreed. The Mitchell court phrased the duty as requiring the physician "to inform [the patient] generally of the possible

serious collateral hazards

. .

.94

while the Natanson court went

further by describing the doctor's duty as requiring
a reasonable disclosure . . of the nature and probable consequences of the suggested or recommended ... treatment, and...
a reasonable disclosure of the dangers within his knowledge which
were incident
to, or possible in, the treatment he proposed to administer. 9 5
Insofar as Natanson and Mitchell, along with their immediate
predecessors and progeny, firmly established the doctrine of "informed consent," they held out great promise to the injured patient
who could not establish medical negligence. By requiring that the
physician provide certain information to the patient before there
could be valid consent, they opened the door to a host of new considerations in the determination of the validity of any particular consent to medical treatment. Courts now would have to inquire into
the kind of information that the physician gave the patient. Because this inquiry would be made and judged retrospectively-that
is, in the context of a suit for damages-the vulnerability of the
doctor to a finding that the consent had not been valid, and hence
91. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
92. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), aff'd after retrial, 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.
1962).
93. In Mitchell, although plaintiff's wife signed the written consent form,
the plaintiff admitted that he also consented to the treatment. Id. at
17. In both Mitchell and Natanson, the plaintiffs apparently assumed
that the consent barred an action for assault and battery, since both
actions were brought in negligence. In Natanson, the plaintiffs
pointed out that the case was not "an action for assault and battery,
where a patient has given no consent to the treatment." 186 Kan. at
401, 350 P.2d at 1100.
94. 334 S.W.2d at 19.
95. 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106.
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to an adverse judgment, was increased. In the practical terms of
obtaining compensation, this meant that litigation over medical accidents would have not just one substantial field of inquiry-the
manner of performance of the medical procedure-but a second as
well, the manner of disclosure to the patient of information about
that procedure.
2. The "ClassicaF'Elements of the Duty to Disclose
Although Natanson, Mitchell and numerous subsequent cases
announced that there is a duty of affirmative disclosure, another
issue remains. Under what circumstances must information be disclosed, and what kind of information must be provided? The common-law process, in which suggested answers are always to be understood as tentative and strictly applicable only to the facts of a
particular case96 has provided almost unlimited freedom for medical-accident victims to suggest and courts to accept (or reject) extensions and modifications of the rules for awarding compensation.
In spite of this freedom to apply and interpret rules, the courts
generally97have agreed upon several "classical" elements of informed
consent.
Mitchell and Natanson both recognized that the central informational component is the possible bad results that may occur from
undergoing a particular procedure. While this concept has been
expressed in several ways, it is generally referred to as the "risks"
of the procedure.9 8 It is self-evident that if an individual is to make
96. See J. FRANK, supra note 33, at 6-7. See also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 23 (1921).

97. A few states have also enacted statutes codifying the common-law requirements. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.11 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4304

(Supp. 1976); LA.

STAT.

ANN. § 40:1299.40 (Supp.

1976); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 41A.110-.120 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54
(1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 1301.303 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-3417 (a) (Supp. 1975). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2906
(1971), construed in Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113
(1975) (section 88-2906 a legislative repudiation of informed consent).
For Canadian legislation and regulations on informed consent see the
references cited in L. RozovsKy, CANADIAN HOSPITAL LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 29 (1974). The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare has adopted regulations defining informed consent in the context of biomedical and behavioral research. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.3 (c)
(1974).
98. Mitchell speaks of "collateral hazards" and "dangers." 334 S.W.2d at
19. The Supreme Court of Kansas spoke, in Natanson, of "dangers"
and "probable consequences." 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106. The
cases generally use words such as "peril," "risk," and "hazards." One
case speaks of the "dangers lurking in the proposed treatment." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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an informed or intelligent choice as to whether to consent to a medical procedure, he must have available to him not only the knowledge that the procedure is intended to diagnose or treat the condition from which he suffers, but also the knowledge of any risks
that it may fail to do so, or that it may leave him worse off after
the procedure. Disclosure of the risks of the procedure will neither
guarantee that the patient will utilize the information in making
a decision, nor assure that the decision will be a "reasonable" one.99
Yet without this information most patients are obviously unable
to make an informed decision.
While Mitchell mandated only the disclosure of risk information, Natanson went further by requiring disclosure of the nature
of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success, and possible alternative treatments. These
requirements, with slight modifications of terminology, 1°0 are the
classical elements of informed consent, and constitute the basis from
which the corpus of informed-consent rules, subrules, and exceptions have developed.
If the practice of medicine were akin to putting together a jigsaw puzzle, there would be little question as to what each of the
classical elements of informed consent requires the physician to disclose in a particular case. That the practice of medicine is not a
precise science explains both why medical accidents do occur even
in the absence of medical negligence, and why a mere enumeration
of the elements of informed consent does not and cannot tell the
doctor precisely what information must be disclosed. To complicate
matters further, the requirements for disclosure are necessarily
hedged with qualifying words, which, though intended to make
clear that the required degree of disclosure is something less than
total, compel the doctor to attempt to second-guess the judicial
process. To put the matter another way, the use of qualifying ex1064 (1972).

The courts have not distinguished between unpleasant

consequences inherent in the performance of a procedure and the risks
of unpleasant (or dangerous) side effects of a procedure. Compare
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958)
(severance of spermatic cords a necessary consequence of a transurethral prostatic resection), with Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790,
82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (2d Dist. 1969) ("foot drop" a potential side effect or
risk of myelogram). The distinction is discussed in Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FOinHAM L. REv.639, 648-50 (1968).
99. See Section IV-D infra.
100. For example, "probability of success" seems to have developed into a
requirement that the doctor describe "any benefits reasonably to be
expected." 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(c) (3) (1974) (U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare regulations for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research).
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pressions permits more freedom to the medical-accident victim to
make his case for compensation. 101
Natanson, as well as its antecedents and progeny, clearly does
not require the doctor to tell the patient all information about risks,
benefits, alternatives, diagnosis, and the nature of the treatment.
To do so would require the patient to first undergo complete medical training himself. 0 2 Even then there would be no assurance
that the patient had been apprised of "all" of the information which
could conceivably fall under the required elements of informed consent. 1 3 Instead the courts have trotted out the tired and weary
old creature of tort law, the reasonable man, and asked him to stand
guard around the citadel of negligence, lest the walls come crumbling down completely.
101. To illustrate: the Supreme Court of California has held that the patient must be informed by the doctor of the material risks of the proposed treatment. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244-45, 502 P.2d 1,
11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972). In a case purporting to follow this
rule, the court held that where a physician failed to disclose the possibility of a stroke from the procedure, but did disclose the possibility
of death, there had been adequate disclosure. See Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681, 689
(Ist Dist. 1976). The court said: "We think the information that a
procedure carries the risk of death or serious disease in lay language
sufficiently explains the range of complications that might occur, including a stroke." Id. But does it? It is neither impossible nor unreasonable that a person faced with risking a crippling stroke would
choose to forego treatment, though the same person faced with the risk
of death (assuming an equal probability of occurrence) might choose
the treatment. Some persons may, in effect, prefer death to an impaired life. See generally Note, Informed Consent-and the Dying Pa-

tient, supra note 64.
102. " [T] he patient's interest in information does not extend to a lengthy
polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-course in
medical science is not required .... ." Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); accord, ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25, 499 P.2d 1, 9 (1972).
In addition, the physician need not disclose risks that could materialize
if the procedure were performed improperly, Mallett v. Pirkey, 171
Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970); Mull v. Emory Univ. Inc., 114 Ga. App.
63, 150 S.E.2d 276 (1966), though there may be liability for medical
negligence. Similarly, there is no obligation to disclose the risks of
properly performed procedures, if the necessity for such procedures is
not reasonably foreseeable at the time that consent is obtained, Block
v. McVay, 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964), although there may
be liability for negligent diagnosis.
103. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct.
2126, 2132 (1976) ("Some information is of such dubious significance
that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than
good.").
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What is required then is not total disclosure, but reasonable disclosure. According to Natanson, reasonable disclosure requires the
doctor to use simple language in explaining the necessary information to the patient.10 4 Reasonable disclosure does not mean that
the patient must be informed of all risks of the procedure, but only
of those within the knowledge of the physician. 10 5 Reasonable disclosure does not even require the physician to tell the patient all
that he knows, but only that which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under similar circumstances. 0 6 Nor is the doc104. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960);
accord, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 rL27 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 224, 502
P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280,
284, 289 P.2d 173, 175-76 (1955) (by implication); Demers v. Gerety, 85
N.M. 641, 653, 515 P.2d 645, 654 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd on procedural
grounds, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869 (1974) (concurring opinion); Scaria
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 227 N.W.2d 647,

653 (1975).
105. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); ac-

cord, Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 693-94, 140 N.W.2d 139, 144-45
(1966); Petterson v. Lynch, 59 Misc. 2d 469, 470, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245
(Sup. Ot. 1969); DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 511, 261 N.Y.S.

2d 623, 624 (1965); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617,
621 (1964); Block v. McVay, 80 S.D. 469, 477, 126 N.W.2d 808, 812

(1964) (dictum). The requirement seems to mandate disclosure not
only of those risks of which the physician knew, but in addition those
of which he should have known. See Martin v. Bralliar, - Colo. App.
-, 504 P.2d 1118, 1121 (1975); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136,
141, 181 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1962); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627,
295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972).

106. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960). The

physician obviously cannot divulge risks of which he is unaware, although there may be liability for failure to exercise due care to discover the risk. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 n.84 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp.
944, 949 (E.D. Va. 1960); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 370, 409
P.2d 74, 86 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966);
Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 363-64, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971);
Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 549-50, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. App. 1965); Nishi v. Hartwell,
52 Hawaii 188, 195-96, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (1970); Green v. Hussey, 127
Ill. App. 2d 174, 184, 262 N.E.2d 156, 161 (1970); Haggerty v. McCarthy,
344 Mass. 136, 141, 181 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1962); Roberts v. Young, 369
Mich. 133, 140, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d
905, 909 (Miss. 1970); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965);
Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 152 Mont. 47, 55-56, 446 P.2d 436, 441 (1968);

Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 257, 232 A.2d 840, 848 (1967),
aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299,
302 (Tex. 1967); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash.
2d 12, 25, 499 P.2d 1, 9 (1972); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo.
1962). This rule is undergoing substantial change. See pp. 93-99 infra.
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tor obligated to disclose commonly known risks.10' 7 Finally, reasonsufficient information be imparted to
able disclosure requires that 108
assure an "informed" consent.
The aim here is not to explore all of the possible combinations
and permutations that the courts have developed in applying the
informed-consent doctrine, but rather to indicate the vast opportunities lurking in the use of these judicial weasel words' 0 9 for awarding compensation to medical-accident victims without regard to the
presence or absence of proof of medical negligence. The courts have
found in each of the elements of informed consent (and in each
of the qualifying phrases used to describe them) the source of new
rules of liability and means for modifying existing rules, finding
them convenient weapons in the assault on the citadel of negligence." 0
3. Informed Consent in the 1960's-A PaperTiger
Despite the increasingly stringent standards that courts, in the
wake of Mitchell and Natanson, began to apply in determining the
validity of a consent to medical treatment, the informed-consent
requirement remained something of a paper tiger. The two distinct
and independent theories of medical liability-negligence in the
performance of the medical procedure, and the adequacy of information disclosed and the validity of the consent obtained-were
almost entirely merged from a procedural perspective. Unquestion107. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295
A.2d 676, 689 (1972). This rule has analogues elsewhere in the law of
torts. See, e.g., Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 312-13 (Tex. 1962)
(occupier of real estate has no duty to warn invitees of obvious dangers).
108. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960). Although it may seem
tautological that the physician's duty of disclosure requires him to
divulge information sufficient to obtain the patient's "informed" consent, the matter is actually far more complicated. See pp. 113-23 infra.
109. See J. FRANK, supra note 33, at 30 & passim.
110.
Even in [a static] social order no one can foresee all the future
permutations and combinations of events; situations are
bound to occur which were never contemplated when the
original rules were made....

Our society would be strait-

jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of the
lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the
realities of ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions ....

Much of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortu-

nate accident: it is of immense social value.
Id. at 6-7.
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ably there were two distinct substantive theories upon which medical liability might be premised. But because a negligence, rather
than a trespass, form of action was increasingly imposed upon actions for failure to obtain informed consent,'1 1 some of the old bar111. There has been a long debate as to whether an action for unauthorized
treatment sounds in trespass, or in negligence, or even in contract. For
a thorough discussion of the state of confusion of the law of unauthorized medical treatment see Capron, supra note 64, at 364-76; Plante,
supra note 98, at 640-48; Comment, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, supra note 67, at 1399-1401; Comment, Informed Consent
As a Theory of Medical Liability, supra note 64, at 882-88; Note, Duty
of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment: Battery or Negligence?, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 217 (1961). See also Goldstein, supra note
64, at 690-98; McCoid, supra note 62.
Most of the early cases were brought in trespass, but a few were
brought in negligence. Those brought in negligence resemble the contemporary informed-consent cases in that although consent to treatment was obtained, there was some question about the physician's failure to disclose information to the patient. See, e.g., Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918); Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep.
860 (K.B. 1767). Contract has occasionally been applied to a cause of
action for unauthorized medical treatment. See, e.g., Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60,
148 A. 124 (1930).
It is increasingly being accepted, however, that the action is properly framed in trespass only where there has been a total failure of the
physician to obtain consent, because in such a case the mere performance of the procedure is the legal wrong.
However, when the patient consents to certain treatment and
the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication ... occurs, no intentional deviation from the
consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining consent
may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should be
pleaded in negligence.
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972).
Before the present controversy arose, Professor McCoid suggested
that the traditional dichotomy between trespass and negligence for unauthorized medical treatment was inadequate, and that judicial analysis should strive toward "a single basis for liability in all malpractice
cases." McCoid, supra note 62, at 434. More recently, Professor Joseph Goldstein has criticized the assimilation of the cause of action for
lack of informed consent to negligence, on the ground that the recovery of damages in negligence requires actual physical harm to the
plaintiff and "does not recognize that a citizen can be wronged without
being 'harmed.'" Goldstein, supra note 64, at 691. A cause of action
in trespass, however, permits recovery of damages for the injury to
one's dignity suffered when an unconsented touching occurs. See note
63, supra. Professor Capron suggests that a new "hybrid" cause of action for informed consent, at least for medical procedures used in the
treatment of "catastrophic illnesses," should be formulated. See Capron, supra note 64, at 403-23.
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riers to compensating medical-accident victims remained while new
ones developed.
Under a negligence form of action, informed consent is viewed
as imposing upon the physician a duty to disclose certain information to the patient and to obtain the patient's consent to treatment
before proceeding. Breach of this duty, which is the proximate
cause of harm to the patient, imposes liability upon the physician.
As in all negligence actions, the plaintiff must carry the burden
112
of proof on four issues: duty, breach, causation, and damages.
The effect of the assimilation of informed consent to the negligence form of action was to transfer some of the old barriers to
compensation to the informed-consent doctrine. Under the rules
that developed, there still existed several ways in which physicians
could avoid liability for medical accidents. While there was room
for argument about all four of the elements of the cause of action
in negligence for inadequate disclosure, the problems of breach of
duty 1 3 and damages never became substantial issues. Rather, the
problem of establishing what the duty was-that is, what kind and
degree of disclosure was required-and the problem of causation,
have presented the most serious stumbling blocks to compensation
of the medical-accident victim under the informed-consent doctrine.
Most significant, the medical profession managed to retain substantial control over the standard by which the duty of disclosure is
tested. Thus whether or not a patient has been "fully" informed
The longer statutes of limitations in negligence may be an incentive
to compensation-minded courts to view the failure to obtain an informed consent as a species of negligence rather than as assault and
battery. 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, 13.04, at 368.
112. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 30, at 143.
113. The problem of determining whether the duty to disclose has been fulfilled is conceptually difficult, and is often further complicated in
practice by conflicting testimony of the patient and the doctor. See,
e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.
2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1st Dist. 1957). See also Mitchell v.
Robinson, 360 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Mo. 1962); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d
299, 303 (Tex. 1967); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, supra note 67, at 1411 n.92 (1967).
There is empirical evidence suggesting that patients often do not
recall what they have been told. In one study, of 20 patients interviewed four to six months after cardiac surgery, only 10% recalled discussion prior to surgery of potential complications; and even with some
suggestion from the interviewer, only 23% recalled this discussion.
See Medical World News, Feb. 23, 1976, at 26; 235 J.A.M.A. 993 (1976).
See also Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent-Form or
Substance, 123 ARcH. INTRN. MED. 682 (1969). There is also evidence
that patients often do not understand the information that is disclosed
to them. See note 176 infra.
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has been determined by reference to the prevailing standard of disclosure in the profession. 114 Second, the invocation of the so-called
"therapeutic privilege" to withhold information the disclosure of
which might be emotionally upsetting to the patient, has provided
a substantial loophole for evasion of the requirements of informed
consent. Finally, as the cases began to signal a clear adoption of
the negligence form of action for failure to obtain informed consent, the issue of causation began rather slowly to emerge as a new
impediment to the compensation of medical-accident victims.
C.

Expanding Liability in the Wake of Canterbury v. Spence

1.

The Standardof Disclosure

Natanson recognized that the degree of disclosure made to a patient is "primarily a question of medical judgment,""1 5 and consequently that "[t] he duty of the physician to disclose . . .is limited
to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would
make under the same or similar circumstances."116 This rule of
liability closely paralleled the rules of liability in medical negligence cases generally, in that the standard to which the physician
would be held not only in the exercise of skill, but also in the disclosure of information to the patient, is that of "what is customary
and usual in the profession."" 1 7 The courts of numerous other ju114. Natanson acknowledged that the scope of the duty of disclosure is to
be judged by reference to the professional custom. See Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960). Mitchell v. Robinson did not specifically address the question of whether expert testimony is necessary to establish what information is to be disclosed.
The Missouri supreme court later clarified this point, however, when
it said in Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), that "the question
of what disclosure of risks incident to proposed treatment should be
made in a particular situation involves medical judgment and ... expert testimony thereon should be required in malpractice cases involving that issue." Id. at 674.
115. 186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106.
116. Id. In Mitchell, the court did not address the issue of the standard by
which the adequacy of disclosure was to be measured. See note 122
infra.
117.

supra note 2, § 32, at 165; 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra
note 3, f 8.04, at 200. But
[w] here the matter is regarded as within the common knowledge of laymen, as where the surgeon saws off the wrong leg,
or there is injury to a part of the body not within the operative field, it has been held that the jury may infer negligence
without the aid of any expert.
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 32, at 164-65. See also authorities cited note
250 infra.
PROSSER,
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risdictions explicitly adopted this rule, 118 and few seriously questioned it for more than a decade." 9 Some courts even went so far
as to apply the locality rule, 20 leaving it to the local medical community to determine what information should be disclosed to a patient.12 1 A corollary of this so-called "professional" standard of dis118. See Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 949 (E.D. Va. 1960); Shetter v.
Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 370, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz.
App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357,
363-64, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971); Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 54950, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla.
App. 1966); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 195-97, 473 P.2d 116, 121
(1970); Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 184, 262 N.E.2d 156, 161
(1970); Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 8, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (1963);
Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 141, 181 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1962);
Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 138-39, 119 N.W.2d 627, 629-30 (1963) ;
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); Ross v. Hodges, 234
So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss. 1970); Negaard v. Estate of Feda, 152 Mont. 47,
55, 446 P.2d 436, 441 (1968); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 257,
232 A.2d 840, 848 (1967); Petterson v. Lynch, 59 Misc. 2d 469, 471, 299
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302
(Tex. 1967); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d
12, 24, 499 P.2d 1, 9 (1972); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo.
1962). See also Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for
Medical Disclosure, supra note 64, at 551; Note, Failure to Inform as
Medical Malpractice,23 VANDrn. L. Rnv. 754, 768 (1970).
Some of the jurisdictions that once adhered to this rule have since
abandoned it. See note 128 infra.
119. A few intermediate appellate courts questioned the standard, see Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 805, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (2d Dist.
1969); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650
(1971); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 907, 484 P.2d 1162, 1167
(1971), aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972); Mason v. Ellsworth,
3 Wash. App. 298, 312, 474 P.2d 909, 918-19 (1970), and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico seems never to have adopted it. See Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962).
Commentators were also critical of the standard. See 2 HARPER &
JAAms, supra note 4, § 17.1, at 60-61 n.15 (Supp. 1968); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64, at 30-43; Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, supra note 67, at 1404-06 (1967); Note, Restructuring
Informed Consent, supra note 64.
120. See note 41 supra.
121. See George v. Travelers Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D. La. 1963),
aff'd, 328 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1964); Dunlap v. Marine, 242 Cal. App. 2d
162, 177, 51 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167 (2d Dist. 1966); Tangora v. Matansky,
231 Cal. App. 2d 468, 479, 42 Cal. Rptr. 348, 356 (2d Dist. 1964);
Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 549-50, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961);
Visingardi v. Tirone, 178 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. App. 1965), rev'd,
193 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 1967) (specifically leaving question open);
Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 140, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963); Ross
v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss. 1970); Negaard v. Estate of Feda,
152 Mont. 47, 56, 446 P.2d 436, 441 (1968); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 NJ.
Super. 242, 257, 232 A.2d 840, 848 (1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d
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closure was the requirement suggested in Natanson12 2 (and further
developed in subsequent cases) 123 that expert medical testimony
was required to establish the standard of care--i.e., the standard
of disclosure-to which the physician was to1 24
be held, with all of
the problems attendant upon this requirement.
A serious obstacle to the medical-accident -victim's obtaining
compensation was removed by a decision of the District of Colum25
bia Court of Appeals in the 1972 case of Canterbury v. Spence,

122.

123.

124.
125.

275 (1968); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967); ZeBarth
v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 22-23, 499 P.2d 1,
8 (1972); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo. 1962).
The first opinion in Natanson implied, but did not hold, that expert
medical testimony is needed to establish the standard of care: "How
the physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient in this
difficult situation involves primarily a question of medical judgment."
186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106. The opinion denying the motion for
rehearing, however, expressly states that expert testimony is required
to establish whether the disclosures actually made "are in accordance
with those which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same or similar circumstances." 187 Kan. at 190, 354 P.2d at 673.
In Mitchell, the defendants claimed that they informed the plaintiff of
the risks of treatment "in great detail," 334 S.W.2d at 16, and the plaintiff claimed that he had been told none of the risks of treatment. Id.
Since there was no dispute between the parties as to what risks should
have been disclosed, there was no need for the court to address the issue of whether the standard of disclosure is dictated by professional
custom. But in a later case, Missouri adopted a rule measuring the
adequacy of disclosure by reference to the professional custom. See
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965).
See Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 977, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 392
(2d Dist. 1971); Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 364, 492 P.2d
862, 865 (1971); Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 549-50, 173 A.2d
333, 339 (1961); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. App. 1965);
Green v. Hussey, 127 fll. App. 2d 174, 184, 262 N.E.2d 156, 161 (1970);
Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 694, 140 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1966);
Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 396-97, 424 P.2d 488, 494-95 (1967);
Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 141, 181 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1962);
Miles v. Van Gelder, 1 Mich. App. 522, 531-32, 137 N.W.2d 292, 296-97
(1965); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); Petterson v.
Lynch, 59 Misc. 2d 469, 471, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 180, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971);
Anderson v Hooker, 420 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 24, 499
P.2d 1, 8-9 (1972); Stundon v. Stadnik, 469 P.2d 16, 21 (Wyo. 1970);
Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo. 1962).
In jurisdictions that have abandoned the professional standard of
disclosure, expert testimony may still needed to establish both the existence of particular risks and alternative forms of treatment. See
note 139 infra.
See note 41 supra.
464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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which was soon followed in opinions of the Supreme Courts of California and Rhode Island-Cobbs v. Grant1 2 and Wilkinson v.
Vesey 12 7 respectively. Canterbury and its progeny discarded the
professional standard of disclosure, replacing it with a "lay" standard which effectively withdrew from the medical profession the
right to determine what information must be disclosed to pa28

tients.1

Three reasons 12 9 were given for abandoning as a standard of disclosure "the custom of physicians practicing in the community
126. 8 Cal.3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
127. 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).

128. In addition to California and Rhode Island, the lay standard of disclosure has been adopted in the following cases by other jurisdictions:
Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Tennessee law); Delaune v. Davis, 316 So. 2d 7, 12 (La. App.
1975); Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 294 So. 2d 618, 620 (La. App.
1974); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962)
(implied requirement of full disclosure); Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic
Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 205, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, 170 (1975);
Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559
(1973); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 104, 308 N.E.2d 765, 771
(1973); Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Ore. 129, 132, 522
P.2d 208, 209, opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 270 Ore. 144, 526
P.2d 577 (1974); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 266, 286 A.2d
647, 650 (1971); Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Tenn. App.

1974); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 557, 349 A.2d 703,

706 (1975); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 284-85, 522 P.2d 852,
860-61 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Scaria v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653
(1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 604, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315
(1973); cf. Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (D. Idaho
1973); Martin v. Bralliar, - Colo. App. -, 540 P.2d 1118, 1121 (1975)
(burden is on defendant to adduce evidence of community or national

standards relieving him of the duty to disclose).

Some courts have declined to adopt the lay standard of disclosure.
See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying
Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Riedisser v. Nelson, 111
Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 327
A.2d 757, 762-63 (Del. Super. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8, 9 (Del. 1975);
Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 756, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1974);
Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich. App. 344, 349, 213 N.W.2d 317, 320
(1973); Collins v. Itoh, 160 Mont. 461, 468-69, 503 P.2d 36, 40-41 (1972);
Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 342, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581-82 (1975);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975); Bly v. Rhoads,
222 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1976).
129. The court also suggested a fourth reason for the modification of the
standard. Under the law of the District of Columbia, the customary
practice of the medical profession is only evidentiary, and not probative of the standard of care. 464 F.2d at 785. The applicability of this
as justification for revision of the standard in other jurisdictions will,
of course, depend upon the rules of evidence of each jurisdiction. For
a critical account of the three reasons given in Canterbury for aban-
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. . .'130 and replacing it with a standard framed in terms of information that is material to the decisionmaking process of the reasonable man. First, starting from the assumption that the underlying
rationale for the informed-consent doctrine is to permit the patient
to exercise choice concerning the risks to which he is willing to
subject himself and which he would prefer to forego, the court concluded that "[r] espect for the patient's right of self-determination
on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians
rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon
themselves.' 13 1 To permit the physician to determine what information is to be disclosed by reference either to his own personal
standards or to standards of the medical profession is to undercut
the patient's right to have available to him information he might
find relevant to the decision that he must make. Second, the court
stated that it is entirely possible, if not likely, that a standard of
disclosure based upon the custom of the medical profession is a
facade for nondisclosure, 13 2 because it is not clear that there is "any
discernible custom reflecting a professional concensus [sic] on communication of option and risk information to patients .... ,,133 Fi-

doning the professional standard of disclosure see Schneyer, Informed

130.
131.
132.

133.

Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 WIs. L. REv. 124, 150-55, which concludes that the
best reason for the change from a professional to a lay standard of disclosure is the bias toward underdisclosure in the medical profession.
464 F.2d at 783.
Id. at 784; accord, Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I 606, 624-25, 295 A.2d 676,
688 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
In Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971), aff'd, 81
Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972), the defendant-physician had testified that the "risks are minimal, and they are never mentioned to a
patient." Id. at 902, 484 P.2d at 1164. The trial judge had therefore
"felt that he was compelled to dismiss Mrs. Hunter's case because she
produced no evidence of a medical standard of disclosure." Id.
464 F.2d at 783; accord, Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 623, 295 A.2d
676, 687 (1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis.
1, 12, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975). Courts that have subsequently considered this question have concurred in this view, and have supplemented it with the rationale that since disclosure in a particular case
depends substantially upon the facts of that case-facts not known to
the medical profession generally-there can realistically be no professional standard of disclosure. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, supra at
623, 295 A.2d at 687.
One study of this problem is reported in Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical,Empirical
Study, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 758, 765-66 (1970). Physicians, in response
to the question, "Was Dr. D right in telling P only what he did?" responded to hypothetical cases as follows:
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nally, the court found it to be inappropriate to establish the bounds
of duty by reference to a profession's own standard of conduct
where the professional's "activity does not bring his [special] medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into play.' 34 Because the
materiality of information to a patient's decision is not a matter of
medical judgment, the standard of materiality, and thus of disclosure, 3 5 must be set by law rather than by professional custom:
When medical judgment enters the picture... prevailing medical
practice must be given its just due. In all other instances, however, the general standard exacting ordinary care applies, and that
standard is set by law. In sum, the physician's duty to disclose
is governed by the same legal principles applicable to others in
comparable situations, with modifications only to the extent that
medical judgment enters the picture. 1 6
A fair statement of the rule that emerged-and there are several
different statements in the Canterbury case alone-is that the
physician is required to disclose all information about a proposed
treatment which a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances
would find material to his decision either to undergo or to forego
treatment.3 7 The scope of the duty to disclose is to be determined
by "the patient's right of self-decision,"'3 8 rather than by the custom or practice either of the particular physician making the disclosure or by the larger medical profession.
Question
1
"Yes"
"No?'

134.
135.
136.
137.

138.

Question
2
"Yes"
"No"

67
52
101
67
a) "medically?"
64
69
38
111
b) "ethically?"
40
78
29
117
c) "legally?"
Id. at 765 n.30, 766 n.34. This illustrates that there is substantial disagreement as to what risks are required to be disclosed as a matter of
good medical practice, ethically, or legally.
464 F.2d at 785.
See note 137 infra.
464 F.2d at 785.
See id. at 786-87. The court adopted as the test of materiality that proposed by Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64, at 640: "A risk is...
material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to
undergo the proposed therapy." 464 F.2d at 787; accord, Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
The Canterbury court rejected as a measure of the physician's duty
of disclosure that which the particular "patient would consider important to his decision," stating that this cannot be known to the physician
with "complete exactitude." The court felt, however, that "on the basis of [the physician's] medical training and experience he can sense
[what] the average, reasonable patient" would want to know. 464
F.2d at 787.
Id. at 786,
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By imposing a "lay" or "objective" standard, Canterbury substantially enhanced the prospects for the compensation of the medical-accident victim. The lay standard of disclosure, by eliminating
the need to obtain expert testimony,13 9 removed one of the more
substantial barriers to getting to the jury. In addition, and probably of far more significance, the jury, rather than being bound
by any single expert witness's testimony or having to decide between conflicting expert testimony, itself determines the adequacy
of disclosure. Therefore, factors extraneous to the actual rules of
decision-most notably the egregiousness of the plaintiff's injuries
-may more directly enter into the jurors' individual and collective
decisionmaking processes.
2.

TherapeuticPrivilege

Although the doctrine of informed consent requires disclosure
of relevant information to patients-whether relevancy is judged
by a lay or professional standard-a patient's consent to treatment
will still be recognized as valid when less than full disclosure has
occurred if full disclosure would have had a deleterious effect upon
the patient's emotional condition. Under these circumstances, the
physician is said to have a "therapeutic privilege" to withhold information from the patient. 14 Despite the fact that the invocation
139. There may still be a need to obtain expert testimony concerning what
the risks are of a particular procedure, as opposed to expert testimony
as to whether admitted risks must be disclosed. See Morgenroth v.
Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 534-35, 126 Cal. Rptr.

681, 689 (1st Dist. 1976); Pierce v. Dowman, 135 Ga. App. 783, 783, 219

S.E.2d 8, 9 (1975); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 626, 295 A.2d 676,
688 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 284, 522 P.2d 852,
861 (1974), affd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
140. The precise definition of the privilege varies considerably among jurisdictions, as does the formulation of the informed-consent requirement
to which it is an exception. Several good discussions of the privilege
exist. See Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of Patient
Choice, supra note 64; Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra
note 64, at 1564; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64, at 641-43. The
legal origins of the therapeutic privilege are unclear, Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1564-65 n.95, although it
seems first to have been adverted to in Twombly v. Leach, 65 Mass.
(11 Cush.) 397, 405-06 (1853) ("Upon the question whether it be good
medical practice to withhold from a patient . . . a knowledge of the

extent and danger of his disease, the testimony of educated and

experienced medical practitioners is material and peculiarly appropri-

ate.").
Paradoxically, the medical profession seems to have recognized a
privilege to withhold information long before there was any firmly established obligation to disclose information. The two earliest articles
discussing the privilege-Lund, The Doctor, the Patient,and the Truth,
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of the privilege undercuts the patient's right of self-determination,
some courts have reasoned that the erosion of this value is more
than offset by the augmentation of the patient's health. 141 Further,
it is said that the physician's obligation to "do no harm" "must take
1 42
precedence at times over the duty to tell the patient the truth."'
On its face the therapeutic privilege bestows substantial latitude
upon the physician to withhold information from the patient. Carried to its extreme, the privilege embodies the paternalistic notion,
completely antithetical to the doctrines of consent and informed
19

TENN.

L. REv. 344 (1946), and Smith, supra note 79-appeared at

a time when very few cases had imposed upon a physician an affirmative duty of disclosure. See note 78 supra.
141. See Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1565-66
(invocation of privilege "should be permitted only when there is a
clear showing that the patient's interest in not hearing is greater than
his interest in making his own decision"). In ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp.
Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972), the court recognized
that "[t]he rules imposing upon a doctor the duty to inform ... may
present dangers to patient and physican alike, and if extravagantly
interpreted might in some degree impede the advancement of medical
science or operate to deprive the patient of the most modern therapy
and latest scientific developments . . . ." Id. at 27, 499 P.2d at 10. It
concluded, however, that this drawback does not justify the abrogation
of the duty. It has also been suggested that "a complete disclosure...
could so alarm the patient that it would, in fact, constitute bad medical
practice," Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 8, 379 P.2d 292, 294 (1963),
that might even be actionable. See note 90 supra.
142. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964); accord,
Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1957); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 365-66, 409 P.2d 74, 81-82 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181
(1957); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 191-92, 473 P.2d 116, 119
(1970); Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 694, 140 N.W.2d 139, 14445 (1966); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 22728, 381 S.W.2d 563, 567-68 (1964).
There is some empirical evidence that full disclosure "does no
harm" to the patient. In a study of 100 patients who were to undergo
angiography (a procedure in which a dye is injected into the arteries
to study circulation), only 2 refused treatment after full disclosure of
the risks. Twenty-seven of the 100 indicated that full disclosure made
them less comfortable about going ahead with the procedure. In a related study, 103 of 132 patients answered "no" to a question asking
them whether they "[w]ould . . . have preferred that we [withhold]
information concerning possible complications." Alfidi, Informed
Consent-A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J.A.M.A. 1325 (1971). See
also Alfidi, Informed Consent and Special Procedures, 40 CLEV. CLINIC
Q., Spring, 1973, at 21 (similar study with similar results); Rosenberg,
Informed Consent-A Reappraisal of Patients' Reactions, 119 CALIF.
MED. 64 (Nov., 1973).
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consent, of "doctor knows best,' 143 permitting the substitution of
the physician's judgment for the patient's. 4 4 In practice, the courts
have been quite tolerant of physicians withholding information on
their mere representation that to have informed the patient would
have unduly upset him.
Recognizing that the therapeutic privilege had the potential to
"devour the disclosure rule itself,'1 45 the Canterbury court considered the application of the privilege and promulgated standards for
its appropriate invocation, departing significantly from the traditional attitude toward the privilege. The privilege, the court
stated, is not to be used to permit the physician to substitute his
judgment for the patient's. Where the physician expects that full
disclosure would cause the patient to forego treatment, a proper
case for its application does not exist. Rather, the privilege properly operates only when the communication of information to the
patient, based on sound medical judgment, would cause the patient
to become so distraught
that he would not be able to make a ra146
tional decision.
The reformulation of the therapeutic privilege in Canterbury
will have a twofold effect on the compensation of medical-accident
victims. Physicians who withhold information from patients,
whether intentionally or negligently, will be forced to contend with
a legal rule permitting such withholding only under very narrow
circumstances. 147 However, litigation also will occur over the ap143. Smith, supra note 79, at 351.
144. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1564-71.

145. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).

146. Id. Canterbury specified the conditions under which the privilege
should not operate, but failed to explain expressly when the privilege
should operate. Since the court indicated, however, that the objective
of disclosure is to promote "the patient's right of self-decision," id. at
786, the privilege should properly operate when disclosure would
interfere with the patient's right of self-decision.
That there is a fine line between withholding information because
it would so upset the patient that he could not make a rational decision, and withholding information because disclosure would result in
a decision against treatment, is well illustrated by the examples in
Lund, supra note 140.
147. If the therapeutic privilege is invoked, is the physician obliged nevertheless to disclose the information withheld from the patient to some
other interested person such as a close relative? In discussing anothet
excertion to the duty to disclose, the so-called "emergency" exception,
the Canterburycourt stated that in an emergency, when informed consent is impractical, "the physician should, as current law requires, attempt to secure a relative's consent if possible." 464 F.2d at 789. Although the court did not address the necessity of disclosure to a close
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propriate rules for the application of the new, narrower privilege
announced in Canterbury. Because the court's discussion of the
privilege was quite limited-the facts of the case do not even appear
to have raised the issue and hence the entire discussion is dictumit will take further litigation to polish the rough edges of the privilege. In the past, little room for maneuvering existed once the
physician testified that he had withheld information because it
would have harmed the patient. 148 Now, however, there will be
to maneuver through tactics, either
additional room for the plaintiff
1 49
factual or legal, or both.
There remains the question of what the appropriate standard
for withholding information ought to be. Should the physician's
right to withhold information from the patient be determined by
the exercise of professional judgment, or in accord with a lay standard of what information would emotionally harm a reasonable
person in like circumstances? Conceptually, the problem of what
information the physician may withhold is the converse of what inrelative when the therapeutic privilege is invoked, other courts have
suggested that less than full disclosure under such circumstances will
not be tolerated.

See, e.g., Darrah v. Kite, 32 App. Div. 2d 208, 212,

301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 292 (1969); cf. Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 187, 198

(Mo. 1959). But see Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 198-99, 473 P.2d
116, 122-23 (1970). See also Hagman, supra note 133, at 791.
Because the legitimate reasons for invoking the therapeutic privilege are absent when the information is to be disclosed to a third
party, the privilege should have no application under such circumstances. Disclosure to a third party may, however, raise ethical, and
possibly legal, issues for the physician who is under an obligation not
to disclose confidential information about the patient. See American
Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, OPINIONS AND
9 (1969), reprinted in
REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL iii-vii,
J.KATZ, supra note 68, at 314, 315. See generally, Boyle, Medical Confidence-Civil Liability for Breach, 24 N. IR. L.Q. 19 (1973); Furner &
Thomason, Physician-Patient Confidences: Legal Effects of Computerization of Records, 31 ALA. LAWYER 193 (1970); Annot., 20
A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968); 28 OKLA.L. REV. 658 (1975).
148. Moreover, "[a]vailable evidence indicates that physicians' decisions to
withhold information are based on hearsay rather than on actual experience with the effects of full disclosure and that the physician's own
emotional reluctance to confront the patient with stark diagnoses and
risks often prevents disclosure." Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1566.
149. Expert testimony concerning the appropriate invocation of the privilege does not appear to be foreclosed even by the restrictive formulation of Canterbury. Psychiatric testimony may be admitted to establish the patient's emotional state at the time when disclosure would
have been made. Expert testimony, however, will no longer be dis-

positive of the issue of whether the privilege was properly exercised.
Id. at 1569 n.105.
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formation he must disclose. A court, when confronted with the issue
of the appropriate standard for the application of the therapeutic

privilege, should therefore follow the same rule that it applies in
determining whether to hold the physician to a lay or professional
standard of disclosure. Thus, to the extent that the lay standard
of disclosure announced in Canterbury' 50 is adopted by other jurisdictions, a correspondingly narrow therapeutic privilege should also
develop. 15 '
150. The Canterbury court did not articulate a standard against which the
operation of the privilege is to be judged. Its statement that "[tihe
critical inquiry is whether the physician responded to a sound medical
judgment that communication of the risk information would present a
threat to the patient's well-being," 464 F.2d at 789 (emphasis added),
could be taken to mean that expert testimony is required to determine
whether the privilege was properly invoked. But the court's strenuous
insistence upon a lay standard for determining what information must
be disclosed to the patient is hard to reconcile with its favoring a professional standard for determining what information may be withheld.
The overall tone of the opinion implies that a lay standard would be
deemed as appropriate to the withholding of information as it was to
the disclosure of information. For a discussion of the possible standards of disclosure see Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64,
at 1567-68.
151. The California supreme court may have rejected a narrow therapeutic
privilege. Its statement in Cobbs v. Grant is at best puzzling and at
worst contradictory:
A disclosure need not be made beyond that required within
the medical community when a doctor can prove by a preponderance of the evidence he relied upon facts which would
demonstrate to a reasonable man the disclosure would have so
seriously upset the patient that the patient would not have
been able to dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment.
8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972). The
statement first seems to indicate that the appropriateness of invoking
the privilege should be measured against the practices of the medical
community (professional test), but then it implies that the privilege
is properly applied only if a reasonable man (lay test) would have
withheld information. Because the statement is obiter dictum, the
court was probably not unduly concerned with clarifying this seeming
ambiguity. Yet California physicians presumably would be interested
in such a clarification. One plausible interpretation is that the test is
to be a professional one as to the content of the information that is to
be disclosed (or withheld) when the privilege is properly invoked, but
the propriety of invoking the privilege is to be judged according to a
lay standard.
Wilkinson v. Vesey did not discuss the issue of therapeutic privilege, but merely recognized that "[t] he imposition of a duty of making
disclosure is tempered by the recognition that there may be a situation
where a disclosure should not be made because it would unduly agitate or undermine an unstable patient." 110 R.I. at 628, 295 A.2d at
689. In support of this statement, it cited three cases-Stauffer v. Kar-
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Regardless of what standard is used to measure the appropriateness of the exercise of the privilege, there remains the question
of which party is to bear the burden of proof. Traditionally the
plaintiff bears the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of the adequacy of disclosure, because it is one of the elements of the cause
of action. 152 Reasoning from this premise, it has generally been
assumed that where the therapeutic privilege is invoked, because
it essentially speaks to the adequacy of disclosure, the burden of
proof on the privilege rests on the plaintiff. 153
abin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 363-64, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971); Di Filippo v.
Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); and Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960)-only the first of which explicitly held
that the validity of the exercise of the privilege is to be tested by professional standards. The other two cases did not have occasion to consider this question, though both held that the duty to disclose was to
be measured by professional standards.
The Canterbury opinion itself states that "[t]he critical inquiry is
whether the physician responded to a sound medical judgment that
communication of the risk information would present a threat to the
patient's well-being." 464 F.2d at 789 (emphasis added). It is not
clear whether the "soundness" of medical judgment is to be determined by reference to some general professional standard, or by reference to the subjective judgment of the defendant-physician who made
the decision to withhold the information. The Canterbury court, in its
discussion of the standard by which to measure affirmative disclosure,
rejected both of these standards as inappropriate. Id. at 787. The inconsistency apparently escaped the attention of the court.
152. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675-76 (Mo. 1965).
153. As is the case with the allocation of the burden of proof in general,
the few courts that have considered the problem in the context of therapeutic privilege have for the most part failed to distinguish between
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. See generally
F. JAMEs, supra note 43, §§ 7.5-.8. One exception is Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 364, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971), in which the
court held that the plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence of
his uninformed status at the time consent was given, and that once
this burden is met, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the nondisclosure "conformed with community medical standards of care or national standards . . .

,"

and implied that

the therapeutic privilege might constitute such a standard. See
also Martin v. Bralliar, - Colo. App. -, 540 P.2d 1118, 1121 (1975).
Several courts have either expressly held or suggested that the burden
of proof on therapeutic privilege is on the doctor. See Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972); Small
v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 557, 349 A.2d 703, 706 (1975);
Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 241, 523 P.2d 211, 218 (1974); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 604, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (1973).
Other courts have suggested that the burden is on the plaintiff. Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 757, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1974); Getchell
v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 182-83, 489 P.2d 953, 957 (1971); Longmire
v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tenn. App. 1974).
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Canterbury analyzed this issue more closely than had any previous case and came to the realization that, essentially, the therapeutic privilege is an affirmative defense by which the physician
first admits that disclosure was less than ordinarily would be
deemed adequate and then seeks to justify the degree of disclosure
that actually occurred. Therefore, because the allocation of the
burden of proof is primarily an issue of fairness and policy rather
than one susceptible to mechanical resolution, 154 Canterburylooked
to the equities of the issue to allocate the burden.
Two factors weighed heavily in Canterbury's allocation of the
burden to the defendant-physician. First, before the matter of
therapeutic privilege even becomes an issue in the case, the plaintiff
must have adduced some evidence that disclosure was inadequate.
Thus, placing the burden of proof regarding therapeutic privilege
on the defendant still would not require him to risk an adverse
directed verdict should he fail to come forth with any explanation
whatever. Second, the fact that "any evidence bearing on the privilege is usually in the hands of the physician alone... [r] equire Es]
him to open the proof on the privilege ... consistent with judicial
policy laying such a burden on the party who seeks shelter from
an exception to a general rule and who is more likely to have possession of the facts."'155 This result honors the therapeutic privilege
as an exception to the general rule of full disclosure, rather than
as a presumptively acceptable manner for physicians to behave
which must be overcome by the plaintiff in individual cases.156
One commentator has stated that "[a]fter the patient has satisfied
the elements necessary to prevail, the burden of going forward shifts
to the physician, who must introduce evidence explaining the reason
for withholding the information." Zaslow, Informed Consent in Medical Practice,22 PRACTICAL LAWYER 13, 25-26 (Apr., 1976). This clearly
goes too far, in that it implies that if the defendant fails to introduce
evidence justifying the invocation of the therapeutic privilege, there
must be a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The failure to justify the
therapeutic privilege, assuming that it is pleaded, should merely permit the plaintiff to get to the jury.
154. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVMIENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940).
155. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). The burden of proof on therapeutic privilege should
be the same whether or not the test of the appropriateness of its invocation is lay or professional. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo.
App. 357, 364, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (1971) (applying a professional test
to the therapeutic privilege and placing the burden of proof on the
defendant-physician).
156. Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, supra
note 64, at 514. Even where the courts are reluctant to apply a therapeutic privilege as narrow as that announced in Canterbury,it is still
not inconsistent to place the burden of proof on the defendant-physi-
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Even in those jurisdictions which might adopt a professional
standard by which to measure the appropriateness of the applica-

tion of the therapeutic privilege, plaintiffs will still have some room
to maneuver with factual tactics. There will be disputes as to
whether the physician actually exercised sound medical judgment
in concluding that disclosure would have been harmful to the plainother
tiff-that is, whether or not he conformed to the practice that
157
physicians would have employed under like circumstances.
The narrow therapeutic privilege articulated in Canterbury,
even if not universally adopted in other jurisdictions, is still likely
to suggest to plaintiffs that the privilege need not be as broad as
the medical profession might like,158 nor as broad as it has been
in practice. 5" Because of the close conceptual relationship between
the privilege and the fundamental duty to disclose, it is likely that
the rules that shape the latter in a given jurisdiction will determine
cian. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 516 (1972).
157. See Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1567-70.

158. See note 148 supra. No scholarly or judicial attention seems to have
been directed toward eliminating the privilege altogether and atempting to reconcile the patient's right to information with the physician's
obligation to do no harm through the mechanism of waiver. The
courts have recognized that the patient may give up the right to have

information disclosed, see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 516, 502 P.2d 1, 12 (1972); Putenson v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12

Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1083-84, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (1st Dist. 1970),
and this view has been supported by even the most ardent critic
of the paternalistic potential of the informed-consent doctrine. See
Goldstein, supra note 64, at 692. But see Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal.
(4th Dist.
App. 3d. 662, -, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 543, -, P.2d 1976). Presumably, a waiver is valid only if it is voluntary and
knowing. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 479 (1966).
Thus, in the medical context, the doctor must not have conditioned
the availability of medical care upon nondisclosure, and he must have
informed the patient that the patient has the right to have information disclosed. To minimize the risk of upsetting the patient, the
doctor might prepare the patient as follows:
There is some information about your treatment that you may
wish to know, and I will tell you about it if you like. There's
a chance that this information may upset you, and if you'd
rather that I not go into details, please say so. And if you'd

like I'll discuss it with your spouse [or other family member]
instead.

See Irvin, Now, Mrs. Blare, About the Complications . . . , 40 ME.
EcoN., July 29, 1963, at 102 (parody of disclosure required by doctrine

of informed consent), reprinted in J. KATZ, supra note 68, at 393. It
is, of course, possible that even the limited disclosure that "this information may upset you" will harm the patient. But to require such
a minimal disclosure does not seem an unreasonable compromise between the competing interests of the patient's right to disclosure and
the doctor's obligation not to harm the patient. But see Aden v.
Younger, supra.
159. See authorities cited note 140 supra.
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the former. Yet plaintiffs who focus on this crucial connection between the two will of necessity emphasize to the courts that the
therapeutic privilege is properly invoked only when the disclosure
of full information would have harmed the plaintiff. To the extent,
then, that courts are made to realize that the privilege cannot be
used to permit the physician to substitute his judgment for the

patient's-that is, to withhold information when the physician
believes that its disclosure would result in a decision to forego treatment-inquiry will have to be made into the validity of the physi-

cian's judgment.
3.

Causation
What Canterbury gave to plaintiffs with one hand, it partially
took away with the other. During the 1960's, the assimilation of
the cause of action for inadequate disclosure to the cause of action
for negligence presented a serious obstacle to the compensation of
medical-accident victims. The primary difficulty was the establishment of the standard of disclosure by the profession, which meant
both that the profession could impose a restrictive standard of disclosure and that proof of the standard had to be by expert testimony. Canterbury,by changing the standard of care from a professional to a lay one and thereby eliminating the need for expert
testimony to establish the standard, eliminated this obstacle, and
consequently focused attention on another problem that had been
lurking in the shadows all along-the element of causation.
Although Canterbury substantially diminished the plaintiffs'
problem, even under an informed-consent theory, of establishing
the duty to which physicians are held-albeit a duty to disclose,
rather than a duty to use reasonable care in the practice of medicine
-it reinforced, if not created, another barrier to compensation. Because mere breach of duty would not establish liability in a cause
of action sounding in negligence, the plaintiff was also compelled
to demonstrate the existence of legal causation between the breach
of duty and the ensuing damages. L6 0
160. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, is the form
of action crucial. If the absence of a legally valid consent is viewed
as rendering the ensuing treatment a trespass to the person, then the
legal wrong consists in the very performance of the procedure. PRossER, supra note 2, § 32, at 165; Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358,
366, 409 P.2d 74, 82 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45
(1966). For a comprehensive analysis of the distinction see" Trogun v.
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 596-600, 207 N.W.2d 297, 311-13 (1973);
C. Fr=D, MEDIccA EXPEPXMNTATION § 2.1 (1974); Goldstein, supra note
64, at 690-98; Plante, supra note 98. If, however, the appropriate form
of action for the lack of a legally valid consent is negligence, the de-
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Prior to Canterbury, courts had given very little attention to
causation in informed-consent cases.' 61 While courts considering
the problem both before 162 and after 163 Canterbury agreed that
parture from that standard is not actionable unless it is the proximate
cause of the ensuing injury. The legal wrong is thus conceived
as being "injury-to-the-patient-resulting-from-inadequate-disclosure,"
whereas the trespass action views the legal injury as the "failureto-convey-adequate-information." See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 32, at
165; 1 HARPER & JAmEs, supra note 4, § 3.10, at 235; Goldstein, supra
note 64, at 691. "Proof of proximate cause in [negligence] cases requires, initially, a showing that the unrevealed risk which should have
been made known has materialized." Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82,
92 (Me. 1974).
Waltz and Scheuneman claim that "[t]his basic principle of tort
law [i.e., a causal connection between the failure to disclose and the
injury resulting from the occurrence of an undisclosed risk] has been
alluded to more frequently by commentators than courts in the medical malpractice area," and that Shetter v. Rochelle, supra, and Aiken
v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), "are the only reported medical
cases that have stated the principle clearly." Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra note 64, at 646 n.69. It should not be surprising that the courts
have paid scant attention to the necessity for a causal connection between the failure to disclose and the injury, since this requirement
such a well-established principle of negligence law. See Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921), in which the court refused to
impose liability upon a physician who had failed to warn a family that
the condition from which two of the children were suffering was a
contagious disease (typhoid fever), on the ground that there was no
proof that the defendant's omission was the proximate cause of the
remainder of the family members' contracting of the disease.
161. For example, in Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74
(1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966), the court seemed
unaware of the problem of the appropriate test to be used to determine
causation. In the following excerpt from its opinion, the court unconsciously intermingled the two tests:
The fact that the plaintiff proceeded to have this operation
upon her other eye by another surgeon, presumably after she
was fully informed of the inherent risks to this operation, is
some evidence that disclosure by the defendant of inherent
risks would not have deterred her from having the earlier operation. The risks of injury are not so great as to most reasonable persons to decline to have such a beneficial operation
performed ....
Id. at 367, 409 P.2d at 83 (emphasis added). At first the court implied ("disclosure . . . of . . . risks would not have deterred her")
that a subjective standard is the test of causation, but in the
next sentence it invoked an objective test (whether "[t]he risks
* * * are ... so great ... to most reasonable persons").
162. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 367, 409 P.2d 74, 83, modified,
2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1965); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.
393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668,
676 (Mo. 1965); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 604, 155 S.E.2d 108, 113
(1967).
163. See note 168 infra.
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causation exists only when disclosure of risks to the patient would
have resulted in a decision to forego treatment,164 most courts failed
to address the problem of whether causation is to be found by reference to an objective (reasonable man) or subjective (the particular
patient) standard. Many commentators assumed that the subjective
test should be applied, 165 and the courts concurred, although seemingly unaware of the issue.'66
Canterbury,however, rejected the subjective test on the grounds
that "[i] t places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight
and bitterness . . . [and] places the factfinder in the position of
deciding whether a speculative answer to a hypothetical question
is to be credited.' 6 Just as other jurisdictions have begun to adopt
the reasoning and holding of the Canterbury decision requiring that
the adequacy of disclosure be measured against a lay, rather than
a professional, standard, so too have they followed Canterbury on
the issue of causation. 68
164. 464 F.2d at 791.
165. See Plante, supra note 98, at 666-67; Comment, Informed Consent
in Medical Malpractice, supra note 67, at 1411; Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, supra note 64, at 885;
75 HARv. L. REV. 1445, 1448-49 (1962). But see Shartsis, supra note 64,
at 547; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64, at 646-48; Note, Failure
to Inform as Medical Malpractice,supra note 118, at 773. Although the
test of causation was assumed to be subjective to the patient, if his
testimony that he would have forgone the procedure was "inherently
incredible," or his "veracity is impeached," or "there is proof that he
actually knew of the danger all along," the trier of fact is not bound by
his testimony. Plante, supra note 98, at 667.
166. See note 161 supra.
167. 464 F.2d at 790-91. The Cobbs court, following similar reasoning, also
adopted the objective test of causation. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) ("we doubt that justice will be served by placing the physician in jeopardy of the patient's
bitterness and disillusionment"); accord, Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan.
524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468,
344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68
Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975). The Canterbury formulation relies
heavily upon that suggested by Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64,
at 646-48.
168. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 422 & n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 845 (1974); Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (1974); Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp.
1073, 1078 (D. Idaho 1973); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d
1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524,
537, 512 P.2d 539, 550 (1973); Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease
Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 207, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, 171-72 (1975); Fogal
v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 474-75, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 560
(1973); Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Okla. 1973) (by implication); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 551, 349 A.2d 703,
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The unwillingness of the courts to view inadequate disclosure
of information alone as a harm to the patient, and the corresponding insistence upon the need to demonstrate that "but for" inadequate disclosure' 60 the patient would not have consented to treat707 (1975); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 236-37, 523 P.2d 211,
216 (1974); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 288-92, 522 P.2d
852, 864-65 (1974), afl'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Scaria
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 227 N.W.2d
647, 655 (1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 603, 207 N.W.2d
297, 315 (1973).
For an example of a forerunner to the test of causation adopted in
Canterbury see Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 266-69, 286
A.2d 647, 650-51 (1971).
As with the lay standard of disclosure, see note 128 supra,there are
still strong pockets of resistance to the adoption of the rules laid down
in Canterbury. Several jurisdictions still adhere to a subjective test
of causation. See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alas. 1975);
Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1975); Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 533-35, 126
Cal. Rptr. 681, 688-89 (1st Dist. 1976); Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 294 So. 2d 618, 620 (La. App. 1974); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I.
606, 628-29, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846, 848 (Tex. 1975). In addition, some courts have not yet recognized or acknowledged that there is even any issue as to the appropriate test of causation. See Poulin v. Zartman, supra; Riedisser v.
Nelson, supra; Goodwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra; Wilkinson v.
Vesey, supra; Jacobs v. Theimer, supra.
169. See generally 2 HARPEa & JAmEs, supra note 4, § 20.2; PROSSER, supra
note 2, §§ 41, 42.
The objective and subjective tests of causation, as applied by the
courts, are both "but for" tests. That is, the plaintiff must prove that
but for the inadequate disclosure, a reasonable person (objective test),
or the plaintiff (subjective test), would not have consented to treatment. One alternative, clearly at the other extreme, is that there be
no test of causation at all, with a mere showing of failure to disclose
being liability-grounding. This, of course, is not entirely a question of
causation, but also pertains to the nature of the duty owed by the physician, as well as the nature of the harm suffered by the patient. Under this rule, the duty owed is that of disclosure per se, and the harm
that occurs is not the bad results from the treatment, but the failure
to disclose.
An intermediate position is that of requiring that the patient demonstrate not that he or a reasonable person would have forgone treatment had adequate disclosure been made, but that the information that
was withheld was material to the decisionmaking process (either of
the plaintiff or of a reasonable person). This test has been applied by
the Supreme Court in determining whether there has been a violation
of § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and of Rule 14a-9
issued thereunder, which require the disclosure of material facts in
proxy statements. To establish such a violation, one need not prove
that undisclosed material information caused the shareholder to vote
in favor of a proposal. The Court has recognized that,
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ment, constitutes the strongest judicial resistance to broadening the
role that the doctrine of informed consent is to play in compensating victims of medical accidents. The added unwillingness to apply
a subjective test of causation further thwarts the ability to obtain
compensation for injuries not occasioned by medical negligence.
More important, these trends undermine a fundamental purpose
of the informed-consent doctrine-the protection and promotion of
[a]s an abstract proposition, the most desirable role for a

court in a suit of this sort, coming after the consummation of

the proposed transaction, would perhaps be to determine
whether in fact the proposal would have been favored by the
shareholders and consummated in the absence of any misstatement or omission.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (1976). Because "such matters are not subject to determination with certainty,"
id., however, the Court held that a violation occurs if material information is merely withheld or misstated. The standard of materiality is
then defined in such a way as to presume that the undisclosed information caused the stockholder to vote as he did without actual proof
thereof:
[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... It does not require proof
of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
Id. at 2133; cf. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 2281-82 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). This test bears a close resemblance to the "substantial factor" formula of causation, under
which a defendant is liable for harm done to the plaintiff only if his
conduct was "a material element and a substantial factor in bringing
it about." PnossEa, supranote 2, § 41, at 240.
If courts were to adopt the position that the mere breach of the
duty to disclose gave rise to a cause of action, without the need for a
showing that failure to disclose was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's decision to consent to treatment, there probably would not be, in
cases where there was no consequent physical injury to the patient, a
rash of lawsuits for failure to disclose, since only nominal damages
would be available. See note 63 supra. Where, however, the undisclosed risk did materialize, but the plaintiff was unable to prove "but
for" causation between the nondisclosure and the injury, an emotional
appeal to the jury concerning the materialized risk might lead to the
awarding of damages for the physical injury under the guise of compensation for the dignitary harm. This is presently not possible in jurisdictions requiring a "but for" test of causation, because the failure
to prove "but for" causation keeps the case from the jury. Only where
consent was also totally lacking, and a count in battery was alleged,
could the plaintiff get to the jury and stand a chance of obtaining damages for the physical injury in the guise of damages for the dignitary
harm.
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human dignity. 17 0 Because the doctrine is premised on the right
of the individual to make decisions concerning the kind of medical
care (if any) that he wishes to undergo or forego, regardless of
the soundness of his reasons, 1'7 1 the subjective test of causation is
far more consonant with the underlying rationale for informed consent than is the objective test.' 7 2 By conditioning the availability
of compensation on the congruence between the patient's own decision and what a "reasonable" person would have decided under
the same or similar circumstances, the objective test undercuts the
patient's right of self-determination.
It is not difficult to understand why this development has occurred. As Canterbury indicates, and as other cases have agreed,' 7 3
170. The objective standard of causation is one example of what Professor
Joseph Goldstein regards as a fundamental misunderstanding and misapplication of informed consent: "In the name of respect for human
dignity, the current concept [of informed consent] has been subtly
construed to deny it . . . ." Goldstein, supra note 64, at 691.
One of the reasons for permitting persons to make foolish decisions
is that it is paternalistic to do otherwise. Id. But there is also a
practical reason-namely, that of the difficulty of defining what is
"foolish," even in the limited context of providing medical care. Doctors themselves often do not obtain routine or other needed medical
care. Am. Med. News, Apr. 5, 1976, at 17, col. 2. That persons educated to make "wise" decisions about medical care often do not follow
their own professional advice evidences disagreement within the medical profession-let alone between doctors and patients-as to the wisdom of particular courses of action.
171. See Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 266-67, 286 A.2d 647, 650
(1971); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15, 790 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d
619, 624 (Northampton County 1973) (a decision that is "foolish and
irrational to an outside observer" does not warrant being overridden).
But see note 189 infra. See also Goldstein, supra note 64, at 69396; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 64, at 642; Note, Physicians and
Surgeons, 75 HARv. L. Rzv. 1445 (1962); Comment, Informed Consent
as a Theory of Medical Liability, supra note 64; Comment, Informed
Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, supra note 64, at 504; Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
172. See, e.g., Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1,
15, 227 N.W.2d 647, 655 (1975) ("The plaintiffs argue that the objective standard is unfair in that it deprives the patient of the right
to make his own decision for whatever reasons he alone may deem
appropriate."). See also Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, supra note 64, at 1642.
173. See note 167 supra. See also Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (testimony
by mother of child who contracted polio from immunization that she
would have refused the immunization if she had been warned of the
danger, is self-serving, but presumption of reading and refusal arises
where warning not given); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d
602, 604-05 (Tex. 1972), rev'g 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
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it is highly unlikely that a medical-accident victim would thwart
his own opportunities for obtaining compensation-no matter how
much good faith we are willing to ascribe to him-by testifying
that had he been properly informed, he would have withheld his
consent.
There is, however, a serious problem with the court's reasoning.
Under an objective test of causation, the plaintiff still will be able
to testify as to what he actually would have done had he been properly informed. Although such testimony will no longer be dispositive of the causation issue, the jury will be able to consider the
plaintiff's subjective views. 174 Canterbury,in rejecting a subjective
test of causation, was skeptical of the plaintiff's ability to admit,
after the fact, that he would have elected treatment even if adequate disclosure had been made. For the same reason that the Canterbury court was skeptical, it is reasonable to assume that the
jurors will also be skeptical. Because it is the jury's function to
evaluate all the evidence and to weigh the credibility of witnesses, 1 75 it would have ample opportunity to employ this natural
skepticism. Thus the fear of the court is overstated, if not entirely
misplaced.
D.

Disclosure or Understanding. The Next Assault?

There are aspects of the doctrine of informed consent that hardly
have begun to be explored by the courts. One of the most notable
is the extent to which a patient must "understand" the information
that has been disclosed to him before his consent is legally valid.
(whether plaintiff's failure to read a label, which did not contain a
warning, was a cause of his injury is a jury question).
174. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash.
2d 12, 31, 499 P.2d 1, 13 (1972). The Washington supreme court,
in applying a subjective test of causation, held that the plaintiff need
not specifically testify on the causation issue in order to establish
proximate cause between the undisclosed information and the decision
to undergo treatment, stating that such testimony adds little to the
credible proof. Id. at 31, 499 P.2d at 13. Despite the court's unwillingness to credit plaintiff's own testimony on causation, it was still
not willing to reject, as was the Canterbury court, a subjective test
of causation.
175. F. JAmES, supra note 43, § 7.7, at 253. The courts might adopt in
informed-consent cases the same rule that has been adopted with respect to causation in products liability cases where the plaintiff alleges
a failure to warn. Some courts, noting that a plaintiff's testimony as
to whether he would have refrained from using the product had a
warning been given is likely to be self-serving, have established a
rebuttable presumption that, but for the failure to warn, the plaintiff
would not have used the product. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
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Many courts have failed to distinguish between the physician's
giving of information on the one hand, and the patient's receiving
it on the other. Judicial opinions use words like "inform," "disclose," "tell," "know," and "understand" almost interchangeably
without any apparent realization that the physician's disclosure of
information does not assure the patient's understanding of that information. 1' 6 One example suffices to illustrate:
[B]efore a patient will be deemed to give an informed consent, it
may be necessary that he know the alternative methods of treatment available to him and the inherent dangers and possibilities
of success of such alternatives ....

If a patient's decision is to

be a knowing and intelligent one, he must understand in addition
to the risks of the suggested surgery, the possible results of the
failure to chance it. A complete understanding of the consequences
of foregoing the operation would seem necessarily to include a consideration of the alternative treatment for the patient's disease or
condition.
Some jurisdictions considering the duty of a physician to disclose to a patient the hazards of surgery have given broad discretion ....

[I]n Pennsylvania a consent is "informed" only if the

patient knows what is apt to happen to him

....

177

498 F.2d 1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1972). This
presumption has been criticized as inappropriate in cases where the
plaintiff has no real alternative, such as where the product involved
was a polio immunization required for enrollment in the public
schools. Note, Mass Immunization Cases: Drug Manufacturer's Liability for Failure to Warn, 29 VAND. L. RE-v. 235, 259 (1976). The presumption may be properly applied in the typical medical-care case,
however, because there are alternatives to undergoing most risky
medical procedures, including that of choosing no treatment at all.
176. See Fellner & Marshall, Kidney Donors-The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 Am. J. PsYcH. 1245 (1970); Olin & Olin, Informed Consent
in Voluntary Mental Hospital Admissions, 132 AM. J. PsYcH. 938
(1975). See also Project, Interrogationof Draft Protesters, 77 YALE
L.J. 300, 310-19 (1967); J. KATZ, supra note 68, at 609-74 (discussion
of the conscious and unconscious, and internal and external factors
that affect understanding).
177. Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 944 (3d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added)
(applying Pennsylvania law). A discussion of the Dunham case in
the subsequent Pennsylvania case of Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super.
260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971), merely compounds the confusion:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Dunham v. Wright
...
found that a charge which instructed the jury that in order for there to have been an "informed and knowledgeable"
consent, the physician should have advised the patient of the
consequences of the oneration as well as the alternative possibilities accurately reflected Pennsylvania law and was fair to
the plaintiff ....
Gray [Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966)]
and Dunham make it clear that the primary interest of Pennsylvania jurisprudence in regard to informed consent is that
of having the patient informed of all the material facts from
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This confusion in language 178 betrays a deeper uncertainty on the
part of the courts as to the true nature of the obligation imposed
which he can make an intelligent choice as to his course of
treatment ....
Id. at 265-66, 286 A.2d at 649-50.
Although under Pennsylvania case law it is not .clear whether the
physician's duty is merely to disclose or to assure some level of
understanding before being entitled to rely on the patient's consent, this problem seems to have been eliminated (though possibly
unintentionally) by a recent legislative enactment defining "informed

consent":

"Informed consent" means for the purposes of this act and
of any proceedings arising under the provisions of this act, the
consent of a patient to the performance of health care services
by a physician or podiatrist: Provided, That prior to the consent having been given, the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient of the nature of the proposed procedure or
treatment and of those risks and alternatives to treatment or
diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider material to
the decision whether or not to undergo treatment or diagnosis ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Supp. 1975).
178. The source of the problem may be largely semantic. The word
"informed" can function as either a verb or an adjective. See 1
WFsBsTEa's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1276 (2d ed. 1959). When
used as a verb (e.g., D has informed P of "X"), the connotation is that
information has been transmitted from one person to another. When
used adjectivally (e.g., P is informed of "X"), the primary connotation is that P is knowledgeable about "X", or more specifically that
.P has understood "X." There may also be an inferential secondary
connotation that before this cognitive integration could occur, information necessarily had to have been transmitted to the person who
is now said to understand it, though this conclusion denies the possibility of original thought.
The confusion in the cases stems from the failure of the courts
to distinguish clearly between the two different meanings of "informed." The following example from a New Mexico case illustrates
this point:
The real basis for the rule requiring disclosure is to give the
patient a basis upon which to exercise judgment as to whether
he will consent to the treatment. Without the disclosure by
the doctor it is said that the patient is not informed and that,
therefore, any consent obtained is ineffectual.
Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 624 (1962).
To
state that the patient is not "informed" is to imply either (1) that
information has not been transmitted .to the patient (the verbal sense
of "informed"), or (2) that information has not been understood by
the patient (the adjectival sense of "informed").
In the grammatical context in which "informed" is used in the
above excerpt, the word functions as an adjective, and therefore the
consent is not valid. But in the logical context of the case, the reason
that the consent was ineffectual is that adequate disclosure did not
occur (which means that the patient could not have understood the
information without having acquired it some other way. See note 107
supra).
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more fundamentally
by the doctrine of informed consent, and even179
with the purposes served by the doctrine itself.
Even the one court that has recognized this issue-Canterburydid not satisfactorily resolve it. Judge Robinson noted that the
phrase "informed consent" is used m two different ways:
The doctrine that a consent effective as authority to form [sic;
perform (?)] therapy can arise only from the patient's understanding of alternatives to and risks of the therapy is commonly denominated "informed consent." . . . The same appellation is frequently

assigned to the doctrine requiring physicians, as a matter of duty
to communicate information as to such alternatives and
to patients,
risks.180
He then explained the distinction between the patient's understanding of information and the physician's disclosure of information:
In duty-to-disclose cases, the focus of attention is more properly
upon the nature and content of the physician's divulgence than the
patient's understanding or consent. Adequate disclosure and informed consent are, of course, two sides of the same coin-the former a sine qua non of the latter. But the vital inquiry on duty
to disclose relates to the physician's performance of an obligation,
while one of the difficulties with analysis in terms of "informed
consent" is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the degree
of the patient's comprehension. As we later emphasize, the physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information although the patient, without fault of the
physician, may not fully grasp it.... Even though the factfinder
may have occasion to draw an inference on the state of the patient's
enlightenment, the factfinding process on performance of the duty
ultimately reaches back to what the physician actually said or
failed to say.' 8 '
If this were all, Canterbury could be said to stand for the proposition that as long as reasonable disclosure is made to the patient
by the physician, the fact that the patient may not have understood
it does not denote any breach of duty on the part of the physician.
But ignoring his own caution "that uncritical use of the 'informed
In order to have conveyed the intended logical meaning-namely,
that consent is ineffectual when there has been inadequate disclosurethe court should have written, "Without the disclosure by the doctor,
any consent obtained is ineffectual," or, "If the patient has not been informed (of the hazards of treatment), any consent obtained is ineffectual." Through sloppy syntax, the court confused the meaning it
intended to convey.
179. See note 68 supra.
180. 464 F.2d at 780 n.15.
181. Id. The first sense of "informed consent" seems to be related to the
battery theory of informed consent, and the second sense of the phrase
traces its origins to the negligence theory of informed consent. See
note 111 supra.
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consent' label can be misleading, 1 8s2 Judge Robinson immediately
obfuscated the issue when he stated that the purpose of disclosure
of therapeutic alternatives and their hazards is "[t] o enable the
patient to chart his course understandably [sic]. "18
If the function of the informed-consent doctrine is to safeguard
the individual's right of self-determination, even his right to make
what might be considered "foolish" decisions' 8 4-which is what
Canterbury asserts'85-the proper concern is exclusively with the
information disclosed by the physician. 80 This of course in no way
prohibits the state, through the legal requirement of informed consent, from encouragingthat the decisions that patients make be "rational."' 8 7 If, however, the function of informed consent is to assure "rational"'' 8 decisionmaking, then the focus of judicial concern
must also be on the patient's comprehension of the information that
has been disclosed. Although considerable judicial lipservice is
given to promoting individual self-determination, and to permitting
patients to make and requiring physicians to honor decisions that
may seem unwise, the holdings of many cases suggest a great deal
of judicial intolerance for decisions viewed as unreasonable in outcome. 18 9 Some courts have left the door open, through their loose
182. 464 F.2d at 780 n.15.
183. Id. at 781. Presumably the court meant "understandingly."
184. See note 171 supra.
185. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
186. See generally Goldstein, supra note 64.
187. See note 68 supra.
188. Canterbury appears to be the only case to have expressly discussed this
problem. Other courts, however, have made statements that bear on
the issue, and at least one has suggested that the purpose of disclosure
of information is to assure that the patient understands the risks of
the procedure. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81
Wash. 2d 12, 29, 499 P.2d 1, 11 (1972) (semble) (duty to inform imposed upon physician "so that the patient's choice will be an intelligent one"); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 520 P.2d 1, 11, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) ("[T]he patient's right of self-decision . . .
can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelfigent choice." (emphasis added)).
When the courts use the term "rational," it is not clear whether
they are referring to the process by which decisions are made, or
the outcome of the decision itself. Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am.J. Psyci. - (1977).
189. Cases involving the refusal, for religious reasons, of blood transfusions, are the most typical. These cases are collected and discussed
in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966), and in Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Court Decisions Involving the Right to
Refuse Blood Transfusions (Ehlke ed. 1973) (No. JC 585 B; 73-87 A).
In the most celebrated of these cases, Application of the President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
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language, to the argument that the mere disclosure of risks to the
patient, without the patient's understanding thereof, is inadequate.190
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), the court demonstrated its intolerance of not only the outcome that probably would have ensued (i.e.,
death) had the refusal of a blood transfusion been permitted to stand,
but also of the patient's reason for refusing treatment:
The President of Georgetown University, Father Bunn, appeared and pleaded with Mr. Jones [the husband of the patient] to authorize the hospital to save his wife's life with a
blood transfusion. Mr. Jones replied that the Scriptures say
that we should not drink blood, and consequently his religion
prohibited transfusions. The doctors explained to Mr. Jones
that a blood transfusion is totally different from drinking
blood in that the blood physically goes into a different part
and through a different process in the body. Mr. Jones was
unmoved. I thereupon signed the order allowing the hospital
to administer such transfusions as the doctors should determine were necessary to save her life.
Id. at 1007; accord, Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center,
49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965). If the reasonableness of a refusal is to be measured against the standards of the medical
profession, there is little left to be protected by a rule that lets the
patient choose in the first instance. There might just as well be initial
acquiescence to medical decisionmaking. Although the court in the
Georgetown case in part justified its decision on the ground that a
husband has no right to refuse life-saving treatment for his spouse,
see Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
supra at 1008, there is fairly persuasive evidence that the wife had also
refused treatment on her own volition. The court, however, discounted
this refusal, stating that "[lit was obvious that the woman was not in
a mental condition to make a decision."- Id. at 1007.
This attitude is not limited to blood transfusions. See generally
Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline
Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973); Goldstein, supra note
64, at 690-98; Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling
Patients, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 695 (1968); Symposium, Euthanasia,27
BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1975); Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 860 (1965); Comment,
Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51
MINN. L. REv. 293 (1966); Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment, 7 J. FAM. L. 644 (1968); Comment, Is
There a Right to a Natural Death?, 9 NEw ENG. L. REv. 293 (1974);
Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient,supra note 64.
190. See, e.g., Dunham'v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1970); cf.
Demers v. Gerety, 85 N.M. 641, 645, 515 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869, rev'd
and remanded after retrial,87 N.M. 52, 54, 529 P.2d 278, 280 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273 (1974); Gravis v. Physicians
& Surgeons Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968); Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
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Although informed-consent cases do not expressly hold that patients must understand the information before thefr consent will
be considered valid, 191 there is some support for this view. Justice
Cardozo's dictum that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body"'192 is often echoed in the contemporary informed-consent
cases. 193 The judicial statements acknowledging that the decision
191. The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has proposed
regulations that would govern research conducted with subjects of
compromised capacity, and ensure voluntary and knowledgeable consent to treatment. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31737 (1973) (original proposal);
39 Fed. Reg. 30647 (1974) (revised proposal); 40 Fed. Reg. 33526
(1975) (adopting in part and revising prior proposals). A comment
received on the definition of "informed consent" in the original proposal, 38 Fed. Reg. 31737, 31740 (1973), "suggested the addition of
language concerning . . .assurance that the subject comprehends the

disclosure." 39 Fed. Reg. 30647, 30649 (1974). In rejecting this suggestion, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that the
"suggestion goes beyond requirements for informed consent as they
have generally been articulated by the courts." Id.
It should be noted that there is empirical evidence to indicate that
patients' understanding of the information disclosed to them before
consent is obtained is not very substantial. See note 113 supra.
192. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
193. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 241-42, 502 P.2d
1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
407-08, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp.,
251 Minn. 427, 433-34, 88 N.W.2d 187, 190 (1958); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 619-20, 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972); cf. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d
170, 181 (1st Dist. 1957); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 18 (Mo.
1960). What this dictum often means in practice is that the refusal of
treatment by a person who is not of "sound mind" (or who is "incompetent") is either ignored by the physician or overridden by the court.
See, e.g., Fraser, A Judge Orders Cancer Surgery, N.Y. Times, Dec.
30, 1973, § 1, at 31, col. 1 (city ed.) (patient who refused to acknowledge that she had cancer, and had been diagnosed as a chronic paranoid
schizophrenic deemed incapable of choice); Illson, Court Orders Doctors to Feed a Woman Who Wants to Die, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975,
at 33, col. 4 (city ed.); Walsh, Amputation or Death, Doctor Tells
Judge, Pittsburgh Press, June 4, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (refusal of treatment
by daughter carrying out expressed wishes of 67-year-old patient overruled); Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 7, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (judge rules for amputation for 96-year-old woman who is not "lucid" and is unable to
consent); cf. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (Northampton County
1973) (although patient was "incompetent," court refused to order
surgery because of patient's prior "competent" refusal).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has indicated that it will apply
a balancing test-one which weighs the patient's interest in privacy
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of a person of unsound mind is legally ineffective do not seem to
be directed explicitly toward patients who do not in fact understand
the information that is disclosed to them. There does not seem,
in other words, to be any explicitly articulated requirement that
the physician attempt to ascertain the patient's level of understanding. Instead the courts seem, through their use of the unsoundnessof-mind exception, to be establishing a requirement of a potentiality
for understanding, rather than of actual understanding. Instead
of looking to the patient's competency to perform a particular actin this case, to make a decision about a specific kind of medical
treatment-the unsoundness-of-mind standard disqualifies a person
about treatment if he is incompetent in a
from making a decision
9 4
generalized way.
against the state's interest in preserving life-where a patient refuses

treatment:
In many of those cases the medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily invasion and
the chances of recovery and return to functioning life [are]
very good. We think that the State's interest contra weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately

there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome

the State interest.
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, -, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). The problem
with this test is that it reverses the presumption of bodily integrity
underlying the informed-consent cases, and places on the party opposing treatment the burden of proof of demonstrating that the individual's interest in refusing treatment outweighs the state's interest in
compelling it.

Although the "incompetent" refusal of treatment by a patient is

often subjected to judicial scrutiny, there seem to be few reported
cases in which a patient's "incompetent" consent to treatment has been
challenged. It is only when such a consent achieves a substantial
degree of notoriety that it is brought to the public's attention. Physicians have little hesitancy about honoring a patient's consent to treatment, even if "incompetent," because it accords with the physician's
own view of the proper course of action. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DIsABmIITY L. REP. 147 (1976)
(consent to experimental brain surgery overridden).
194. In Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), the court enjoined regulations governing sterilization operations paid for with federal funds. It held that the sterilization could be undertaken only
with the "voluntary, knowing, and uncoerced consent" of the patient
Id. at 1201. It absolutely prohibited, however, the sterilization of "incompetent" persons, on the ground that "[n]o person who is mentally
incompetent can meet these standards . . .," id. at 1202, and stated
that the term "voluntary," "at least when important human rights
are at stake, entails a requirement that the individual have at his
disposal the information necessary to make his decision and the mental
competence to appreciate the significance of that information." Id.
at 1202. This language implicitly recognizes that the disclosure of
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There is also a small group of cases more directly suggesting
that the consent of patients who actually have not understood the
disclosure of information is not valid authorization for treatment.
In each of these cases the plaintiff claimed that he or she was under
the influence of some therapeutically administered sedative medication that compromised the cognitive faculties. The courts have held
that if this claim can be established, and it can be shown that the
patient was thereby disabled from understanding information about
the procedure, the consent is invalid. 195 However, there is a division as to whether the burden is on the plaintiff to establish lack
of understanding,' 9" or whether the fiduciary nature of the doctorpatient relationship requires the physician to attempt to ascertain
proceeding
the patient's level of understanding and to refrain from
97
with treatment where comprehension is compromised.
A final source of support for the view that the physician has
an obligation to ascertain the patient's level of understanding reinformation does not guarantee its comprehension. Additionally, the
court clearly insisted upon the patient's understanding of the information, as well as its disclosure, in order for the consent to be valid.
The court subsequently refused to approve modified federal regulations because, inter alia, they lack a requirement that "the attending
physician [certify] that the patient has truly given informed consent
with full understanding .... " Relf v. Mathews, 403 F. Supp. 1235
1239 (D.D.C. 1975) (emphasis added).
Another way of viewing this matter is that if the patient seems
to be so unlike the "reasonable man" of tort law that he is unable
to make a rational decision, then the physician will not be permitted
to rely upon the patient's decision as valid authorization for treatment.
The requirement of a generalized competency thus becomes a threshold of understanding, which, if not met by the patient, deprives him
of his right to make his own decision about medical treatment. Conversely, the physician who relies upon the refusal of such a personi.e., an "incompetent" refusal-may incur liability for failure to obtain
proxy consent to render medically necessary treatment, or to proceed
without consent in an emergency. See Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa
914, 927-29, 237 N.W. 444, 451 (1931); Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d
187, 198 (Mo. 1959); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 362-63, 90 S.E.2d
754, 759 (1956).
One problem with the unsoundness-of-mind standard, besides its
inherent imprecision, is that some persons who may appear quite deranged may in fact be able to articulate clear, rational, and compelling decisions to consent to or refuse treatment.
195. See Demers v. Gerety, 85 N.M. 641, 515 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 86 N.M. 141, 520 P.2d 869
(1974); Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.
1968); Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
196. Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
197. Demers v. Gerety, 85 N.M. 641, 646-47, 649-50, 515 P.2d 645, 650-51,
653-54 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 86 N.M.
141, 520 P.2d 869 (1974).
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sides in the meaning of the word "consent" as it is used in the law
of torts generally. According to Harper and James, "'consent' indicates an 'assent' given under circumstances which make it legally
effective." 198 One kind of circumstance under which an assentthat is,"an expression or manifestation of willingness to suffer a
particular interest-invasion"199-is ineffective is where the person
giving the assent is incapable of expressing a rational will. 20 0

The

physician who relies upon such an "assent" will find that it does
not rise to the level of a "consent." Thus it could be said that
to avoid liability, the physician has a duty to assure himself that
198. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 3.10, at 233.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 234-35. The Restatement of Torts defines consent similarly:
"A person of full capacity who freely and without fraud or mistake
manifests to another assent to the conduct of the other is not entitled
to maintain an action of tort for harm resulting from such conduct."
Comment b indicates
RESTATEMENT Or TORTS § 892, at 486 (1939).
than an assent based upon a mistake of fact, including the consequences of the other person's conduct, does not constitute a consent.
Comment e states that "[tihe manifestation of assent by a person
so mentally defective that he does not understand the nature or
effect of an act done is not a defense to an action for such act." Id.
at 490.
A proposed revision of this and related sections makes even clearer
that a mistake of fact known to the actor renders ineffective a consent:
If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to do so by a substantial mistake as to the nature of the
invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it, and his mistake is known to the other

. . .

the

consent is not effective as to the expected invasion or harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (2) (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
The comments to this section also indicate that where the mistake
that induces the consent is known to the actor (whether a mistake
as to the nature of the interest-invasion or as to the nature of the
harm reasonably to be expected therefrom), the consent does not
shield the actor from tort liability. Id. comments d & e. Neither
the Restatement nor the tentative revision, however, expressly addresses the problem of whether a mistake of fact occurs merely when
inadequate or incorrect information has been provided by the actor,
or when the consenting person misunderstands adequate and correct
information. But, the tentative draft states, "to be effective, consent
must be by one who has the capacity to consent .

.

. 2" Id. § 892A

(2) (a). The comment to this subsection states that the consent of
a child or a mentally deficient person "may still be effective if he
is capable of appreciating the nature, extent and probable consequences of the conduct consented to .

. . ."

but not otherwise.

Id.

§ 892A(2), comment b. This seems to imply that there must be some
subjective understanding of the nature of the conduct and the consequences, and that mere disclosure of information about the conduct
and its consequences is inadequate to shield the actor from liability.
In discussing informed consent to medical treatment, the Restatement does not further elucidate upon this problem, but merely uses
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the patient has achieved the requisite level of understanding (whatever that level may be)201 of the information that has been disclosed.
Enterprising courts and lawyers faced with a situation in which
there has been adequate disclosure, but little understanding by the
plaintiff, may therefore be amenable to the suggestion that "the
physician could be held responsible for taking reasonable steps to
ascertain whether the information presented has been understood
.... -202

The desirability of such a requirement for the practice

of medicine, for the well-being of patients, and for the multitudi20 3
nous social interests served by the doctrine of informed consent
2
0
4
is not here in issue.
Rather, what is clear is that for the medicalaccident victim who is unable to prove medical negligence, the ambiguity of the nature of the physician's obligation under the developing doctrine of informed consent will invite further litigation
aimed at broadening the physician's obligation to include a reasonable effort to ascertain whether the patient understands the information that has been disclosed.
E. Informed Consent and Strict Liability
At first glance, liability grounded upon the physician's failure
to obtain the patient's informed consent does not seem to be equiv-

201.

202.
203.
204.

the phrases it employs elsewhere, without defining them precisely:
"[C]onsent to an operation is binding if the patient is made aware
of the nature of the operation or treatment and of the extent of the
harm normally to be expected." Id. § 892B(2), comment i (emphasis added). Query whether "made aware" means "made to understand" or "provided with information."
The problems of ascertaining when and the extent to which a person
understands something are immense. The added administrative burden of such a requirement might ultimately make it unworkable.
In one proposal, Miller and Willner recommend that the patient
be given a kind of written examination, after information has been
disclosed, to determine if he understands sufficiently. See Miller &
Willner, The Two-Part Consent Form, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 964
(1974). One virtue of this procedure is that it demonstrates that the
physician has made a good-faith effort to ascertain the level of the patient's understanding. But the proposal raises far more questions than
it answers. For example, does the ability to answer questions correctly
necessarily test understanding, or merely ability to recall? Furthermore, it would be very difficult to establish the requisite level of
understanding, assuming that we were able to specify what we mean
by "understanding." See Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated)
Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972).
Capron, supra note 64, at 414. See also Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 64, at 643-45.
See note 68 supra.
See pp. 150-51 infra.
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alent to strict liability. A true system of strict liability, in rudimentary form, requires only proof by the plaintiff that the medical
treatment was the cause of the bad results. 20 5 To impose liability
under the doctrine of informed consent, the plaintiff must meet this
rudimentary requirement of strict liability, but there is an additional requirement that must be satisfied. The plaintiff must also
show that the physician failed to disclose information to the patient
adequate to enable him to make an intelligent choice to undergo
treatment, and that but for this failure, plaintiff would not have
consented to treatment. Thus, under the informed-consent doctrine
there must be inquiry into the adequacy of disclosure and the reasonableness of the decision to forego treatment had adequate disclosure been made, both of which are to be measured in accordance
with accepted rules of negligence liability.
Yet despite the assimilation of the cause of action for informed
consent to a negligence form of action, to the extent that informed
consent permits the injured patient to obtain compensation without having to establish negligence in the traditional sphere of medical practice, the doctrine does constitute a vital link with strict liability. By permitting the patient to impose liability upon the
physician for bad results not caused by negligent medical practice,
but caused by inadequate disclosure of information, there is at the
very least a substantial abandonment of medical negligence as the
basis for liability, and a corresponding movement toward a system
of liability without regard to fault.
On closer examination, there is an even more striking similarity
between informed consent and strict liability. When the layers of
rhetoric and procedural formality are stripped away, it is apparent
that the doctrine of informed consent closely approximates strict
liability for medical accidents.
An illustrative basis for comparison is strict liability in tort for
injuries from a defective product. To hold a seller or manufacturer
strictly liable for personal injuries, the plaintiff must prove essentially that his injuries were caused 2 6 by a product manufactured
205. Prosser, supra note 24, at 840. See generally 2 HARPER &JAMES, supra
note 4, § 12.2.
206. 1 FRUMER & FmEDMAN, supra note 24, § 11.01[1], at 198.12. "A defendant cannot be [held strictly] liable unless his conduct is an actual cause of the plaintiff's harm-that is, unless the plaintiff would
not have been injured but for the defendant's conduct." Comment,
Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict-Liability Cases, 50 N.C.L. REV. 714,
715 (1972).
Causation in products liability cases consists of two elements--causation-in-fact and proximate cause-either or both of which the plain-
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or sold by the defendant Which was in a defective condition making
it unreasonably dangerous for use.20 7 If these basic elements of
the cause of action can be established, the defendant will be held
to strict
a recognized defense
liable unless he is able to establish
20 9
20 s
or assumption of risk.
liability, such as abnormal use
Allowing for the relevant differences between medicine and
commerce, this is how the informed-consent doctrine operates for
tiff must prove. Causation-in-fact refers to whether the defendant's
product caused the injury that the plaintiff incurred, whereas proximate cause refers to whether the defect (which may be a failure
to warn) in the defendant's product was responsible for the plaintiff's
injury. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). Proximate cause, however, may
be inferrable as a matter of law-that is, it is not always a question
of fact whether the plaintiff would have refrained from using the injurious product had he been adequately warned; that he would have
will sometimes be presumed. Id. at 1281-82. See also note 175 supra.
207.

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The literature dealing with liability for injuries from products is so
vast that there does not seem to be any single comprehensive bibliography. Some of the major works are cited in Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 ORE. L. Ruv. 293, 293
n.2 (1975), and McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturers' Products Liability Doctrine-What's in a Name?, 27 OKLA. L.
REV. 347, 351 n.25 (1974).
208. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 102, at 667-68; Prosser, supra note 24, at 82426.
209. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
See also PROSSER, supra note 2, § 102, at 667-71; Prosser, supra note 24,
at 839.
Assumption of risk in products liability cases is not always discussed as such because it tends to merge into the requirement that the
plaintiff prove that the defect was latent. Thus, in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal 2d 59, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.

697, 701 (1963), the court stated that a cause of action for strict liability in tort was made out if plaintiff proved "defect in design and manufacture of which [he] was not aware." See generally 2 FRumER &
FRiEDmAN, supra note 24, § 16A[5] [f].
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medical-accident victims. To hold a doctor liable, the plaintiff must
prove that his injuries were caused by the conduct of the doctor.
The doctor's conduct must have been "defective," not in the sense
that this term fs used in the law of negligence to denote a departure from a standard of care, but in the sense that it posed an "unreasonably dangerous" risk to the patient. 210 The very failure to
warn may constitute the defective condition that makes the conduct
210.

The question of when a product is unreasonably unsafe has
[The] terminology [of the
Second Restatement of Torts § 402A] may perhaps leave
something to be desired, since it is clear that the "defect" need
not be a matter of errors in manufacture, and that a product
is "defective" when it is properly made according to an unreasonably dangerous design, or when it is not accompanied by
adequate instructions and warning of the dangers attending its
use.
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 99, at 659.
Some courts have rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, holding that strict liability in tort may apply even to products
that are unavoidably unsafe. See Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,
358 F. Supp. 976, 978-79 (D. Alas. 1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-43
(1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 602-03, 304 A.2d
562, 564-65 (1973).
A defect in design of a product, as well as a defect in manufacture,
calls into play strict liability in tort. This has raised the extremely
difficult metaphysical and practical question of what a defect is, see
2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, § 16A[4] [e], and has also permitted negligence principles to creep into strict liability through the
back door. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39
Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974). Some courts have held that where the defect
alleged is in the design, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
failed to use reasonable care in the development of the design. Comment, Products Liability: Is § 402A Strict Liability Really Strict in
Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L.J. 866, 867-74 (1974) (discussing Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973)). Other courts, however,
have held that strict liability for defective design should not turn on
negligence in the design process. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft
Co., 278 Minn. 322, 337-39, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (1967); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91-93, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965); MacDougall
v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 387-88, 257 A.2d 676, 678 (1969);
Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
The problem is analogous to the issue of what information is required to be disclosed under the doctrine of informed consent. A failure to warn of any information about a risk that materializes does not
necessarily lead to the imposition of liability on the defendant-doctor.
Only if the information would have been "material" to a "reasonable"
person in the plaintiff's position does liability attach for nondisclosure.
See also note 211 infra. The adequacy of disclosure under the doctrine
of informed consent is measured by reference to reasonableness, in the
same manner that some courts determine whether or not there was a
defect in design.
occupied a good many writers ....
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unreasonably dangerous. 211 The doctor, like the manufacturer or
seller in products liability cases, may avoid liability if the patient
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 402A, comment 1, at 353 (1965); see,

e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1973) (failure to warn of lung disease
from inhaling asbestos dust); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1968) (failure to warn of possibility of contracting polio by taking polio vaccine); Boains v. Lasar Mfg. Co., 330 F.
Supp. 1134, 1137 (D. Conn. 1971) (failure to warn of possibility of injury
from inherent defect in meat grinding machine); Mountain v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534, 536-37 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (failure to
warn of allergic response to shampoo); Canifax v. Hercules Powder
Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 53-54, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (3d Dist. 1965)
(failure to warn of fuse burning time; dynamite explosion); Crane v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 860-61, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754,
757 (4th Dist. 1963) (failure to warn of low flash point of paint surface
preparer; plaintiff "caught on fire"); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344-45, 306 N.E.2d 312, 316 (1973) (failure to warn of dangers of drinking household cleaner); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 349, 353-55, 311 A.2d 140, 143
(1973) (failure to warn adequately of method of operating helicopter
in event of power failure; pilot killed in crash). See also Annot.,
53 A.L.R.3d 239 (1973).
The rationale for this has been stated as follows:
Modern, and rapid, advances in technology have resulted
in the production and commercialization of more and more
highly sophisticated products in virtually every field of manufacturing. Many users and consumers of these sophisticated
products lack the knowledge, experience, and skill to fully
comprehend the true nature of such complex items.
The very nature of a manufactured item, therefore, may be
a potential source of physical harm to the user unless he or
she is made aware of the potential danger.
Accordingly, the manufacturer's duty is not just to use reasonable care in designing or manufacturing his product. There
may be a duty to warn even though the product is perfectly
made.
1 FRuMER & FRmEDmAN, supra note 24, § 8.01, at 143. This is' equally
true of medical practice, which has become increasingly technologized,
sophisticated, and unfamiliar to the average patient. The Restatement, however, cautions that products, such as drugs, that are incapable of being made entirely safe, are not defective or unreasonably
dangerous if accompanied by a proper warning and directions for use.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment k, at 353 (1965).
See also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of
Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 517-21 (1976).
Similarly, in medical accidents, the liability-grounding conduct is
the physician's failure to warn of '"material" risks, or of risks that are
not common or not actually known to the patient. See text accompanying note 107 supra. This is the equivalent of the duty in products
liability cases to warn of "latent" dangers, but not of "patent" ones..

See 1 FRUMER & FRDMA,

supra note 24, § 8.04. Manufacturers, like
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assumed the risk of the doctor's conduct. Assumption of risk occurs
when the doctor warns of the risks of the treatment and the patient
consents to the treatment anyway. 212 Although the burden of
proof is allocated differently in informed-consent cases than in
products liability cases-in the former it is the plaintiff who must
establish as an element of his cause of action that there was inadequate disclosure and hence no assumption of risk,2 13 and in the latdoctors, will not be held liable for injuries to users of their products
where the injury results from a common, known risk. Fanning v. LeMay, 83 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967) (common knowledge that a
rubber shoe heel and sole will slip when wet). See generally 2
FRumE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, § 16A[4] [d], at 3-302 to -303.
When risks are "common," or actually known to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff assumes the risk thereof despite the physician's failure to
warn. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 516 (1972). The same is true when the patient requests that
he not be informed of risks-that is, when he waives his right to make
an informed decision. Id.; Putensen v. Clay Adams Inc., 12 Cal. App.
3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1st Dist. 1970); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J.
Super. 242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. Super. 404, 241 A.2d 235
(1968); Goldstein, supra note 64, at 692; Hagman, supra note 136, at

785; Note Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1562
et seq.
The failure of a manufacturer to warn of the risks of a product will
not always give rise to liability. A warning is required only if "the
seller ... has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the .. . danger." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A,
comment j, at 353 (1965). See also 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note
24, § 8.03[1]. That only negligent failures to warn create liability, even under the so-called "strict" liability provision of the Restatement, has the effect of bringing negligence principles into strict liability theory through the back door. Fischer, supra note 210. But see
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974)
(failure to warn is not to be tested by negligence principles). In this
respect, strict liability for medical accidents under the informed-consent doctrine is no less "strict" than strict liability in tort for defective
products, since under the informed-consent doctrine, physicians are
liable only for negligent failure to warn. See p. 124 supra. For a
discussion of the relationship between "defect," "assumption of risk,"
and "appropriateness of use" see Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11,
at 1061-67.
212. Although the equivalence of "informed consent" and assumption of
the risk may be inferred from the informed-consent cases, no court
has stated the proposition directly. Cf. Steele v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d
187, 196 (Mo. 1959) ("the refusal of treatment, after reasonable
explanation as to its necessity ... is a complete defense of the
doctor who is accused of negligence in not giving the treatment");
accord, Carey v. Mercer, 239 Mass. 599, 600-01, 132 N.E. 353, 354 (1921).
213. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502
P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972); Martin v. Bralliar, - Colo.
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ter it is the defendant who must establish as an affirmative defense
that the plaintiff assumed the risk 214-- the basic rules of liability
2 15
are remarkably similar.
App. -, 540 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (1975); Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan.
750, 756-57, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1974); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606,
625-26, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972); Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 319
(Tenn. App. 1974); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., - Vt. -, 349
A.2d 703, 706 (1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 693-04, 207

N.W.2d 297, 315 (1973).

214. Shuput v. Heublein Inc., 511 F.2d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1975); Hastings
v. Dis Tran Prods., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. La. 1975); Hiigel
v. General Motors Corp., 34 Colo. App. 145, 544 P.2d 983, 988 (1975);
Parzini v. Center Chem. Co., 136 Ga. App. 396, 400, 221 S.E.2d 475, 479
(1975); Collins v. Musgrave, 28 Ill. App. 3d 307, 311-12, 328 N.E.2d
649, 652 (1975); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., - Pa. -, 337
A.2d 893, 901-02 (1975); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.
1975). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 21.7, at 119091; 3 FRtJMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, § 46.02 [5], at 16-80.

215. That a system of strict liability for medical accidents-whether developed through the doctrine of informed consent or otherwise-has not
as yet been worked out in great detail does not mean that there is no
place for such a system. See Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas
in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STui. 165 (1974). The virtue
of a judicially adopted system of strict liability is its flexibility, since
no more change need be made in a case than is necessitated by the
facts before the court. A case-by-case approach avoids two of the major pitfalls of most of the statutory and private-law no-fault proposals: the inflexibility of paying compensation according to predetermined schedules, and the problem of defining compensable events.
See J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7 ("elective" no-fault); Havighurst &
Tancredi, supra note 37, at 71-72, 75-88; Rubsamen, No-Fault Liability

for Adverse Medical Results-Is It a Reasonable Alternative to the
Present Tort System?, 117 CALIF. MED. 78 (1972).

The common law's flexibility, necessary to achieve strict liability
for medical accidents, is amply evidenced by the long-developing shift
from negligence to strict liability as a basis for compensating victims
of defective products. See Prosser, supra note 27; Prosser, supra note
24. The flexibility and effectiveness of the judicial process is also illustrated by the movement toward a fault basis for tort liability:
Absolute liability for one's acts is today the exception; there
must commonly be some tinge of fault, whether willful or
negligent. Time was, however, when absolute liability was
the rule ....
These changes ... have been wrought by
judges.. The men who wrought them used the same tools as
the judges of today.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 96, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). Presumably,
the flexibility of the judicial process is bidirectional. Cf. Note, Hospital Liability in the New York Court of Appeals: A Study of Judicial
Methodology, 61 CoLum. I. REV. 871, 899 (1961)

("[T]he original for-

mulation of the [charitable] hospital immunity rule resulted from a
judicial policy determination. It would be anomalous to say that this
policy determination could not also be reexamined by the judiciary in
light of changed circumstances."). See also Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
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Why not then rid ourselves of this confusing and obscuring
phrase "informed consent"? Concerning the development of the
law of strict liability for defective products, Prosser wrote:
[I] t gradually became apparent that "warranty," as a device for the
justification of strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much
luggage in the way of undesirable complications, and is more
trouble than it is worth. The suggestion was therefore a sufficiently obvious one, that we get rid of the word, which was originally adopted only because it21provided a theory ready at hand to
accomplish the desired result. 6

Although the phrase "informed consent" has caused untold confusion in the law of liability for medical accidents 2 17-as did "warranty" in the law of products liability 218 -not the least of which
has been its concealment of the drift toward strict liability, there
are quite different policy considerations at stake.
Ridding the case law of this phrase would be acceptable as
a means of removing the cloak that presently obscures the movement toward strict liability only if it did not also entail dispensing
with the requirement that the physician disclose information to the
patient. The effect of the disclosure requirement may be to impose
liability without fault, but its purpose is to permit medical patients
to wield intelligent decisionmaking power within the doctor-patient
relationship. 219 The independent policy consideration that patients
216.

PROSSER,

supra note 2, § 98, at 656. See also Prosser, supra note 27, at

1133-34.
217. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), 409 U.S.

1064 (1972) ("uncritical use of the 'informed consent' label can be
misleading"). Plante, supra note 98, at 671-72.
218. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 505 (10th Cir.
1959); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 166-69,
317 P.2d 1094, 1096-97 (1957); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 622-31, 258

P.2d 317, 324-31 (1953); Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
221 La. 919, 925 n.3, 60 So. 2d 873, 875 n.3 (1952); Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 1119-21, 253 S.W.2d 532,
536-37 (1952); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230

Mo. App. 275, 282-83, 90 S.W.2d 445, 449 (1936); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 273-75, 149 N.E.2d 181, 187-88
(1958); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 647, 314
P.2d 421, 422 (1957). See generally Prosser, supra note 27, at 1124-34.
219. See Section IV-D supra. Professor Goldstein has argued persuasively

that we could rid ourselves of the confusing term "informed consent"
and still preserve the goals it was originally designed to serve. See
Goldstein, supra note 64. In fact, since "[t]he concept has been employed to emphasize a patient's or subject's actual state of mind,
knowledge, or understanding in giving (not denying) consent, rather
than to emphasize and force attention on the conduct required of the

therapist or experimenter in the process of informing the citizen for
decision," id. at 690-91, abandonment of the term would facilitate a return to the original purpose.
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be permitted and encouraged to make intelligent choices about medical care might be severely compromised if the stated purpose of
disclosure were to become subsidiary to the compensation of medical-accident victims without regard to fault. Although a system
of strict liability for medical accidents can exist without the disclosure requirement, individual self-determination and rational decisionmaking cannot.
The phrase "informed consent" therefore serves an important
purpose apart from the method of determining liability, which was
not the case with "warranty." Though "warranty" may have carried too -much luggage, "informed consent" carries luggage vital to
the promotion of individual self-determination and rational decisionmaking about matters of medical care. It should not be abandoned lightly, even if the cost is to retard the advance on the citadel.
To a large extent the development of informed consent has been
dictated by the ends it is said to serve-those of promoting individual autonomy and protecting bodily integrity. But its development
has also been affected by the skirmishes fought over the compensation of medical-accident victims. The desire to circumvent the
requirement of having to establish medical negligence has served
as a strong incentive to medical-accident victims to attempt to shape
the doctrine of informed consent to meet immediate needs. Thus,
rather than being invoked exclusively to protect the individual's
dignity, it has also been invoked-and has therefore been shaped
220
and applied-to protect the accident victim's economic interests.
Although the doctrine of informed consent bears manor structural similarities to strict liability in tort, doctors are not actually
being held strictly liable for bad results. However, aggressive
plaintiffs' counsel may seize upon the informed-consent doctrine,
and by exploiting its flexibility and ambiguity push the courts
closer to strict liability. Even in cases where consent has been
given and disclosure has been made, the plaintiff, merely by alleging that disclosure was inadequate, is afforded an opportunity for
220. It has been said that "[tihe object of changing the law [of consent to

medical treatment] is not to get doctors into court, but to get them to
change their practices." Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra
note 64, at 1569. Though this may be theoretically so, in practice it
seems that one of the major objectives of changing the law is to get the
doctor into court, and to impose liability upon him, not so much for the
specific or general deterrent effect that the imposition of liability may
have upon medical practices, but to make whole the medical-accident
victim. One of the consequences of the constant state of flux in which
the law of consent to medical treatment has been for the last two
decades has been the formulation of new rules that have made compensable hitherto uncompensable medical accidents.
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recovery not available in negligence alone. Although the fight may
be uphill, continual changes in the standard of disclosure, the test
of causation, the rules for the operation of the therapeutic privilege,
and the necessity vel non for patient understanding, afford plaintiffs an opportunity to get to the jury not otherwise available. This
is precisely how each of the landmark "informed consent" cases was
made in the past, and how new ones will be made in the future.
V. THE HEAD-ON ASSAULT ON THE CITADEL
Although the doctrine of informed consent, especially in its present formative period, is a highly flexible one permitting judges and
juries extensive leeway in awarding compensation, a large proportion of medical-accident victims is still unable to obtain compensation under this theory of liability. Only where there has been inadequate disclosure does a possibility for compensation exist. If there
is inadequate disclosure and the patient consents to treatment, or
if there is inadequate disclosure and the patient refuses treatment,
liability may attach if the inadequate disclosure was the cause of
the patient's decision. But if disclosure is adequate and the patient
either accepts or refuses treatment, the warning given by the doctor
concerning the risks of treatment or of foregoing treatment forecloses liability under the informed-consent doctrine. Equally significant is the case in which the physician makes a nonnegligent
decision about the patient's condition involving an omission of treatment. . In such situations there often will be no warnings of the
consequences of foregoing treatment, since no treatment is contemplated.
The patient who suffers bad results under either of these circumstances-that is, when there is adequate disclosure or when there
is a nonnegligent omission of treatment and consequently no disclosure of the risks of foregoing it-is still worse off than another
patient who incurs precisely the same injuries from negligently
rendered or omitted medical care. The problem that caused our
initial concern-the differential treatment of medical-accident victims, depending upon whether the accident occurred as a result of
negligence or not-remains unresolved as long as the doctor has
complied with his duty to warn and the patient has assumed the
risk of treatment.
Other efforts have been made in judicial forums to breach the
citadel of negligence for medical-accident victims. Although many
of these efforts have met with quite limited success, if not downright failure, the viability of head-on attacks on the negligence requirement (to be distinguished from the surreptitious attacks
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launched under the banners of res ipsa loquitur and informed consent) remains an open question.
Patients whose injuries have resulted from transfusions of contaminated or infected blood have persistently pursued these avenues of assault, as have those whose injuries have resulted from
a drug or a medical device. But the courts have, for the most part,
been unreceptive to these claims, tending to treat the provision of
blood, the prescription of a drug, or the use of a medical device,
thus making unavailable a waras a "service" rather than a "sale,"
2 21
ranty of strict liability theory.
Other patients injured by drugs and devices have sought to impose liability not only upon their physicians but on the drug or
221. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1364 (1972) (blood transfusions); Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 928 (1972) (drugs); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1973) (drugs
and devices).
There has been a great deal of judicial reluctance to apply strict
liability in tort to services, or to products supplied as incidental to a
service. PROsSER, supra note 2, § 104, at 679. In 1971, Prosser stated
that such efforts had "entirely failed." Id.; accord, Comment, SalesService Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575, 583
& passim (1974). See generally Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of
Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLm. L. Rsv. 653 (1957); Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid
Transaction, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 111 (1972); Note, Implied Warranties
and Service Contracts, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 680 (1964); Comment,
Continuing the Common-Law Response to the New Industrial State:
The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 401 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Extension
of Enterprise Liability]; Comment, Strict Liability for Services, Chevron v. Sutton, 4 N.M.L. REv. 271 (1974). But see Note, Strict Liability:
A "Lady in Waiting" for Wrongful Birth Cases, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 136
(1974).

The sales-service distinction was originally made in the case of
blood transfusions in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954). The vast body of literature on this subject is col-

lected in Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Transmission of Serum
Hepatitis: The Need for Statutory Reform, 24 Am. U.L. Rsv. 367, 36869 n.7 (1975).
Courts have been more willing to impose liability upon commercial
blood banks than upon hospitals, because blood banks are more clearly

involved in the "sale" of blood than hospitals, where the provision ol
blood is incidental to a "service." See, e.g., Community Blood Bank,
Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). Some states have enacted
statutes prohibiting the imposition of liability, under a strict liability
or breach of warranty theory, for the provision of blood. In some

cases, such statutes have had the effect of overruling case law that had
applied such theories. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. Rrv. 439, 474-75 n.203 (1972)
(collecting statutes).
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device manufacturers. Suits grounded in negligence have had to
contend with many of the same problems of privity that existed
in other areas of products liability, but just as the privity barrier
has been surmounted elsewhere, 222 so has it also with drugs and devices. 22S More recently, plaintiffs have also sought to hold the drug
manufacturer strictly liable for failing to warn the physician who
its side effects, and these efforts have met
prescribed the drug 2of
24
with general success.

A single recent development in the effort to overrun the citadel
of negligence by medical-accident victims is more significant than
the sum of all these other efforts because it is aimed at the very
foundation of the cause of action in negligence, and has occurred
in the heart of medical practice, rather than in the periphery of
drugs, blood transfusions, and medical devices.
222. Prosser, supra note 27; Prosser, supra note 24.

223. With respect to drugs see, e.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182

Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1st Dist. 1960). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 301 §§ 37, 38 (1961). With respect to devices see, e.g.,
Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960). See generally Rubin, Manufacturer and Professional User's Liability for Defective Medical Equipment, 8 AKRON L. REV. 99 (1974).
. Ostensibly because there was a "sale" rather than a provision of a
medical "service," the courts have not been as hesitant to apply breach
of warranty theory and strict liability in tort against manufacturers as
they have against physicians. See, e.g., Silverhart v. Mount Zion
Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1028-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91 (1st Dist.
1971); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 980, 5 Cal. Rptr. 381,
393 (2d Dist. 1971); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra. The
courts' receptivity to the application of strict liability and warranty to
manufacturers may be due to the presumption that manufacturers
have "deep pockets," and to a belief in manufacturers' ability to practice deterrence and cost-spreading. Thus, in Magrine v. Krasnica, 94
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (County Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968) (per curiam),
aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (per curiam), the New Jersey
courts refused to hold a dentist strictly liable for a patient's injuries
suffered when a hypodermic needle broke in the patient's jaw. Although relying heavily on the fact that the dentist was merely a user
of the needle, was not in the business of selling such needles, and did
not promote its use, there can be no doubt that the dentist, unlike the
manufacturer of the needle, could not "fairly be assumed to have
[had] substantial assets and volume of business, and a large area of
contacts over which the risk [could] be widely spread." Id. at 238,
227 A.2d at 545. See generally C. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 39-67.
224. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239 §§ 8(a), 10, 14 (1973). When
an individualized doctor-patient relationship is absent, such as in a
mass-immunization program, the manufacturer's duty is to the patient.
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968). See generally Note, Mass Immunization
Cases: Drug Manufacturers'Liability for Failure to Warn, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 235 (1976).
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Ordinarily, the standard of care in medical malpractice is determined by reference to how a reasonable member of the profession
would act in like circumstances. 225 It was this point that was at
issue in Canterbury, regarding the test of the adequacy of disclosure, and it was only because the court held that no special expertise is required to determine what information about treatment is
material to a patient that it rejected the profession's standard as
the legal standard of care. 226 The court implied that it would have

abided by the profession's standard of care if it had determined that
of information is a matter requiring professional
the materiality
227
expertise.

Yet in the recent case of Helling v. Carey,228 which either may
be aberrant 229 or may signal a new trend in medical-accident cases,
the Supreme Court of Washington invaded even this sacrosanct area
of deference to the medical profession. In Helling, the plaintiff developed glaucoma, a disease of the eye which causes severely impaired vision and, ultimately, blindness. 230 For more than nine
years, she had been a regular patient of the defendants, who were
specialists in the treatment of disorders of the eye, having first consulted them for nearsightedness and on ten other occasions for what
were described as eye "irritations." The defendants believed that
the plaintiff's visual problems were related solely to complications
associated with the contact lenses that they had prescribed for the
nearsightedness. Not until the eleventh consultation did they consider that the plaintiff's visual problems were related to anything
other than the contact lenses. On that occasion one of the defend225. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968). Malpractice cases thus differ from other
negligence cases, in which "customary performance may help to appraise the defendant's conduct but does not conclusively determine
whether it was reasonable ... ." 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note
3, f 8.04, at 200 (1973). See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, § 33, at
'166-69; King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical
Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213
(1975).
226. See pp. 93-95 supra.
227. 464 F.2d at 784-85.
228. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (en banc).
229. The Court of Appeals of Washington, in one of the two cases citing
Helling v. Carey, concluded that "the holding there was intended to
be restricted solely to its own 'unique' facts, i.e., cases in which an
opthamologist is alleged to have failed to test for glaucoma under the
same or similar circumstances." Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571,
-, 550 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1976). See also Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d
291, 293-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (rejecting Helling as authority for
the rule that a doctor's performance is not to be judged by its conformance "with the general practice of reasonable physicians utilizing
the same treatment").
230. See 3 R. GRAY, ATToRNEY's TExTBooK OF MhxDICINE Iff 55B.00-.70 (3d ed.
1976).
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ants performed a test that was positive for glaucoma. By this time
the plaintiff had lost her peripheral vision, and her central vision
was drastically reduced.
After consulting other physicians, the plaintiff brought suit
against her original opthalmologists. 231 Expert testimony of witnesses called by both the plaintiff and the defendant to establish
the profession's standard of care unanimously indicated that it was
not routine practice to perform glaucoma tests on patients under
40 years of age, because in that age group the disease occurs at
the low rate of approximately 1 in 25,000 persons. Testimony also
revealed, however, that the professional standards require a pressure test even in those under 40 "if the patient's complaints and
symptoms reveal to the physician that glaucoma should be sus23 2
pected."
The jury verdict for the defendant eliminated the possibility of
the appeal turning on the factual question of whether the plaintiff's
complaints and symptoms should reasonably have led the defendants to suspect glaucoma and administer a pressure test, even
though the plaintiff was under 40. Rather, if compensation were
to be made available at the appellate level, the standard of care
itself had to be addressed.23 3 To do so, the court was confronted
by the rule that the medical profession ordinarily establishes.its
own standard. Yet it was able to circumvent this rule through appropriate invocation of two legal demigods, Holmes and Hand.
At the turn of the century, Justice Holmes said of the standard
of care: "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought
to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of
reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.1234
And in equally, if not more, famous words, Hand reminded us that
231. That there was no allegation of a failure to disclose information to the
plaintiff is understandable, since it is not reasonable to require a physician to inform a patient of the risks, benefits, alternatives, and consequences of forgoing a treatment that is not even contemplated. Liability must attach, if at all, for the doctor's failure to have contemplated
and proposed the treatment.
232. 83 Wash. 2d at 516, 519 P.2d at 982.
233. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the trial court had improperly refused to charge the jury that "by reason of their special
ability, knowledge and information, [defendants] were negligent in
failing to give the pressure test to the plaintiff at an earlier point in
time . . . ." Id. at 517, 519 P.2d at 982. Because the defendants did
not have any greater special ability, knowledge, or information than
opthalmologists in general-that is, more than others in the group to
whom the standard of care applied-the court held that they could not
be held to a higher standard. See id.
234. Id. at 518-19, 519 P.2d at 983 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (Holmes, J.) ).
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"a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required;
there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission. '2 5 With the aid of these precedents, the court was able to swallow whatever misgivings it might
have had and announce that "[u] nder the facts of this case reasonthe timely giving of the pressure test to
able prudence required
6
this plaintiff.

' ' 23

The "facts of this case" that the court referred to as justifying
its refusal to accept the professional standard of practice as the legal
standard of care, were that the test necessary to avert the harm
that befell the plaintiff was simple, harmless, and inexpensive,23 7
and that the harm itself, blindness, was serious.
Helling achieved, through selective choice of precedent, the compensation of a medical-accident victim. In so doing, it left intact
the form of the negligence requirement, but simultaneously so dramatically changed its substance as to raise a substantial question
medicalabout the continued viability of consistently compensating
28 s
accident victims exclusively on a negligence principle.
235. Id. at 519. 519 P.2d at 983 (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740
(2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.)).
236. Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.

237. But see Charfoos, Helling: The Law of Medical Malpractice Rewritten, 2 Omo N.L. REv. 692, 696-98 (1975) (arguing that the tonometry
test that the Helling court found had been improperly omitted is not
without risk) (citing Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. LEGAL MED.,
Sept.-Oct., 1974, at 52). There is also evidence that the test may not be

reliable. See Heilmann, On the Reversibility of Visual Field Defects in
Glaucomas, 78 TRANS. AM. ACAD. OPTHALMOL. & OTOLARYNGOL. 304

(1974); H. SCHEIE & D. ALBERT, ADLER'S TEXTBOOK OF OPTHALMOLOGY
341 (8th ed. 1969), cited in Charfoos, supra at 698. Moreover, though
the test may be inexpensive for any given patient, it may be quite expensive relative to the cost of the harm that it is able to prevent. See

Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, supra note 37, at 1147 n.38. See also Spaeth, Is Screening for
Glaucoma Worthwhile?, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1299 (1975).

238. It has been suggested that the decision is not at all inconsistent with
the rule permitting the medical profession to establish its own
standard of care by reference to customary practice. Since the basis
for the rule is that laymen are not competent to decide whether a doctor exercised reasonable care, the rule operates only when the matter

in issue is too technical for laymen to judge. Since the question raised
in Helling was "relatively simple," there is no reason why the standard of care should have been established by resort to customary practice. 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 361, 364-65 (1975). But see authorities cited
note 237 supra.
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Three justices of the nine-member court, concurring in an opinion of Justice Utter, pierced the formalistic veil in which the majority enshrouded its result. Though agreeing that liability ought
to be imposed upon the defendants, their basis for doing so was
stated more openly. The concurring justices, like the majority, believed that the reason for imposing liability was that the test the
defendants had failed to administer to the plaintiff was simple,
harmless, and inexpensive.23 9 But whereas the rationale-perhaps
"rationalization" is a more apt description-given by the majority
for reaching its result was that ultimately it is for the courts and
not the profession to establish the standard of care, the concurring
justices employed a more innovative and straightforward analysis.
Because of the apparent absence of wrongdoing 240 on the part
of the defendant doctors, it seemed to the concurring justices unnecessarily stigmatizing to impose liability on the ground of negligence. Rather than predicating liability upon blameworthiness and
implicitly assigning blame where in fact it was absent, the justices
chose to predicate liability upon a social policy supportable by the
facts of the case. -The doctrine of strict liability avoids both the
stigmatization of the defendants and the -ratiocinations of the majority justices. What the court was really doing, observed the concurring opinion, was choosing to shift the costs of an unforturate
event from the victim (plaintiff) to parties (the defendants) who
were in a better position to bear or to spread the cost. 241
But even the concurring justices failed to note-though there
was no necessity for their doing so-that the same conditions exist
in all statistical-risk medical-accident cases. As a class, and probably in the vast majority of individual instances, doctors are situated to bear the costs of accidents more easily, and are able to spread
the costs by prorating their insurance premiums to all of their patients through the fees charged for their services. Certainly the
features of this case which the concurring justices found to warrant
strict lifability-(1) conformance with the profession's standard of
care, (2) problems of proof where events are not matters of common experience, (3) a precise definition of the injurious activity
to permit cost allocation, and (4) a financially responsible defend239. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520, 519 P.2d 981, 984 (1974).
240. The concurring opinion suggests that there was an absence of "moral"
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants. Id. at 520, 519 P.2d at 984.
The majority and concurring opinions make clear, however, that there
was also an absence of wrongdoing in the sense that there was no departure from the profession's standard of care.
241. Id. at 520, 519 P.2d at 984.
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ant 24 2-are present in most statistical-risk medical-accident cases.
In fact, all except the first of these criteria ordinarily are present
in all medical accidents.
Problems of proof are omnipresent, for it is this factor which
ordinarily creates the often impenetrable barrier to success in suits
grounded in negligence. For the most part, the competent medical
practitioner is able to obtain insurance against medical accidents. 248
The only element that is questionable is the precision with which
the accident-causing activity can be identified. In many situations,
an act of medical commission or omission can be identified as the
cause of the accident, though in many others there is a substantial
amount of admixture between the patient's pre-existing condition
244
and the unsuccessful medical intervention.

242. Id. at 521-22, 519 P.2d at 984-85. Four conditions must be met for the
judicial imposition of strict liability in the absence of a controlling
statute: (1) the defendant must be aware of the abnormally dangerous nature of the activity in which he engages; (2) the damage that
is threatened by the activity for which liability is sought to be imposed must be well defined; (3) there must be a well-defined class of
persons threatened by the defendant's abnormally dangerous activity;
and (4) the harm must occur from the defendant's activity. PnossEn,
supra note 2, § 79. Though each of these conditions is met in medical
accidents, the application of strict liability to medical accidents is not
without substantial problems. See authorities cited note 254 infra.
243. But see note 31 supra.
244. The most difficult practical problem of strict liability for medical accidents lies in determining what kinds of bad results were caused by the
natural course of the illness or injury that originally brought the patient to the doctor, and what kinds were iatrogenically caused-that is,
caused by the medical intervention made to deal with the particular
illness or injury.
Take... the patient who presents with a mild febrile illness
which is treated with aspirin, then goes home and develops a
fatal meningitis? What if the fever was low grade, the sore
throat mild and these occurred when a number of patients in
the community were manifesting epidemic virus respiratory
infections? Were the patient's parents carefully instructed to
contact the physician within 24 hours and did they then not
do so? Is it reasonable to suppose that the meningitis wasn't
present at all when the patient was first seen, developing only
later from the upper respiratory infection? It is one thing to
talk about a "deviation from expected results" where there
has been surgical operation, but how can one talk about the
"expected results" in this meningitis case without analyzing
every facet of the presenting problem and subsequent course?
Rubsamen, supra note 215, at 87. See also J. O'CoNNELL, supra note
7, at 70-111 & app. IMl (1975); Cooper, Sweden's No-Fault Patient-Injury Insurance,294 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1268, 1268-69 (1976); Havighurst
& Tancredi, supra note 37, at 75-88; Keeton, supra note 31, at 614-15;

O'Connell, supra note 29, at 790-93; Comment, Extension of Enterprise
Liability, supra note 221, at 424-30; Note, Comparative Approaches to
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There are other indications that the issue really at stake in Helling was whether there is to be strict liability for medical accidents,
rather than who is to establish the standard of care. The fact that
the tonometry test, which the court held should have been used
by the defendants, may not be as riskless, inexpensive, and reliable 245 as both the majority and concurring opinions suggest, casts
doubt upon the assertion that the defendants acted unreasonably
even when judged by a lay standard. If there is doubt about the
reasonableness of the failure to employ the test, then the imposition
of liability can only be on the basis of strict liability-the court's
efforts to camouflage this result notwithstanding.
Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to raise at trial the issue on
which the majority decided the case on appeal. The concurring
opinion noted this and excused it:
Where this court has authoritatively stated the law, the parties
are bound by those principles until they have been overruled. Acceptance of those principles at trial does not constitute a waiver
or estop appellants from adapting their cause on appeal to such
a rule as might be declared if the earlier precedent is overruled.2 46
But the fact is that the rule of law upon which the majority
claimed to decide the case-that the standard of care is for the
courts to determine, and customary professional conduct, while evidence of the proper standard, is not dispositive of the issue-had
previously been adopted by the Supreme Court of Washington only
eight years earlier. In Mills v. Inter Island Telephone Co.,247 the

court stated:
We think it is important that the parties and the trial court recognize that even if the industry has not accepted [a particular standard of care] or used it, the issue of negligence is not to be determined simply and solely by a reference to what is commonly done
in the industry. It is possible that the entire industry has been
negligent in its practices. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2 Cir.
1932); Prosser, [The Law of Torts] § 32, p. 136 [(3d ed. 1964)].
Liability for Medical Maloccurrences,supra note 37, at 1153-54. But cf.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 795 (D.C. Cir.) ("A Tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him ....

"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064

(1972).
One legislative no-fault proposal takes a rather simplistic view of
the causation problem, providing no-fault benefits "for loss from any
injury suffered as a result of health care services provided ....

"

S.

215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1711(a) (1975). The process of administrative regulation by which these broad terms will necessarily have to be
interpreted is akin to the judicial definition that would be necessary
under a judicially constructed system of strict liability.
245. See note 237 supra.
246. 83 Wash. 2d at 522, 519 P.2d at 985.
247. 68 Wash. 2d 820, 416 P.2d 115 (1966).
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Especially, this may be true if the cost and ease of precautions that
may be taken are weighed against the severity of the risk to be
guarded against. See Prosser, op. cit., supra, § 30, p. 122.248
Not only had the "court . . . authoritatively stated the law," but
it had even relied upon one of the same authorities, The T. J.Hooper,
that it did in Helling.
Thus the fact that the theory upon which the case was decided
was the law of Washington prior to the decision in the Helling case,
and despite the concurring opinion's assertion to the contrary, the
plaintiff's failure to raise this claim in her pleadings and at trial
would ordinarily have led the court to find that the claim had been
waived.2 49 Its failure so to hold is further evidence of its desire
to provide compensation for the victim of a medical accident on
the basis of the factual or emotional appeal of the case, rather than
on the basis of pre-existing principles of law.
The commentary2 50 to date on Helling v. Carey-which has been
described as sending off "shock waves . . . [whichi have already
begun to spread and may be expected to permeate all areas of pro-

248. Id. at 833, 416 P.2d at 123. The Mills case involved an appeal from
the dismissal of the action on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's decedent died when an airplane in which he was riding became, on a landing approach, entangled in power and telephone
wires owned in part by the defendant. The issue for decision on appeal was whether a d6cument signed by plaintiff in an agreement with
another tortfeasor (since dropped as a defendant), styled a "covenant
not to sue," released the claim against the present defendant. Plaintiff, however, had also moved for partial summary judgment in part
on the issue of whether defendant as a matter of law "was negligent
in failing to mark its poles and wires so that they were clearly visible
to pilots approaching the airfield for a landing . . .," id. at 832, 416
P.2d at 123, in conformity with a standard issued by the United States
Department of Commerce and the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Since it granted defendant's motion and dismissed the action, the trial
court did not rule on this motion. In response to the defendant's claim
that the standard was not accepted by the industry, the court felt compelled to speak to the relationship between custom and the legal
standard of care.
249. See Ivan's Tire Serv. Store, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10
Wash. App. 110, 125-27, 517 P.2d 229, 239 (1973), affd, 86 Wash. 2d 513,
546 P.2d 109 (1976). See generally F. JAmEs, supra note 43, § 11.3, at
526-28.
250. Charfoos, supra note 237; King, supra note 225, at 1244-57; Comment,
The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 55 B.U.L. REV.
647 (1975); 20 N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975); 6 TEXAs TEcH.L. RE. 279 (1974);
44 U. CIm.L. REV. 361 (1975); 11 WILLAwmaTE L.J. 152 (1974). But cf.
28 VAND.L. REV. 441, 448 n.43 (1975).
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fessional negligence litigation in time," 251-has almost exclusively
viewed the case as raising the issue of who is to set standards of
professional practice, the professions or the courts. While unquestionably this is a significant issue in Helling, when viewed in the
context of other developments in the law of medical accident liability, the fundamental issue of policy seems to be whether compliance
with or deviation from any standard of care, by whomever set, is
to be determinative of whether medical-accident victims are to receive compensation for their injuries-that is, whether there is to
be strict liability for injuries from medical accidents.
The overall lack of success of the direct efforts involving blood
transfusions, drugs, and medical devices, to breach the negligence
stronghold and impose strict liability upon doctors, indicates that
the war over compensating medical-accident victims will probably
continue to be carried out for the foreseeable future through the
use of guerilla tactics and flanking maneuvers such as the informedconsent doctrine. As has occurred over the past half century or
more in the area of products liability, slow inroads may first be
made under warranty theories when injuries may be characterized
as being occasioned by a defective "good" rather than by a "service." This has already begun to occur with injuries caused by blood
transfusions, drugs, and medical instruments. Though the courts
have on the whole been unreceptive to a forthright application of
strict liability, they have been somewhat more willing to apply
breach-of-warranty theories, though even here the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the theory have rejected it.252
251. Stieglitz, Liability of Accountants and Investment Counselors, 15 FOR
THE DEFENSE, Sept., 1974, at 92. See also 29 THE CITATION, May 1, 1974,
at 17-18.
252. Although the courts have been less than enthusiastic about openly applying strict liability, there have been some legislative proposals to
create a system of strict liability for medical accidents. Senators Inouye and Kennedy have introduced a bill in the Senate, entitled the
National Medical Injury Compensation Insurance Act of 1975, which
would, in part, permit the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to enter into contracts with health-care providers to provide both traditional tort liability insurance and no-fault insurance. See S. 215,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1701 (1975). No-fault benefits would be available "for loss from any injury suffered as a result of health care services provided by an insured," id. § 1711 (a), and for economic and noneconomic losses. Id. § 1713. See also S. 482, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) (also introduced by Senators Inouye and Kennedy, providing
for a national medical malpractice insurance and arbitration system,
the use of which would be a prerequisite to the filing of a traditional
tort suit). The provisions of this bill are discussed in Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, supra note
37, at 1158-60. Other federal proposals for dealing with the problem
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Thus, against this background of overall judicial hostility toward
widening the possibilities of forthrightly compensating medical-accident victims under strict liabilty and breach-of-warranty theories,
the case of Helling v. Carey (and especially the concurring opinion)
may signal another significant breach in the negligence fortress.258
VI. STRICT LIABILITY AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP
Strict liability for medical accidents is presently in an incipient
stage of development. Should it be nipped in the bud and limited
to situations in which the doctrine of informed consent is properly
applied? Should it be expanded beyond the bounds of that doctrine
as suggested by the concurring opinion in Helling? Or should it
be eliminated altogether, by legislative fiat if necessary?
Whether or not strict liability for medical accidents would promote the goals of accident law better than the present negligence
system has been debated substantially, though inconclusively, 54 in
of compensating medical-accident victims, none of which proposes a
no-fault system, are S. 188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1378, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); and H.R. 6100, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
253. In response to Helling, the Washington legislature enacted a statute
providing that:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against a hospital which is licensed by the state of
Washington or against the personnel of any such hospital, or
against a member of the healing arts . .. , the plaintiff in
order to prevail shall be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant or defendants failed
to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed
by other persons in the same profession and that as a proximate result of such failure the plaintiff suffered damages, but
in no event shall the provisions of this section apply to an action based on the failure to obtain the informed consent of a
patient.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975). The legislative history indicates that the statutory intent is to "re-establish the pre-Helling standards of negligence that have been developed through case law in
Washington. (See Pederson v. Dumochel [72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d
973 (1967)] and Hayes v. Hulswit, [73 Wash. 2d 796, 440 P.2d 849
(1968)].)" 51 WASH. L. REv. 167, 168 n.6 (1975). It continues by
explicitly stating that the effect of the bill is to require the "medical
malpractice plaintiff to show that the defendant failed to exercise the
degree of skill, care and learning possessed by others in the same profession and that such failure caused damages." Id. It is not at all
clear that the statute will have its intended effect. Id. at 183-85.
254. Analysis and choice of a system of compensating accident victims has
been complicated by the lack of unanimity as to what the proper goals
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recent years. 255 Because this debate has been part of the larger
one over how best to compensate accident victims and to promote
the goals of accident law,2' 5 6 little concern has been paid to the
unique aspects of medical accidents and to what effect strict liability might have on the doctor-patient relationship.
The doctor-patient relationship partakes of many aspects of an
arms-length consumer relationship. 257 There is often a disparity

of accident law are. See Extension of Enterprise Liability, supra note

221, at 430.
255. See G. CALABRnsI, supra note 11; Brown, Toward an Economic Theory
of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 11; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972); Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5 BELL J.
EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 366 (1974); Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liabilbility: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, supra note
215; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972);
Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
256. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 72-73, 92-94, 189-94 & passim; CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION AND QUALITY CONTROL

SYSTEMS (1971); Carlson, Conceptualization of a No-Fault Compensation System for Medical Injuries, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 329 (1973);
Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed
FirstStep Toward the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 279 (1964); Ford, The Fault with "No Fault",
61 A.B.A.J. 1071 (1975); Franklin, supra note 221; Havighurst "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Hasits Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233;
Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 37; HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
supra note 4, at 30; Keeton, supra note 31; Lanzone, Products Liability
and Professional Liability No-Fault: A Defense Lawyer's Views, 47
N.Y. ST. B.J. 185 (1975); O'Connell, supra note 29, at 778, 785-86;
O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical
Treatment: A Proposalfor Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975);
Roth & Rosenthal, Non-Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation
Systems, in HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 450 app.;
Rubsamen, supra note 215; Comment, Extension of Enterprise Liability,
supra note 221, at 424-430; Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability
for Medical Maloccurrences,supra note 37.
Because a system of no-fault compensation for medical accidents

would probably provide compensation to a larger number of persons
than does the present system, it might be fairer, but also far more expensive. Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice

Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1192-94. The increased costs of a more
broadly based system of compensation might be offset, however, by
eliminating or restricting damages for pain and suffering, as has been
done with no-fault automobile insurance.

257. See generally S.

SmNELL, THE LAW IN MEDICAL PRACTICE

ch. 2 (1966);
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of bargaining power between the parties, arising from the doctor's
superior knowledge of medicine and from the patient's suffering.
Providing medical care is the means by which the doctor earns his
living, and the extent to which it is dispensed on a charitable basis
has substantially declined inrecent decades with the advent of private and governmental insurance. Medical care is increasingly
being provided by large, impersonal institutions nominally under
the direction of physicians, but actually under the direction of a
shared authority of doctors, hospital administrators,258 technicians,
and assorted other professionals and paraprofessionals.
Yet the doctor-patient relationship has an added, and probably
essential, dimension lacking in purely commercial relationships. No
matter how commercialized medicine may become, this dimension
will always remain, because the very subject matter of the doctorpatient relationship is the human body. Because of the irreplaceable, personal, and some would say sacred, 2 59 nature of this subject

matter, additional responsibilities are placed on the doctor which
neither the vendor of goods nor the provider of services is morally
or legally obligated to bear.
First of all, the doctor-patient relationship is one depending in
large part for its efficacy on the patient's trust in the doctor. 260
Although other professional relationships depend upon trust, rarely
does a lack of trust have the same far-reaching consequences for
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 A.B.
FouNDATIoN RESEARCH J. 87, 93-94.
258. See generally R. DuFr & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY
(1968); Field, The Doctor-PatientRelationship in the Perspective of
"Fee-for-Service" and "Third-Party" Medicine, in PATIENTS, PHYZSICANS, AND ILLNESS 222 (E.G. Jaco ed. 1972); Freidson, Client Control
and Medical Practice, in PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND ILLNESS, supra at
214; Georgopoulos & Mann, The Hospital As an Organization, in
PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND ILLNESS, supra at 304; Mechanic, Problems
in the Future Organization of Medical Practice, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROB. 233, 235-39 (1970).
259. See P. RAmSEY, supra note 68; Pope Pius XII, The Moral Limits of
Medical Research and Treatment, 44 ACTA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 779
(1952), reprinted in J. KATZ, supra note 68. The almost universal view
of the human body as sacred may explain in part why early medical
practice was often performed by priests. J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND
MEDICINE 3 (paper ed. 1960).
260. It is well recognized that much of the benefit of medical intervention
is attributable to what is referred to as the "placebo effect" of the doctor-patient relationship. In fact, "throughout much of the history of
medicine, until the 19th century, the placebo effect was the most a
physician was able to offer his patients. . . ." Benson & Epstein, The

Plecebo Effect-A Neglected Asset in the Care of Patients, 232
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relationship where the
doctor-patient
the client as it does in the 26
1
patient's life may be at stake.

Yet while the doctor-patient relationship is heavily dependent
upon trust, this dependence is not total. Because the patient, not
the doctor, must bear the consequences, both good and bad, of medithe patient's right to detercal treatment, it is in the first instance
262
mine what is to be done to his body.

Thus in evaluating the applicability of strict liability to medical
accidents, consideration must be given not only to the effect that
it might have on the realization of the goals of accident law, but
also to the effects strict liability is likely to have on these two other
factors unique to the doctor-patient relationship: trust and selfdetermination. These effects are speculative; nevertheless, an attempt at evaluation should not be forsaken.
1. "Defensive" Medicine. Ideally, medical decisions ought to be
made only on the basis of medical considerations (supplied by the
doctor) and personal value preferences (supplied by the patient).
However, it is often stated, and it is certainly logical to assume,
J.A.M.A. 1225 (1975). The trusting nature of the doctor-patient relationship is more than a matter of efficacy. It is also an ethical issue.
Guttentag, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, in ETHICAL
ISSUES

IN MEDICINE

208 et seq. (F. Torrey ed. 1968); P. RAMSEY, supra

note 68, at 1-58.
An excellent discussion of the doctor-patient relationship making
clear the necessity for trust between doctor and patient, and especially
of the doctor by the patient, may be found in Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, supra note 64, at 1535-51.
The erosion of the patient's trust in the physician is probably one
of the primary factors in the patient's decision to bring suit against the
doctor. 1 LOuiSELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, 11 5.03, 5.08; Frankel,
Medico-Legal Communication, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 193, 202 (1970). This
is especially plausible in light of the fact that relatively few iatrogenically injured patients bring suit against their doctors. In large part,
this is because the medical-accident victim often is not aware that his
condition has been worsened by the medical intervention. The conspiracy of silence by doctors who refuse to testify for plaintiffs in malpractice cases, see text accompanying notes 36-39 supra, extends to an
unwillingness to inform their own or other patients of iatrogenically
induced bad results. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at 33-39. See also
Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 37, at 73.
261. The criminal lawyer in a capital case occupies a position similar to
that of the physician, though of course relatively few doctor-patient
encounters entail even a remote possibility that death of the patient
will ensue.
262. Cf. Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975). See also text
accompanying note 66 supra.
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that doctors also have one eye on the risk of incurring legal liability for bad results,2 63 and therefore they tend to practice what is
termed "defensive" medicine 264-that is to perform procedures,
especially diagnostic ones, which are only marginally medically
indicated, but which from a juror's hindsight view may seem unreasonable to have omitted.
The imposition of liability on a no-fault basis may remove this
consideration from medical decisionmaking, or reduce its importance. Because liability will attach for bad results, whether negligently caused or not, the doctor will be freer to choose the most
medically sound course of treatment, and possibly encouraged to
choose a treatment which minimizes the possibility of bad results
of the statistical-risk variety. A more trusting doctor-patient relationship may then exist, in which the doctor views the patient less
adversarially, and the patient believes that the doctor is exercising
his best medical judgment.
2.

The Bias in Favor of Medical "Omissions." Another extrane-

ous consideration may be eliminated from the practice of medicine
if strict liability is imposed for nonnegligent omissions as well as
for nonnegligent commissions. As long as strict liability for medical accidents exists only as a consequence of the operation of the
263. Judicial recognition of this phenomenon has been used as a rationale
by some courts to limit the degree of disclosure required by the physi-

cian:

To adopt the minority rule of Canterbury would result in requiring every doctor to spend much unnecessary time in going
over with every patient every possible effect of any proposed
treatment. The doctor should not have to practice his profession with the knowledge that every consultation with every

patient with respect to future treatment contains a potential
lawsuit and his advice and suggestions must necessarily be
phrased with the possible defense of a lawsuit in mind.
Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 342, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581 (1975).
See also Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 909-10 (Miss. 1970).
264. "Defensive medicine consist[s] of medically unjustified care provided
by the physician for the purpose of reducing the possibility of a malpractice suit . . . ." Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A
Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuxE L.J. 939, 942. This study
concludes that "[t] he threat of malpractice suit does induce physicians
to overutilize the diagnostic tests and procedures in particular cases,
but . . . the practice is not extensive and probably not a contributing
factor to the rising costs of medical care." Id. at 964. But see Sagall,
Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right?, 10 TRIAL, July/Aug.,
1974, at 59, 60, suggesting that reports on the extent of the practice of
defensive medicine are exaggerated. Query whether the performance
of medical diagnostic procedures not justified by medical considerations is actionable, perhaps as a breach of contract, as negligence, or
as fraud by the doctor on the patient.
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informed-consent doctrine, liability for the failure to perform a
medical procedure will continue to be grounded in negligence, and
therefore will be less widespread than liability for bad results from
acts of commission. This asymmetry may create another nonmedical bias in the practice of medicine, though this time in favor of
the nonperformance of medical procedures in those situations where
the necessity for the procedure is unclear.
If, however, strict liability is applied to omissions as well as to
commissions (as suggested by the Helling concurring opinion), this
factor, which ought to be irrelevant in the practice of conscientious
medicine, will disappear. By not having to worry about the differential prospects of liability, the doctor may be more inclined to act
on the basis of medical judgment alone. To the extent that this
encourages doctors to speak more openly with patients about the
various options, this may enhance the opportunity for patient selfdetermination and for a trusting relationship.
3. Effect on Disclosure of Information. Strict liability for medical accidents firmly planted on considerations of justice and efficiency rather than flowing indirectly from the doctrine of informed
consent may create an incentive for doctors to withhold information
from patients. If doctors were to be held strictly liable for bad
results even if they had made adequate disclosure, the incentive
for disclosure would be lost and the possibilities for rational patient-decisionmaking undermined. However, if a cause of action for
the dignatary harm of inadequate disclosure 265 were to be recognized, this outcome might be mitigated. Furthermore, even if strict
liability is to be applied independently of the informed-consent docof material dangers as
trine, there still ought to be a duty to warn
266
there is in the law of products liability.
4. The Stigma of Liability. Strict liabihty, unlike negligence
liability, does not rest on a finding of wrongdoing (either moral
or legal) on the part of the defendant. By eliminating the stigma
that presently flows from a plaitiff's verdict, 2 67 physicians may
be less inclined to fight malpractice suits tooth-and-nail even when
268
their insurance carrier has recommended settlement of a claim.
In addition to reducing the administrative costs of a medical accident-victim-compensation system, liability strictly imposed for bad

265. See Goldstein, supra note 64. See also J. FLETCHER, supra note 259, at

60-64.
266. See note 211 supra.
267. 1 LOUISELL &WmLiAMS, supra note 3, 11.01, at 3-4; Project,supra note
264, at 951-52, 965.
268. Demy, Practice and Malpractice (One Doctor's Viewpoint), 1973 MEm.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 61, 67; O'Connell, supra note 29, at 756.
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results instead of for wrongdoing would no longer constitute an
indictment of the doctor's professional expertise, and therefore
might lead to a more trustful relationship with patients.
5. The Adequately Warned, Consenting, but Injured Patient.

As long as assumption of risk remains a defense to actions for strict
liability in tort, the patient who has been warned of the risks of
treatment and who consents to bear them will go uncompensated,
while the patient who suffers the same injury as a result of negligent medical practice will be able to obtain compensation. This
disparate outcome might lead to bitterness on the part of one class
of medical-accident victims, and could further undermine the trust
that patients place in doctors and in the law.
To the extent that this is true, the adverse effect on the doctorpatient relationship is bound to be less than it presently is from
the disparate treatment of victims of negligently caused injuries
and statistical-risk-caused injuries. Merely because strict liability
may not eliminate all unfairness is no reason to prevent it from
eliminating a large quantity of unfairness. The better solution is
not to abolish strict liability altogether, but to eliminate the defense
of assumption of risk, 26 9 possibly on the ground that an individual
269.

[Elven when a danger is fully known and comprehended
plaintiff is not barred from recovery simply because he
chooses deliberately to encounter it ....
He may be contributorily negligent if he does so under circumstances which make the choice unreasonable. But that is
because his encountering the risk is negligent and not because

it is voluntary.
2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, § 21.1, at 1165 & n.17. Applying this
rule would not always bar the plaintiff to whom adequate disclosure
has been made and who has consented to treatment from maintaining
an action in strict liability. Only in those cases where the decision to
undergo treatment could be viewed as "unreasonable" would the defense operate, thus reintroducing negligence principles into strict liability theory. See also note 210 supra.
Harper and James believe that assumption of risk is a vestige "of
laissez faire and its concommitant philosophy of individualism which
has passed its prime . . . [and] is likely to lose more ground as notions
of social insurance gain strength and techniques for effecting broad
distribution of enterprise liability are developed." 2 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 4, § 21.3, at 1174-75. Though advocating abolition of the
defense in general, they believe it should be retained where the plaintiff expressly agrees to assume the risk and where the defendant is
under no obligation to protect the plaintiff from the Irisk. See id. §
21.8, at 1191. This is not the case in the medical-accident context,
because the defendant is under a duty to use reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm even when disclosure of it is
made. Furthermore, any attempt to relieve the defendant of liability
by the plaintiff's express agreement may be void as against public
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should not be forced to make a choice between certain, present suffering from a potentially treatable condition, and foregoing compensation for possible future suffering from a statistical risk, in
order to exercise his right of self-determination.
On balance, it is difficult to discern the impact that strict liability would have on the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and
on the goal of encouraging rational decisionmaking by patients. But
strict liability probably would make the doctor no more wary of
the patient, and no more influenced by legal rather than by medical
considerations, than does negligence liability, nor would it seem to
make the patient any less trustful of the doctor. Strict liability
would only undercut the goals of the informed-consent doctrine if
the courts were to refuse to recognize a cause of action for injury
to dignity caused by inadequate disclosure of risks and other information about treatment.
The greatest threat posed by a system of strict liability for medical accidents, which does not depend upon the doctrine of informed
consent, is to the values promoted by informed consent. 270 In the
name of grounding compensation for medical accidents on a more
equitable foundation than negligence theory may be able to provide,
the ends served by informed consent may be first subtly, then dramatically subverted. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this
subversion would be the enunciation of a rule that the patient's consent is not valid unless he "understands" the information
that is disclosed, by whatever standard understanding is to be
gauged. If such a requirement were to be recognized, the old-style
paternalism that insisted that doctors make decisions for patients
because patients are not able to understand, would be replaced by
a neopaternalism which would deprive a patient of the right to
decide if he could not in fact understand.
policy where the plaintiff suffers from a disadvantage in bargaining
power. PRossER, supra note 2, § 68, at 442. In Professors Calabresi's

and Hirschoff's view, assumption of risk is "a kind of plaintiff's strict
liability." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1065 & passim.
This view embodies the judgment that the plaintiff is in a better position than the defendant to determine which party is able to avoid an
accident at the least expense. In other words, assumption of risk
reflects, at its essence, the determination that the accident victim was
better able to compare the risks and benefits of the accident-causing

activity than was the injurer, and therefore ought to bear the costs of
the accident.

Ultimately, the applicability vel non of assumption of risk in strict
liability cases, as elsewhere, is a matter of policy, see PROSSER, supra
note 2, § 68, at 454-57, and cannot be settled by the application of
mechanical rules.
270. See note 68 supra.

INFORMED CONSENT
The often complementary but sometimes competing goals served
by the informed-consent doctrine and by strict liability are each
important in themselves. Neither should be sacrificed to the attainment of the other. It would be ironic if the informed-consent doctrine, which spawned strict liability for medical accidents, were to
contain the seeds of its own destruction, and equally tragic if in
the pursuit of the humane urge to compensate medical-accident victims without regard to medical negligence, courts were to take
measures that would spell the death of the doctor's duty to disclose
and the patient's right to chart his own course.
VII. CONCLUSION
The persistent efforts of lawyers and judges have shaken the
very foundation of the system of compensating medical-accident
victims based on negligence. Although there has been an outright
2 71
rejection of strict liability for medical accidents by some courts,
and despite the black-letter law that a doctor is not an "insurer"
27 3
of the care he provides,

272

there has been a slow, surreptitious,

271. See note 221 supra. No case, however, has explicitly sought to apply
a theory of strict liability for bad results in the absence of a blood
transfusion, drug, or medical device.
272. Prosser, supra note 2, § 32, at 162. But see Markham, The Doctrine of
Informed Consent-Fact or Fiction?, 10 FoRum 1073, 1076-77 (1975)
("The terrible injustice of the rule [in Canterbury v. Spence, requiring
disclosure of a 1% risk of paraplegia in connection with a laminectomy] is that it makes .

.

. the physician an insurer of a successful

medical outcome."). In this regard, strict liability must be distinguished from absolute liability. The adoption of strict liability for injuries resulting from defective products does not make the manufacturer or seller an insurer of the user's safety. Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 ll. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965); Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Servs., 45 N.J. 434, 452, 212 A.2d 769, 779
(1965); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
Strict liability has never meant that the party held strictly liable is to be a general insurer for the victim no matter how or
where the victim comes to grief. General insurance was not
the rule in classical instances of strict liability, such as ultrahazardous activities, or in legislatively mandated instances,
such as workmen's compensation, and it is not the rule in the
recent instances of application such as products liability.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1056. Similarly, a physician,
under strict-liability principles, is liable only for injuries to the patient
caused by his medical conduct, and not for injuries traceable to the
underlying illness or injury for which the patient sought treatment.
See pp. 56-57 supra.
273. "Although Harper and James applaud this trend of accident law toward more compensation, others have bitterly resented it. To them,
it was not only distorting the law of torts but doing it surreptitiously,
without fairly facing the issues." J. O'CoNmrL, supra note 7, at 66

152

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 1 (1977)

but perceptible advance toward strict liability for medical accidents.
The initial impetus, procedural in appearance, but substantive at
its core, has come from a liberalized application of res ipsa loquitur.
Another has been the development of an entirely distinct basis for
liability-the doctrine of informed consent. Recently the citadel
of negligence has been breached head-on, though in a concurring
opinion, by the Supreme Court of Washington in Heling v. Carey.
But still the citadel stands, its ultimate collapse foreseeable,
probably inevitable, yet distant. In the meantime, the inequities
and deficiencies persist. We can improve little on Prosser's obserassault upon
vation made in a similar context some time ago: "The
2 4
the citadel ... is proceeding in these days apace.1 7

(citing Cooperrider, Book Review, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1958)). A
government report reaches a similar conclusion within the specific
context of medical accidents:
The Commission FINDS that some courts have applied certain legal doctrines for the purposes of creating or relieving
the liability of health professionals. The Commission further
FINDS that such special doctrines, or the application thereof,
are no longer justified.
The Commission RECOMMENDS that legal doctrines relating to the liability of health professionals should be applied
in the same manner as they are applied to all classes of defendants, whether they be favorable or unfavorable to health
professionals.
HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 4, at 31.
274. Prosser, supra note 27, at 1099.

